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ABSTRACT

BRITISH ROMANTICISM AND COMPOSITION THEORY:
THE TRADITIONS AND VALUE OF ROMANTIC RHETORIC
by
Sherrie L. Gradin
University of New Hampshire, September, 1990

My study examines, through the philosophies and
writings of the British Romantic poets, particularly those
of Wordsworth and Coleridge, their beliefs about education,
their theories on composing, and their interaction with the
political and social climate as they relate to current
expressivist rhetorical theories and pedagogies.

I explore

the ways in which Romantic assumptions surface in subsequent
philosophers, educators, and rhetoricians such as Matthew
Arnold, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey, and more recently,
Ann Berthoff, Donald Murray, and Peter Elbow.

I argue that

like the Romantics, current expressivists are interested in
cultivating an imaginative intellect in their writing
students.
The dissertation makes a case for expressivist
rhetoric, arguing that it is valuable and should not be
ignored or forgotten in light of new social theories of
rhetoric.

Recently, Romantic rhetorical theories have come
viii

under sharp attack for, among other things, perpetuating the
myth of the "inspired writer, and for ignoring the fact that
individuals are socially constructed and that the writing
situation involves the dialectical interaction among writer,
community, and social, political, and economic conditions.
Although some of these attacks are valid, I argue that the
problems critics have identified lie not with the theories
themselves, but with the short-sighted application of these
rich and complex Romantic theories.

I look back, for

instance, to the Romantic poets' philosophies of the self in
order to show expressivists that the tradition from which
they evolved recognized that the individual was not isolated
from its culture.

I also argue, however, that the recent

denigration of the expressivist theories of composition is
often based on misconceptions of Romantic theory and
practice as well as an incomplete knowledge of the tradition
from which they arise.
I argue that expressivist rhetorical theories are also
valuable because they align themselves with feminist theory
and pedagogy and offer a way of teaching writing that is
especially useful for women.

Finally, I examine the

usefulness of expressivist theories for the cross-cultural
classroom, and point out ways in which these theories are
valuable and ways in which they are problematic for ethnic
minority students.

INTRODUCTION

Composition theorists acknowledge that there is
more than one rhetorical theory underlying our pedagogical
practice.

Currently there are at least three dominant

categories into which rhetorical theory falls: cognitive,
social-constructivist, and Romantic or expressivist
theories.

My interest lies in the theory, or set of

theories, that have arisen from the traditions of
Romanticism, specifically British Romanticism— the rhetoric
that Richard Young has called "new romanticism," James
Berlin "expressionistic," and Lester Faigley "expressivist.
Recently, these Romantic theories of rhetoric have come
under sharp attack.

Although some of these attacks are

valid, I believe that the problems critics have identified
lie not with the theory itself, but with the short-sighted
application of this very rich and complex theory.

I also

believe, however, that the recent denigration of the
Romantic theories of composition is often based on
misconceptions of Romantic theory and practice as well as
incomplete knowledge of the tradition from which they arise
In 1978, Richard Young, while discussing the "currenttraditionalist" paradigm that was firmly entrenched through
the early 1980's, suggests that as new research in the
discipline began to change the complexion of that paradigm
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two ultimately incompatible theories emerged from within it
("Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in Rhetorical
Invention").

He claims that our discipline was in crisis

because the incongruity cannot be resolved: one theory
emphasizes the composed product, and the other focuses on
the composing process.

The theoretical stance stressing the

product also privileges "the analysis of discourse into
words, sentences, and paragraphs; the classification of
discourse into description, narration, exposition, and
argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling,
punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis);
the preoccupation with the informal essay and the research
paper; and so on" ("Paradigms" 31).
opposing stance

the "vitalist."

Young calls the
Its assumptions are

"inherited from the Romantics"; it recognizes the composing
process as important, and stresses the "natural powers of
the mind and the uniqueness of the creative act" (31).

By

1980 Young is arguing that these positions are completely
incompatible, and to underscore their theoretical
differences, he labels one the "new classicism" and the
other the "new romanticism" ("Arts, Crafts, Gifts and
Knacks").
Since the early 1980#s, others have identified what
they believe to be various theoretical postures within the
field of rhetoric, relabeling and redefining them to fit
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their own understanding of these views.

James Berlin, for

example, identifies three current theories of rhetoric at
work: "objective," "subjective," and "transactional"
(Rhetoric and Reality).

The objective theories are those

which posit that reality is located in an empirically
determined material world, and the writer's object is to
relay that world as accurately as possible.

Within this

category Berlin includes current-traditional rhetorics, as
well as behaviorist, semanticist, and linguistic rhetorics
(x).

Subjective theories, according to Berlin, find truth

within the individual or within a context that is available
only through the individual's internal perspective— "reality
is a personal and private construct" (143).

He suggests

that the roots of subjective theories, at least in America,
are found in Platonic idealism as modified by Emerson and
Thoreau and that these various rhetorics are commonly called
"expressionistic."

His final category, that of

transactional theories, is based on an epistemology that
"sees truth as arising out of the interaction of the
elements of the rhetorical situation: an interaction of
subject and object or of subject and audience or even of all
the elements— subject, object, audience, and language—
operating simultaneously" (15).
In "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class," Berlin
updates the ideas he expressed in

Rhetoric and Reality.

He
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identifies three major theories of current rhetoric:
cognitive rhetoric, expressionistic rhetoric, and socialepistemic rhetoric.

He cites Linda Flower and John Hayes as

the best- known proponents of cognitive rhetoric.

He

summarizes their stance as one in which "the most important
features of composing are those which can be analyzed into
discrete units and expressed in linear, hierarchical terms,
however unpredictably recursive these terms may be.

The

mind is regarded as a set of structures that performs in a
rational manner, adjusting and reordering functions in the
service of the goals of the individual" (482).
According to Berlin, expressionistic rhetoric developed
during the first two decades of the twentieth century; it is
a "descendant of Rousseau on the one hand and of the
romantic recoil from the urban horrors created by
nineteenth-century capitalism on the other" (484).

He finds

it closely tied to theories of psychology that argue for the
inherent goodness of the individual.

In fact, the existence

of this rhetoric is "located within the individual subject
. . . . [Writing] is an art, a creative act in which the
process— the discovery of the true self— is as important as
the product— the self discovered and expressed" (484).

The

names that Berlin associates with expressionistic rhetoric
are Ken Macrorie, Walker Gibson, William Coles, Donald
Murray, and Peter Elbow.
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The third rhetoric, social-epistemic, and the one that
Berlin favors, is distinguished by a belief that the "real
is located in a relationship that involves the dialectical
interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social
group) in which the observer is functioning, and the
material conditions of existence" (486).

He argues that the

individual is not a private self, as the expressionists
might say, but that the self is a "social construct."
"There is no universal, eternal, and authentic self that
beneath all appearances is at one with all other selves. The
self is always a creation of a particular historical and
cultural moment" (487).

The greatest advantage that Berlin

sees in social-epistemic rhetoric is that it views knowledge
as an "arena of ideological conflict: there are no arguments
from transcendent truth since all arguments arise in
ideology.

It thus inevitably supports economic, social,

political, and cultural democracy" (487).

Rhetoricians that

Berlin cites as advocates of the social-epistemic or social
constructivist rhetoric include Richard Ohmann, Kenneth
Bruffee, Lester Faigley, David Bartholomae, Patricia
Bizzell, and Karen Burke LeFevre.
Lester Faigley, narrowing his discussion to that part
of the rhetorical triad which focuses on composing, suggests
that "current-traditional" rhetorics are out of favor and
that the two major competitive perspectives on composing

6

come from within the process movement of rhetoric.

Relying

on Berlin's discussions of the present rhetorical scene,
Faigley similarly identifies these two outlooks on composing
as a "cognitive view" and an "expressive view" ("Competing
Theories of Process").

He also acknowledges the emergence

of a social view which is akin to Berlin's definition of a
social-epistemic rhetoric.
Faigley traces cognitive theory to the American
movement in cognitive psychology.

He places cognitive

compositionist theories, like those of Flower and Hayes,
within a cognitive research tradition which has helped
"promote a 'science consciousness' among writing teachers"
(534).

The expressivist theory he sets within the tradition

of British Romanticism, since it views good writing as
having "integrity, spontaneity and originality— the same
qualities M.H. Abrams uses to define 'expressive' poetry in
The Mirror and the Lamp" (529).

He terms the rhetoricians

in this camp— such well known names as D. Gordon Rohman,
Albert Wlecke, Peter Elbow, Donald Murray, and Donald
Stewart— as "authentic voice" proponents.

Finally, Faigley

suggests that the third view of rhetoric, the social view,
is less codified than the cognitive and expressive because
it does not arise from a single tradition.

Rather, he says,

"it arises from several disciplinary traditions.

Because of

this diversity a comprehensive social view cannot be
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extrapolated from a collection of positions in the same way
I have described the expressive and cognitive views of
composing" (534-35).

He presents an understanding of a

social rhetoric much like that of Berlin's.

Faigley

describes the social view as resting on one central
assumption: "human language (including writing) can be
understood only from the perspective of a society rather
than a single individual" (535).

In a nutshell, the social

view of rhetoric rejects the idea that writing is an
activity that springs from an individual, private construct.
Instead, it posits that the "individual is a constituent of
a culture" (535).
As I have stated, my interest in these discussions of
current rhetorical theory and pedagogy lies in those
rhetorical theories that have arisen from the traditions of
Romanticism.

I will offer a rereading of Romanticism for

composition scholars, thereby correcting some of the
inaccurate myths that surround Romantic ideas and which play
a part in the reaction against expressivist rhetorics.
Moreover, I wish to enrich expressivist theories and
pedagogies and open them up to new possibilities by offering
a fuller understanding of the Romantic heritage from which
they evolve. Finally, I wish to caution teachers and
scholars against squelching or neglecting the many valuable
aspects of these rhetorics as we enter a new phase of
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research and pedagogical theory based on social
constructivism.
Perhaps an analogy will help to justify my concern for
their neglect: as the classical theories of rhetoric were
challenged by expressive theories, the former were abruptly
dismissed by hasty critics as wrong-headed.

When

several

brave souls attempted to make a case for the usefulness of
classical theory for current-day pedagogy, they were
vehemently discounted.

However, through the continuing

efforts of scholars such as C. Jan Swearengin, Edward P.J.
Corbett, Robert J. Connors, S. Michael Ha11oran, and Andrea
Lunsford, we have begun to reacknowledge the usefulness of
classical rhetoric.
With the new and promising move toward social theories
of rhetoric, the discipline is once again shifting its
theoretical view, and history appears to be repeating
itself: this time it is the contributions of the Romantic
rhetoric that are being neglected or too quickly dismissed.
The classical approach to rhetorical theory and pedagogy,
for instance, considers the Romantic view unsuitable for
composition pedagogy because it is premised on the Romantic
assumption that successful writing is a mysterious process
or act of genius.

Classical critics believe that proponents

of Romantic pedagogies assume that students improve their
writing through subjective means— through "inspiration” or
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"self-discovery."

This inner and individual focus, they

claim, comes at the expense of intellectual rigor.

Along

similar lines, theorists of various persuasions have accused
Romantic rhetorics of anti-intellectualism, and of thus
making a poor theory on which to build a pedagogy.

The

social constructivists find Romantic approaches to the
teaching of writing deficient because they seem to focus on
the individual as opposed to the relationships among the
writer, the community, and the social, political and
economic conditions of existence.

The result, they charge,

may be an individual "empowered" but unaware of economic,
political, and social issues (Berlin).

A Romantic rhetoric

and pedagogy, they believe, results in isolated, fragmented,
politically ineffectual students and citizens.
Some of these criticisms have merit, but others are
based on incomplete definitions and faulty conceptions of
Romantic theories of rhetoric and the tradition from which
they arise.

It is important, I believe, to recover a more

accurate understanding of expressivism's roots in British
Romanticism, not only to better understand the value of
Romantic rhetoric and to correct the misconceptions
surrounding it, but to adjust expressivist pedagogies when
they fall short.

Thus, I will examine, through the

philosophies and writings of the British Romantic poets,
particularly those of Wordsworth and Coleridge, their
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beliefs about education, their theories on composing, and
their interaction with the political and social climate as
they relate to a theory of rhetoric; and, I will explore the
rich and varied influence of their work on subsequent
educators and rhetoricians such as Matthew Arnold, J.S.
Mill, and John Dewey, and more recently, Berthoff, Murray,
and Elbow.

CHAPTER I

REFLECTING ON EDUCATION: THE VIEWS OF
WORDSWORTH AND COLERIDGE

Modernists have often asserted that Romanticism died
over a century ago, or that it is an unworthy subject, or
both.

The term has become equated with anti-rationalism,

emotionalism, liberalism, and naive idealism.

Yet, to the

field of composition and to others interested in rhetorical
and pedagogical theory, Romanticism is not a thing of the
past.

We can open books or periodicals and quickly realize

that Romanticism and its rhetorical counterpart,
expressivism, is considered a liability, a mistake, or
occasionally, as I ultimately argue,
honored and kept alive.1

something to be

Composition and educational

philosophers like Mark Waldo, James Kinneavy, and John M.
Willinsky, for instance, have recently discussed the
importance of Romanticism to theories of rhetoric,
discourse, and educational curricula.

Waldo's 1982

dissertation has gone a long way toward placing Wordsworth
and Coleridge, and their influence on current composition
theories, in perspective.2

And Willinsky, in an article on
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current curricula, has suggested that Romanticism, and
especially the work of Wordsworth and Coleridge, initiated a
much needed revolution in educational thought— one that is
still felt today.3

Kinneavy, in his important book on

theories of discourse, notes that Wordsworth and Coleridge's
theories on education and composing arise as a "reassertion
of the importance of the individual, of subjectivity, of
personal value in an academic, cultural, and social
environment which tended to ignore the personal and the
subjective" (A Theory of Discourse 396).

These scholars,

then, have begun to identify what is revolutionary in the
Romantics' thoughts on education: their reaction to a system
that suppressed the individual's emotions, experience, and
imagination.
During the late eighteenth century and through the
nineteenth, most educators continued to uphold a
longstanding belief that

knowledge is best gained through

the analytical study of books, mechanical exercises, and
rote memorization.

The educational policies they followed

made learning a chore, something to dread.

As James

Fotheringham explains in his book on Wordsworth's The
Prelude as a study of education, "the older educationists
had made everything, or most things, hard, distasteful.
They even seemed to act on the principle that the
educational value of things in a course of training turned
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on their hardness, their unpleasantness" (35).

There was

simply no tolerance for those facets of education that
Wordsworth and Coleridge spent much of their lifetime
arguing for.

Instead, the curriculum in English schools was

strictly based on classical literature and languages and
consisted of memorizing passages of literature.

A student

in the fifth or sixth form, for instance, would spend a
great deal of time memorizing passages from Homer, Virgil,
and Horace.

What time was not spent on memorizing and

reciting was spent at writing Latin verses and composing
"themes" in Latin.4

The theory underlying the instructional

practices of reading and recitation garnered further support
from the psychological theory of associationism put forth by
Locke and Hartley.

This view saw the mind as a kind of

machine "in which were associated atomic particles of
meaning" (Wardle 82), and worked on the assumption that if
the simplest possible "elements" were stored in the mind,
the teacher could impart his subject material in such a way
that elements were associated together in useful
connections,

if one element were recalled, the others would

be "drawn from the mind after the manner of a string of
sausages" (Wardle 82).
This approach to pedagogy was not completely without
value.

It relied on thorough preparation, and the material

given was carefully analyzed.

It also took into account the
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importance of experience and a developmental approach to
learning.

On the negative side, however, it represented

much that Wordsworth and Coleridge found at fault in
educational practices.

Pupils, for example, became passive

recipients of material given by the teachers. Most student
participation was merely recapitulation and the student did
not participate in any active search for meaning or
knowledge.
Because of such practices, the early nineteenth century
heard much discussion of education; "treatises on the
subject were a fashion, and many new and plausible schemes
of human culture were being zealously advocated as a part of
the passion of the time for human improvement" (Fotheringham
14).

The educational philosophies of Jean Jacques Rousseau

were being tested in various forms.

Perhaps Rousseau's

greatest contribution led to the first wide-spread
consideration that human growth and education occur in
developmental stages; he demanded that the child be valued
as a child, not as a diminutive adult.

Also, he disagreed

strongly with the prevailing assumption that, because of
Original Sin, children were predisposed toward evil— if left
to their own, children would simply fall the way of crime
(Coveny 42). It had been the part of education to redeem
these children, usually through strict discipline; thus, the
well-practiced adage: "spare the rod and spoil the child."
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Rousseau viewed the child not as a passive receptor of
external experience, but as an active soul, virtuous from
birth.

This active soul and virtuous self, according to

Rousseau, needed to be carefully developed and nurtured
slowly "towards the necessities of social existence" (Coveny
42) .5
While Coleridge's thoughts on education are scattered
throughout his notebooks, lectures, letters, and marginalia,
Wordsworth's are nicely drawn together in The Prelude.

An

account of the development of the poet's own philosophical
and poetic mind,

The Prelude is, among other things, a

treatise on education.

In fact, in its original design it

was conceived as a work explicitly about education (Chandler
95) and we can find in it Wordsworth's statement of a plan
for national education of the masses that "marks him as a
pioneer poet among those men of letters who appreciated the
need of universal education" (Babenroth 360).
The Prelude follows the course of the poet's life,
selecting the events and experiences which had significant
influence in shaping his mind, personality, moral beliefs,
and intellectual powers.

In its completed form, the poem

stands as an examination and condemnation of what Wordsworth
felt was a misguided schooling.

The Prelude includes not

only a denunciation of the state's negligent and inept
educational practices, but also of the many home education
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systems that had arisen in attempts to replace the formal
systems both Wordsworth and Coleridge found so offensive
(Babenroth 217).
Although Wordsworth was not specifically a follower of
Rousseau, and there is little evidence that he seriously
studied Rousseau's theories (Fotheringham 53), it is
difficult to read The Prelude as a treatise on education
without recognizing that Rousseau had helped set the stage
for those educational philosophies that Willinsky has
identified as revolutionary. Like Rousseau, Wordsworth spoke
out against forcing children into premature adulthood; he
believed the child should experience childhood and a slow
and natural growth into the adult world.

He also denounced

the belief that children were evil, believing instead in
their natural goodness and innocence.

Like Rousseau, he

recognized the importance of childhood, and respected it as
necessary for proper psychological and educational growth.
Against this background, then, Wordsworth proposed his
own educational theories in opposition to those that kept
children from reaching what the Romantics believed to be the
most encompassing intellect.

To reach this higher form of

intellect, according to Wordsworth and Coleridge, children
must not be denied their childhood; they must exercise the
imaginative and creative imagination in conjunction with a
more traditional approach of mechanical exercise,
memorization, and analytical reasoning.
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In much of his poetry Wordsworth proclaims, in what
might seem an extremely radical stance to his readers, that
the child will benefit from the wisdom and education
fostered outside the schoolroom walls.

In "The Tables

Turned," for instance, Wordsworth counsels leaving study and
books to come into the woods where the real learning will
take place:
Books! 'tis a dull and endless strife:
Come, hear the woodland linnet,
How sweet his music! on my life,
There's more of wisdom in it. . .
One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach you more of man,
Of moral evil and of good,
Than all the sages can.
This extreme stance is more easily understood, however, when
set

against much of what was passing as education inside

the school walls— systems based solely on recitation and
memorization of facts.
written

Charles Dickens' Hard Times, though

much later in the century, serves to help illuminate

the kind

of schooling Wordsworth and Coleridge were reacting

against.

Although Hard Times paints a satirical and

fictional portrait of that "hard and distasteful" education,
it is nonetheless based in reality:
"Now what I want is Facts. Teach these boys
and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone
are wanted in life. Plant nothing else,
and root out everything else . . .". The
speaker, and the schoolmaster, and the
third grown person present, all backed a
little, and swept with their eyes the
inclined plane of little vessels then and
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there arranged in order. . .Mr. Gradgrind.
. . seemed a galvanizing apparatus; . . .
charged with a grim, mechanical substitute
for the tender young imaginations that were
to be stormed away . . . . (47-48)
Dickens' language, "inclined plane," "vessels," "galvanizing
apparatus," underscores the mechanical and lifeless,
noncreative, passive and non-imaginative education that
takes place in Mr. Gradgrind's school.

This educational

system "storms" the imagination away, so that when Gradgrind
demands of young Bitzer, "Your definition of a horse," the
young student's answer is cold, calculated fact.

He sees

the horse in its parts, but not as a whole:
Quadruped. Graminivorous.
Forty teeth, namely
twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve
incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy
countries sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but
requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by
marks in mouth." Thus (and much more) Bitzer.
(50)
Dickens' fictional account of these miseducated
students is similar to that of real students that Wordsworth
portrays in The Prelude.

The result of the commonplace

schooling is a child "Full early trained to worship
seemliness."

Like Bitzer in Hard Times, this student mimics

the attitudes and inclinations of adults, thereby becoming
the "diminutive adult" which Rousseau condemned as
inappropriate and harmful.

Wordsworth's wrongly educated

student of The Prelude is lacking anything emotive, is
purely rational and can "read" his way through all the
subjects:
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he can read
The insides of the earth, and spell the stars;
He knows the policies of foreign lands;
Can string you names of districts, cities, towns,
the whole world over, tight as beads of dew
Upon a gossamer thread; he sifts, he weighs;
All things are put to question[.] (The Prelude V
317-23).®
The problem for students trained in this manner, according
to a Wordsworthian educational scheme, is that their
intellectual abilities rely solely on memorization,
analysis, and recapitulation (Waldo PWC 52).

In other

words, if the child is not allowed to know what "Nature
teaches" and is kept confined to a curriculum that excludes
creative and imaginative life experiences, including those
beyond the schoolroom walls, then school becomes a prison
and the student a prisoner assigned to death row.

As

Wordsworth writes in The Prelude:
In lieu of wandering, as we did, through vales
Rich with indigenous produce, open ground
Of fancy, happy pastures ranged at will,
We had been followed, hourly watched, and noosed,
Each in his several melancholy walk
Stringed like a poor man's heifer at its feed,
Led through the lanes in forlorn servitude;
Or rather like a stalled ox debarred
From touch of growing grass, that may not taste
A flower till it have yielded up its sweets
A prelibation to the mower's scythe. (V 235-45)
In these lines, Wordsworth accuses the educational
philosophy of his day of having made students passive,
ineffective, and unable to reach their potential as
philosophical beings. In Wordsworthian educational theory
the potential for the intellect, or philosophical mind, will
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remain unfulfilled if the student only learns through books
and rote exercises, and if the imagination is not nurtured
through experience, perception, and interaction with nature.
The student of the passage above is deficient.

He may know

geography, politics, and science, but because he has merely
absorbed information, he lacks imagination, the essential
element for a fully developed intellect; like Dickens'
Bitzer he can analyze that information but not synthesize it
since synthesis takes an active imagination.

The closing

books (XII and XIII) of The Prelude strongly emphasize that
the method in knowledge and education should be constructive
and synthetic, not analytic (see Fotheringham).

In James

Fotheringham's summary of Wordsworth's thoughts,
the real apprehension of a thing is a
creative and not a mechanical process.
Taking things to bits, and regarding them
singly, we never know them. Taking them
coldly and through a medium of logical
process only, we never grasp them, and
cannot give them to other minds. We must
grasp them as living facts, in a whole that
itself lives for us. (37)
Wordsworth and Coleridge both warn that without a
curriculum that nurtures the creative mind and imagination,
students are "manufactured" full of factual knowledge but
empty of any thoughts or ideas of their own; they are apt to
have merely passive minds.

The poets felt schools denied

students the possibility for growth of the imagination and
thus the faculty of mind necessary for synthesis.
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Wordsworth sees the imagination as a power that shapes and
creates, not only by dissolving and separating unity into
number, but also by "consolidating numbers into unity" (1815
Preface 754).

The fully operational mind is one that

embraces both the passive principles of analysis and the
active principles of the creative imagination.

It perceives

in "wise passiveness" while at the same time imprints itself
on the world.

Coleridge speaks of two interlocking forms of

the imagination, the primary imagination and the secondary
imagination.

The primary imagination is "all of perception"

and is accessible to everyone.

The secondary imagination is

creative, and has the power to reconcile opposites:

"it

dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create . . .
to idealize and to unify" (Biographia Literaria 304).

It is

cultivated and put into action by conscious will, and works
upon material received by the primary imagination.

Again,

what is important to this immediate discussion is the
conjoining of two different operative principles: the
passive and active.

In his desire to reconcile these

opposites, Coleridge adopts the figure of the androgyne as a
controlling image throughout his prose writings.

He uses

this image because it allows him to underscore
metaphorically the importance of fusion between disparate
faculties.

A great mind reconciles the active and the

passive, and thus is androgynous in Coleridge's scheme:
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I have known strong minds with imposing,
undoubting, Cobbett-like manners, but I
have never met a great mind of this sort.
And of the former, they are at least as
often wrong as right. The truth is, a
great mind, must be androgynous. (Table
Talk September 1, 1832).
This "androgynous" or imaginative and synthetic mind is
similar to the mind that Paul Armstrong describes as
inventing "new ways of fitting things together by
recognizing and even creating new analogies, new patterns of
similarity and difference" (31).

The result of recognizing

and creating these new patterns of similarity and difference
is an ability to create new concepts— to form a point of
view.

In other words, the imagination is essential, along

with reasoning and analytical powers, to the growth of a
full intellect, a creative, synthesizing intellect.
A passage from the Biographia Literaria is helpful in
illuminating Coleridge's desire to have both passive and
active processes become an element in the educative mission
of fostering encompassing intellects.

Using the water

spider as an example, Coleridge describes the imagination in
terms of its two parts:
Most of my readers will have observed a small
water-insect on the surface of rivulets,
which throws a cinque-spotted shadow
fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny
bottom of the brook; and will have noticed,
how the little animal wins its way up
against the stream, by alternate pulses of
active and passive motion, now resisting
the current, and now yielding to it in
order to gather strength and a momentary
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fulcrum for further propulsion. This is no
unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience
in the act of thinking. There are
evidently two powers at work, which
relatively to each other are active and
passive; and this is not possible without
an intermediate faculty, which is at once
both active and passive.
(In philosophical
language, we must denominate this
intermediate faculty in all its degrees and
determinations, the IMAGINATION. . . ).
(BL 124)
Both Wordsworth and Coleridge, then, felt that if schools
neglect one of these powers, and traditionally the "active”
has been disregarded, then the imaginative mind will not
come to fruition.
Wordsworth's stance on education is one which calls for
"quitting" books and wandering about in nature.

We cannot

escape, however, the irony of Wordsworth's counseling to
stop reading while at the same time he is communicating his
theories to us through the written word.

This, of course,

seems to negate his dictum that we should give up books as
an educational pursuit,

what we must remember, however, is

that Wordsworth's relentless and apparently one-sided demand
for an education of nature is in some ways a rhetorical
ploy.

In other words, in poems like "Tables Turned,"

"Expostulation and Reply," and parts of The Prelude as well,
Wordsworth is carefully choosing and selecting those
experiences which made his education different from the
traditional one.

He employs a rhetorical strategy that

allows him to emphasize what he saw as the detrimental lack
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of imaginative schooling commonly practiced by most schools
of his day.

And as we shall see, Wordsworth did not

unconditionally condemn books and reading as a cursory study
of his works might suggest, but only in so far as they were
misused for educational purposes both in formal school
systems and in amateur systems at home.
In light of Wordsworth's supposed stance against books,
it is especially interesting to note that while at Hawkshead
he was considered rather bookish.

In 1885, the son of

Hawkshead Headmaster Thomas Bowman recalled things his
father had said about Wordsworth and reading:
My father used to say that he believed that
he did more for William Wordsworth by
lending him books than by his teaching,
though Wordsworth, mind you, did well
enough under him at both Classics and
Mathematics, so I understood. But it was
books he wanted, all sorts of books; Tours
and Travel, which my father was partial to,
and Histories and Biographies, which were
also favorites with him; and Poetry— that
goes without saying. . . A story he used to
tell about William Wordsworth is that he
left him in his study once for what he
thought would only be a minute or two,
telling him to be looking for another book
in place of one he brought back. . .he was
kept half and hour or more . . . .When he
got back, there was W. poring over a book,
so absorbed in it he did not notice my
father's return . . .And "what do you think
it was" my father would say . . . It was
Newton's "Optics". (As qtd. in T.W.
Thompson's Wordsworth's Hawkshead 343-44)
What, then, prompts Wordsworth to suggest that the reading
required by schools is damaging to the intellect?

In large
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part it was that the study of books was forced
indiscriminately on children.

Wordsworth read because he

was excited and yearned for knowledge.

Hawkshead made

books available to all of its students, not only through the
library proper, but through the Boy's Book Club which
Wordsworth promptly joined, and the Headmaster's personal
library.

In his earliest years of school, Wordsworth read

"all Fielding's works, Don Quixote, Gil Bias, and any part
of Swift that I liked;

Gulliver's Travels, and Tale of a

Tub, being much to my taste"(Gill 28).

What is strikingly

different for Wordsworth than for most school children of
his day, is that he was able to pursue his own interests as
well as those expected by the school.

"The importance of

any school," however, as Stephen Gill notes in his biography
of Wordsworth, "lies not so much in the formal curriculum or
even in the quality of the teaching as in the encouragement
it offers to a pupil's own interests and the possibilities
it opens up" (28).
Wordsworth's duration at Hawkshead also gave him the
time he believed necessary for children to spend at play,
released from directed study.

He was able to develop the

emotional and experiential components of his mind as well as
the intellectual by wandering in the countryside and seeing
firsthand the beauties of nature.

The custom of students

living in the villagers' homes rather than at the school
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gave Wordsworth

freedoms that other grammar students did

not enjoy (Waldo FWC 50).

Not only was he granted time for

play, but he was able to escape the problems of other
grammar schools where overcrowded conditions resulted in
boys sleeping two and three to a bed, a problem that
disrupted studies and health, thereby putting a damper on
any extracurricular activities, which Wordsworth believed
fostered "affections and human sympathies, and placed in the
context of the whole being the use of the intellect" (Waldo
FWC 50).7

From the time Wordsworth entered Hawkshead at age

nine, he lived with Dame Ann Tyson in her home, the most
consistent adult figure in his life from childhood through
young manhood (see Thompson).8
cherished her.

Wordsworth loved and

She captivated his imagination with tales

and real-life experiences from her days as a servant in
Scotland.

In fact, some of his narrative verses are a

poetic retelling of her tales (Thompson 65-69).
I do not intend to suggest that Wordsworth's education
at Hawkshead was all play and no work.
misleading and inaccurate.

That would be

The Hawkshead curriculum was

strenuous; the school was considered one of the best in
England. Every year several Hawkshead boys were sent to
Cambridge, many of whom became prize-winning Fellows.
Wordsworth was not only given a solid background in
mathematics and natural philosophy, but he was given a firm
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grounding in the Classics as well. This foundation, however,
was not built through tiresome exercises in verse
compositions in Greek and Latin and rote learning as it was
at most schools (Gill 27).

As Stephen Gill suggests,

Hawkshead's approach to learning must have worked with
Wordsworth, for he had a passionate love of Virgil, Ovid,
and Homer, all of which he read at school; he was affected
deeply by the beauty of Classical literature (27).

Gill

writes;
that he was able to delight in the poetry
as something more than an academic chore,
to feel in the 1790's the contemporaneity
of Juvenal, and to profit from the ideas of
Cicero and Seneca must be attributed to
early teaching of rare quality. (27)
The reading and study required of Wordsworth became a
pleasurable activity rather than a chore because he was
granted time for play as well as work.

His imagination was

stimulated by jaunts through the countryside, through the
stories of Dame Tyson, and the readings of his own choice.
He wasallowed the pursuit
active education.

of experience, emotion, and

He was not merely crammed full of facts—

not educated into a miniature adult.
So it was Wordsworth's academic studies and the
imaginative pursuits animated by what Wordsworth calls
"vital feeling" or the "vital soul" (Fotheringham 31) as
well that led him to promote so strongly the educational
philosophy that it is the emotive and imaginative faculties
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in conjunction with the intellectual and analytical that
make for a mature and encompassing intellect.9
soul" is crucial to Wordsworth.
perceives, creates, and feels.

The "vital

It is the self that
It is "the ground of all

real education, and the free expansion of the 'vital soul'
is the true end of education . . . There is no real and
right growth for the human mind without depth and cordiality
of feeling" (Fotheringham 31-33).

In fact, an inability to

develop the vital soul spells certain death for the
encompassing intellect.
Wordsworth's "Lucy" poems, though very complex and not
amenable to a single interpretation, might be read as
eulogies for the death of the vital soul.

In "A Slumber did

My Spirit Seal," for instance, if we understand Lucy to be
emblematic of the soul, the slumber that closes Lucy off
from the "touch of earthly years" also seals her off from
the "vital feelings of delight" ("Three Years She Grew"):
A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.
In the passive state of slumber, the vital soul is unable to
perceive, to feel, to create; thus, the mind is without onehalf of the equation needed to make it the all powerful
faculty of Wordsworth's philosophic mind.
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The vital soul is a natural element for children, and
unless it is educated out of them, it grants children
passionate feelings such as hate and love. According to
Wordsworth, the vital soul and all the passionate feelings
that are a part of it are necessary for a full education.
And with these come
Simplicity in habit, truth in speech,
Be these the daily strengtheners of their minds?
May books and Nature be their early joy!
And knowledge, rightly honored with that name—
Knowledge not purchased by the loss of power!
(The Prelude V 421-25)
Passions, books, and Nature are what shape these "real
children" who can grow physically, emotionally, and
intellectually (Waldo PNC 51).

It was Wordsworth's desire

in much of his poetry and prose to show how most educators
had gone astray, even damaged the intellect of their
students by barring them from emotion, experience, and
imagination.

If the analytical mind is severed from the

passions and the imaginative intellect, knowledge comes at
great cost— lost is the higher intellect, the powerful
intellect that melds both reason and imagination, what I
have been calling the "encompassing intellect."
The growth of the philosophic mind does not end in
childhood, but continues, forever in progression, until
death.

It is not surprising, then, that Wordsworth's

interest in the instruction of pupils does not end with
grammar school. Wordsworth's years at Cambridge served to
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reinforce what his Hawkshead schooling had taught him about
learning and the fostering of a complete intellect (see
Schneider).

His tenure at Cambridge spurred him to

articulate what he found wrong with the university system
and to continue arguing for his own ideal vision of the
university where the fertilization of the encompassing
intellect p r o c e e d e d . O n c e again, it is The Prelude that
lends most insight into Wordsworth's thoughts on higher
education and the growth of the mental faculties.
Although Wordsworth certainly did not find his time at
Cambridge a total loss, there was much he found lacking.

In

Book V of The Prelude he "condemned" (Schneider 39)
The guides and wardens of our faculties,
Sages who in their prescience would control
All accidents, and to the very road
Which they have fashioned would confine us down
Like engines[.]
(354-58)
Cambridge was such a place for Wordsworth. The system was
too controlling.

He comments directly on this:

I did not love,
Judging not ill perhaps, the timid course
Of our scholastic studies; could have wished
To see the river flow with ampler range
And freer pace[.] (Ill 496-500)
The result of this too tightly controlled educational system
was to leave Wordsworth divorced from his scholarly
activities: "many books / Were skimmed, devoured, or
studiously perused, / But with no settled plan.

I was

detached / Internally from academic cares" (VI 23-26).
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Schneider suggests that Wordsworth found Cambridge at
fault because it placed knowledge at risk:

this system

initiated and honored competitive strife while actively
discouraging within students a true desire to learn.
"Prizes, like carrots in front of donkeys noses, were set
before the undergraduates at strategic places all over the
educative landscape" (Schneider 25).

The students came to

value these prizes more than the "knowledge obtained in
gaining them" (Schneider 25).

Perhaps the most atrocious

outcome of this competitive system, in Wordsworth's view,
was its effect on the quality of teaching.

Under a routine

of competition for prizes, students were not obliged to
study unless they desired a prize, and thus tutors were not
obliged to teach them (Schneider 25).

Since the pursuits of

students were for prizes and not knowledge, professors
ceased to function as teachers.

Believing that the prizes

themselves were enough to stimulate learning, they
"contented themselves with putting the proper material
before them [students] in lectures, which were usually dull"
(Schneider 27).

The teaching was poor, the students

inappropriately inspired to prizes, not knowledge, not
learning for learning's sake.
Wordsworth would have none of this.

He did not compete

for prizes and consequently he took no honors at Cambridge.
Wordsworth cut his own educational path and continued to
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walk it until he took his B.A.

He read voraciously, but did

not give up the nurturing of his emotional and experiential
side for the narrowness of the Cambridge curriculum.

He

continued to enrich his vital soul through study,
imaginative pursuits, and his beloved nature:
Beside the pleasant Mill of Trompington
I laughed with Chaucer in the hawthorn shade;
Heard him,
while birds were warbling, tell his tales
Of amorous passion . . .
Sweet Spenser, moving through his clouded heaven
With the moon's beauty and the moon's soft pace,
(The Prelude III 278-84)
Wordsworth hoped for a system of higher education that
would foster learning for its own sake.

He longed for a

broader curriculum, one that would inspire students to an
active, imaginative, and life-long desire to learn.

In

contrast to the Cambridge he knew, Wordsworth imagined an
ideal university "whose studious aspect should have bent me
down / To instantaneous service; should at once / Have made
me pay to science and to arts / And to written lore" ([The
Prelude III 377-79] Schneider 40).

*

*

*

*

*

*

Wordsworth is speaking of Coleridge when he writes of a
friend raised in the city and denied the joys of the English
countryside.

Coleridge was not educated at Hawkshead where

Wordsworth found the luxury of expanding his imagination
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through interaction with nature.

Rather, Coleridge was

schooled at Christ's Hospital, a far more traditional
school, where he was tightly governed by the hand of the
Reverend James Boyer.

Yet despite the differences in their

upbringing, both men grew to hold many similar ideas and
philosophies, not only about politics, poetry, and theories
of the imagination, but about education as well.

One might

argue that Coleridge came to kindred conclusions with
Wordsworth about the part creative activity, reading, self
reflection, self-knowledge, emotion, perception, and the
imagination play in the growth of a full intellect, not only
through his own limited but memorable imaginative childhood
play, but through a vicarious sharing of the childhood of
his friend William Wordsworth— a man Coleridge considered to
have a truly great mind.
By the time Coleridge is raising and educating his own
children, he has come to hope for a more Wordsworthian
education for them then he had for himself (Waldo FWC 105).
In "Frost at Midnight" he gives thanks that his son Hartley
will not suffer the "cloisters dim":
My Babe so beautiful!
it thrills my heart
With tender gladness, thus to look at thee,
And think that thou shalt learn far other lore,
And in far other scenes! For I was reared
In the great city, pent 'mid cloisters dim,
And saw not lovely but the sky and stars.
But thou my babe! shalt wander like a breeze
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the clouds,
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores
And mountain crags:
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Read literally, Coleridge was certainly blessing Hartley's
opportunities to frolic amongst the pleasures of the natural
world. He sees in his son's interactions with nature a
chance to foster the "natural child," the passionate and
experiential component of learning that Wordsworth claims
such power for in his chronicle of the growth of the
philosophical mind.

It is no accident that these lines

about learning appear in a poem so directly about the
imagination: Coleridge means to draw attention to the
importance of the imagination in the education of children.
I would suggest that the "cloisters dim," which shut
Coleridge off from the world of nature, are more than city
dwellings.

Coleridge was not merely "pent" physically, but

mentally and imaginatively as well, and this Coleridge sees
as detrimental to education and learning.
Consider, for instance, that Coleridge's father
disallowed the reading of anything fanciful.

Before his

father put a stop to it, Coleridge, as a young boy, read
fairy tales and stories of adventure (Waldo FWC 98).

He

remembers these readings fondly, and as an adult makes an
argument for them in the shaping of the encompassing
intellect:
From my early reading of fairy tales and genii,
etc., etc., my mind had been habituated to the
Vast, and I never regarded my senses in any way as
the criteria of my belief.
I regulated all my
creeds by my conceptions, not by my sight, even at
that age. Should children be permitted to read
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romances, and relations of giants and magicians and
genii? I know all that has been said against it;
but X have formed my faith in the affirmative. I
know of no other way of giving the mind a love of
the Great and the Whole. (Letters Vol. I 16)
Like most children when left to their own imaginative
pursuits, Coleridge entered into the world of play and
fantasy where he would act out exciting adventures.
Coleridge's father was tyrannical in some ways, however, and
when he observed his son acting out the readings in
imaginative play, he burned the books (Waldo FMC 99).

This

was harsh discipline for the young Coleridge, and it
resulted in a dimming of imaginative light that is
metaphorically parallel to being "pent 'mid cloisters dim"
in the "great city."11
As Waldo Suggests, the "stern preceptor" remembered by
Coleridge in

"Frost at Midnight," while recalling his

father, probably refers more directly to James Boyer,
Coleridge's teacher at Christ's Hospital( FS/iC 105).

In the

Biographia Literaria, Coleridge writes ambivalently of Boyer
and his educative techniques.

Boyer followed the tradition

of the time in that his instruction consisted mostly of
memorization and drills.

Student prose compositions were

important only as grammatically correct products destined to
fit a pre-determined form.

They were to contain none of the

subjectivity, emotion, or imaginative pursuit that later
became a major tenet of Romantic theories on literature.

In
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fact, Boyer took great pains to keep the imagination of his
students in c h e ck.^

Coleridge recollects:

In our own English compositions (at least
for the last three years of our school
education) he showed no mercy to phrase,
metaphor, or image, unsupported by sound
sense, or where the same sense might have
been conveyed with equal force and dignity
in plainer words. Lute, harp, and lyre,
muse, muses and inspirations . . . were all
an abomination to him. In fancy I can
almost hear him now, exclaiming "Harp?
Harp? Lyre? Pen and ink, boy, you mean!
Muse, boy, Muse? your Nurses's daughter,
you mean!
Pierian spring? Oh! aye! The
cloister-pump, I suppose!" (BL I 9-10)
Coleridge, then, did not share with Wordsworth an
education that nurtured the imagination.

But as drastically

different from Wordsworth's as his education was, Coleridge
came to hold a similar educational philosophy, according to
which analytical practice and imaginative pursuits should be
yoked together in order to obtain optimum mental powers, and
he agreed with Wordsworth on how this educative goal can be
reached.

Coleridge joined ranks with Rousseau and

Wordsworth in his belief that children should not be
educated as though they were miniature adults.

Therefore,

Coleridge also agreed with Wordsworth that the pursuit of
knowledge takes place in progression, and that it is a great
error to cram young minds with facts that pass as knowledge.
Since the child is capable of appreciating only a few simple
relations, education should attempt to refine the sense of
relation and connections because, according to Coleridge,
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"the comparing power, the judgment, is not at that age
active, and ought not to be forcibly excited as is too
frequently and mistakenly done in modern systems of
education . .

(Walsh 19).

To force academic pursuits

and exercise, rote memorization, and factual information
upon young children is a grave mistake. In a powerful
analogy Coleridge wrote, "Touch a door a little ajar or half
open, and it will yield to the push of your finger.

Fire a

cannon-ball at it, and the door stirs not much: you make a
hole thro' it, the door is spoilt for ever, but not moved "
(Inquiring Spirit 81).
Coleridge would connect, I believe, the school system's
tendency to rely on rote memorization to "memoria technica,"
a process which he decries as "artificial memory" in the
Biographia Literaria.

Memoria technica is an ancient

technique of impressing places and images on the memory.
The problem that Coleridge had with this is that, because it
was solely passive, it neglected the role the will plays in
memory:
But the will itself by confining and
intensifying the attention may arbitrarily
give vividness and distinctness to any
object whatsoever; and from hence we may
deduce the uselessness if not the absurdity
of certain recent schemes which promise an
artificial memory, but which in reality can
only produce a confusion and debasement of
the fancy. (BL 127)
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It is the active participation of the will, as it relates to
the act of remembering, that rote memorization fails to
stimulate.
It is clear, then, that by education Coleridge meant
more than gaining expertise or memorizing little-known
facts; and he meant even more than the imaginative pursuits
afforded by readings of the fantastic.

Education also

includes moral growth— preparation of the mind to make the
best judgments for the good of society.

It takes both

aspects of education, moral and intellectual, to be truly
educated, which in Coleridge's terms meant having the
ability to see all things in fullness and relation to each
other.

As he wrote in the Biographia Literaria, "the

educated man chiefly seeks to discover and express those
connections of things, or those relative bearings of fact to
fact . . ." (53):
the intercourse of uneducated men, is
distinguished from the diction of their
superiors in knowledge and power by the
greater disjunction and separation in the
component parts of that, whatever it be,
which they wish to communicate. There is a
want to that prospectiveness of mind, that
surview, which enables a man to foresee the
whole of what he is to convey, appertaining
to one point; and by this means so to
subordinate and arrange the different parts
according to their relative importance, as
to convey it at once, and as an organised
whole. (EL II 58)
Ultimately this is Coleridge's definition of the
encompassing intellect.

As with Wordsworth, the mind is
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fully mature when it is synthetic and unified.

According to

Coleridge, the ability to nurture the young mind into the
unified intellect must include reflection, self-knowledge,
and consciousness, all which lead to the melding of
reasoning and imaginative powers necessary to the completely
educated mind.13

"Our intellectual life," he argued in a

lecture on Shakespeare, passes "not so much in acquiring new
facts, as in acquiring a distinct consciousness" (Coburn The
Self-Conscious Imagination 25).

Without a consciousness of

self the moral intellect is stunted, damaging not only the
individual, but society as well.

He felt the lack of it can

be harmful to others and often spoke to this issue.
Speaking of the conflicts in human societies Coleridge
asked, "Why is difference linked with hatred?"

His answer

was, from lack of consciousness of self (Self-Conscious
Imagination 32).
This consciousness is in turn linked to reflection and
self-knowledge.

Self-knowledge is the ability to commune

with the "very and permanent" self and it is a prerequisite
for any knowledge that is not cursory.

All knowledge,

Coleridge argues, is "not merely mechanical and like a
carpenter's rule, having its whole value in the immediate
outward use to which it is applied . . .all knowledge.

. .

that enlightens and liberalises, is a form and means of
self-knowledge, whether it be grammar, logical or classical"

40

(Letter to Gillman qtd. in Walsh 60).

Coleridge's self-

knowledge is much like Wordsworth's vital soul, and may be
attained through a method of thinking, feeling,
experiencing, imagining, and cultivating sensitivity. It
comes from a combination of inner and outer awareness.
Outer awareness is observation, and he calls inner awareness
the art of reflection.

Reflection is a mode of personal

experience; it is concrete and individual.

As William Walsh

points out, it is not to be confused with reverie, "a
lackadaisical, bemused sauntering in the company of a mere
sequence of notions and images" (58).

Rather, it is a very

difficult and active process calling on "energy and thought"
(Walsh 58).

According to Coleridge, "It requires no

ordinary skill and address to fix the attention of men on
the world within them, to induce them to study the processes
and superintend the works which they are themselves carrying
on in their own minds" (Aids to Reflection Introductory
Aphorisms).14

The educational philosophies with which both

Coleridge and Wordsworth disagree err by ignoring the
cultivation of a reflective self-knowledge.

Rather than

"educing" it from within, they try, says Coleridge, to
"shape convictions and deduce knowledge from without by an
exclusive observation of outward and sensible things" (Walsh
58).

This results in a mind able to distinguish between

aggregate parts but not a vitally whole mind capable of
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making connections.
Learning the art of reflection includes reflective
self-knowledge— examining one's own thoughts and actions—
but since we are shaped by language and the written word, it
also includes learning to actively analyze language and
question what we read:
Reflect on your thoughts, actions,
circumstances and— which will be of
especial aid to you in forming a habit of
reflection— accustom yourself to reflect on
the words you use, hear or read, their
truth, derivation and history. For if
words are not things, they are living
powers, by which things of most importance
to mankind are activated, combined and
humanised.
(Aids to Reflection Preface)15
"The first question," alleges Coleridge, "we should put to
ourselves when we have to read a passage that perplexes us
in a work of authority is: What does the writer mean by all
this?

And the second question should be, What does he

intend by all this?" (Walsh 61).

Coleridge suggests that as

readers we should consider each part of the text in relation
to the whole, what the author has written in relation to
ourselves, and the intention of the author.

Further, he

suggests that reflection, whether of ourselves or of a text,
can help lead to a refined sense of "distinction."

For

Coleridge, making distinctions, but seeing those
distinctions reunified within the whole, is the sign of the
truly educated mind.

A "distinct consciousness" leads to an

encompassing intellect.
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Through his own learning experiences, his vast reading
on the nature of knowledge, and his deep friendship with
William Wordsworth, Coleridge came to

believe that a

child's intellect must be strengthened through excitement,
imagination, nourishing support, reflection, a consciousness
of self, and time.

Education is an active process.

If we

approach education as "educing . . . the blossom . . . from
the bud" in a natural progression that begins with
respecting the capabilities of the young mind and the need
for creative activity, as opposed to the memorization and
regurgitation of factual information, the imaginative power
will come alive.

And as Walsh argues, it is the imagination

that leads to great intellectual deeds and the growth of a
society:
. . . In the imagination of man exist the
seeds of all moral and scientific
improvement; chemistry was first alchemy,
and out of astrology sprang astronomy.
In
the childhood of those sciences the
imagination opened a way, and furnished
materials, on which the ratiocinative
powers in a maturer stage operated with
success. The progressive being; and I
repeat that it ought to be carefully guided
and strengthened as the indispensable means
and instrument of continued amelioration
and refinement.
(23)
With an education that truly educes the "vital soul," as
Wordsworth calls it, "vital excellencies" in Coleridge's
terms, of imagination, passion, and reason, a deep-feeling
and moral intellect can be cultivated.

As a passage in a
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letter of 1801 from Coleridge to Poole underscores, "deep
thinking is attainable only by . . . deep feeling." 16
Coleridge, like Wordsworth, firmly believed that a
mechanized approach to education that did not take into
account the natural development of a child's mind and moral
being, or the importance of the vital excellencies, was
gravely damaging.

Echoing passages of Wordsworth's from The

Prelude, Coleridge condemns those educators who deny the
young mind its natural growth toward intellectual and moral
power.

Teachers are, he says,
instructed how to metamorphose children
into prodigies; . . . prodigies of selfconceit, shallowness, arrogance, and
infidelity. Instead of storing the memory,
during the period when the memory is the
predominant faculty, with facts for the
after exercise of the judgment, and instead
of awakening by the noblest models the fond
and unmixed love and admiration, which is
the natural and graceful temper of early
youth, these nurslings of improved pedagogy
are taught to dispute and deride, to
suspect all but their own and their
lecturer's wisdom, and to hold nothing
sacred from their contempt but their own
contemptible arrogance[;] (BL I 13)

Although Wordsworth believes cramming young minds with
intellectual miscellany when the faculty for memory is not
yet grown leads to a weakened intellectual capability,
Coleridge, at least in this passage, suggests that a certain
amount of memorization at an early age is fruitful.

Where

this "storing" of memory fails, though, is when facts are
passively received or when young students are taught to
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argue or dispute on the facts they have memorized, not
through their own ability to discriminate, but simply by
virtue of what they have been told.

The educational

philosophies practiced during the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, however, often treated students as
passive receivers of knowledge, and learning as an inactive,
non-imaginative process.

And further, according to

Coleridge, under the traditional system of schooling,
students of a young age have not cultivated the judgment
necessary to make any productive use of the "storing of
memory."

Forcing youth to "dispute" and "deride" rather

than "love" and "admire" short-circuits the natural
development of mind.

Consequently, as the passage above

suggests, when an education based on memorization is
misapplied students become mirrors of their instructors,
able to recapitulate what they have heard and read, but
unable to form a point of view of their own.

Although

Wordsworth and Coleridge might disagree on when memorization
should be employed, or even on how useful it is, both poets
envisioned a curriculum which allowed children to feel and
experience a full range of emotion and imaginative activity.
Learning was not to be forced through fear, humiliation, and
punishment, but educed through love.

Schooling should

excite the imagination through reading and life experience,
not the passive exercise of memorization and recapitulation.
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Students should learn to reflect, to question,

and to feel

deeply in order to think deeply.
Through their poetry, letters, and lectures, Wordsworth
and Coleridge offered educational alternatives which they
believed fostered the growth of a moral, unified, synthetic,
and encompassing intellect. They have had immense influence
in the years following the publication of their poetic works
and statements on politics and philosophy.

We often forget

that both Wordsworth and Coleridge had much of value to say
about education as well as the theory of poetics.

But if we

reexamine their works in this light, it becomes clear
the legacy they left has

that

had a profound impacton educators

of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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Endnotes

1 As Arthur O. Lovejoy has made clear (see "On the
Discrimination of Romanticisms"), it is a mistake to
assume that Romanticism is one unified concept.
Rather, there are many different ideas and several
distinct strains that are to be found under the rubric
of Romanticism.
For my purposes, I am using the term
"Romanticism" in a general sense as a descriptor of the
major tenets of thought that arose with the English
Romantic poets, i.e., Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, and
Shelley.
2 I am greatly indebted to Mark Waldo's
dissertation, The Rhetoric of Wordsworth and Coleridge:
Its Place in Current Composition Theory. I have taken
an approach similar to his and worked with many of the
same materials.
Although my first chapter covers much
of the same ground Waldo does, it will be used as
background information which will serve to launch me in
directions not taken by him.
3 Willinsky points out, among other things, that
what he calls the "New Literacy" is grounded in organic
metaphors, the questioning of authority, and an
acceptance of the "personal" voice in student work.
4 Occasionally, a school would have allowed other
subjects to creep into the curriculum, and geography
and algebra might be taught.
5 Two popular educational systems of concern to
Wordsworth and Coleridge that arose during this time
are attributed to Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster.
Although they were great rivals, their systems were
quite similar and the establishment of their respective
systems spoke to problems that had arisen within the
schools by the end of the eighteenth century.
Fundamental to both of them was the reliance on a
monitorial system, because the schools were so over
crowded that a teacher could not handle all of the
students. They instituted two of the first monitorial
systems in which certain number of older pupils were
selected as tutors and much of the instruction was
undertaken by them.
Despite many similarities, Bell and Lancaster
differed greatly in their approaches to punishment.
While Bell's system left punishment up to the judgment
of a student's peers, except in extreme cases, and
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preferred to focus on positive reinforcement through
praise, Lancaster's, to the contrary, focused on severe
punishments. These included hanging six-pound logs
about the necks of offenders; shackling their legs with
pieces of wood; tying frequent offenders together by
pieces of wood fastened around their necks; forcing
them to walk backwards; and hanging pupils in a sack
suspended from the roof for the amusement of other
students.
It was the issue of punishment that most
drew Wordsworth's and Coleridge's ardent support of
Bell, and Coleridge's continual rebuttals to Lancaster.
Coleridge was publicly verbal in his aspersions against
Lancaster and his praise for Bell. In his Lecture on
the New System of Education at Bristol in 1813, he
condemned Lancaster for mishandling discipline.
Coleridge dealt with other aspects of education in the
lecture, but emphasized, in contrast to Lancaster, the
need to teach children through love rather than fear
and humiliation.
Coleridge was also drawn to Bell's system because
the practice of the monitorial system was "a dynamic
principle" which would arouse the "whole individual"
into activity (BL II 60).
6 All citations from The Prelude will be the 1850
edition unless otherwise noted.
7 Stephen Gill in Wordsworth: A Life, and Mary
Moorman in William Wordsworth: A Biography: The Early
Years, as well as Waldo, offer useful accounts of
Wordsworth's education at Hawkshead. Moorman also
notes that Wordsworth was not the only poet to proffer
praises of the Hawkshead education. Charles Farish, a
fellow student of Wordsworth's published a poem
exalting the outdoor adventures of the Hawkshead
students entitled The Minstrels of Winandermere (26).
8 Ann Tyson granted Wordsworth enormous freedom.
Although she was a church-goer she never forced young
William to attend or study the doctrines of the church.
She allowed him to be himself and do as he pleased. He
took full advantage of the freedom he was granted, and
as early as age nine, when he first arrived in
Hawkshead, he wandered about the hills and fields until
long after nightfall.
9 Mark Waldo's dissertation also points out that
the crucial aspect of the educational philosophy
Wordsworth is promoting is based on the conjunction of

48

the imaginative and analytical.
10 Ben Ross Schneider Jr.'s book, Wordsworth's
Cambridge Education, presents a clear study of
Wordsworth's attitudes, and actions during his time at
Cambridge.
11 Scholars have speculated that the burning of
his cherished books caused psychological damage to
Coleridge which in turn manifested itself in an
inability to write without great mental anguish.
12 Waldo offers a useful discussion of Boyer's
effect on Coleridge.
13 Walsh and Waldo also note the importance of
reflection to Coleridge's theories.
14 See also

Walsh page

59.

15 See also

Walsh page 61.

16 Elsewhere Coleridge has said that the powerful
intellect is one that discovers: "to invent was
different from to discover— a watch maker invented a
time-piece, but a profound thinker only could discover"
(Collected Works of STC vol. V 583).

CHAPTER II

VITAL LINKS:

ROMANTIC THEMES IN THE EDUCATIONAL

THEORIES OF ARNOLD, MILL, AND DEWEY

In an article collected in The Web of Meaning, Janet
Emig speaks of the "tacit tradition" from which our work in
composition research arises, the implicit knowledge and
language shared by scholars and thinkers within our
discipline.

She notes that "certain kinds of knowing and

doing, summed, qualify as emblems of membership and
participation" ("The Tacit Tradition: The Inevitability of
Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Writing Research 147).

In

the case of expressivist rhetorics, "certain kinds of
knowing and doing" have been passed down to us, not only
through the writings of the Romantics, but by subsequent
educators and thinkers, not usually considered Romantics,
who have nonetheless shared some of the "root metaphors and
governing paradigms" of Romantic thought on education and
learning. As I will argue here, for example, Matthew Arnold
John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey can be seen as
representative philosophers of educational thought and
practice who have perpetuated Romantic teaching
philosophies.
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It is useful here to define "Romantic" for the purposes
of this project.

This was not the poets own self-

discriptor; the label was applied to them in later years by
English literary historians.
As a result, despite the many attempts to define
Romanticism in a coherent manner by such scholars as Irving
Babbitt, Cleanth Brooks, M.H. Abrams, Morse Peckman, Arthur
Lovejoy, and Rene Wellek, there is still not one agreed upon
definition for "Romantic."

Indeed, Arthur O. Lovejoy argues

in "On the Discriminations of Romanticisms," that
Romanticism is not one unified concept.

Rather, he sees

several distinct strains of Romanticism, which he identifies
by nationality— German, French, English.
have countered Lovejoy's argument.

Other scholars

Rene Wellek, for

instance, believes that the "major romantic movements form a
unity of theories, philosophies, and style, and that these,
in turn, form a coherent group of ideas each of which
implicates the other"
Literary History" 182).

(The Concept of Romanticism in
The debates surrounding the

defining of Romanticism have shown that it is unfortunately
quite easy either to define Romanticism so broadly that
everything falls under its purview,

or so narrowly as to

reduce it to an uninteresting technical matter.
I am using the terms "Romantic" and "Romanticism" as a
general descriptor of the major tenets of thought and action
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that arose with the English Romantic poets, especially
Wordsworth and Coleridge, including a reaction against the
rising urbanization and commercialization which eventually
led to the industrialization of England; in the name of
liberty, a reaction against a government and political
system which was oppressive to the majority of English
people while allowing the newly evolving industrialists to
prosper; a belief in the importance and almost holiness of
the natural world; a belief in the importance of the
individual self; a belief in the superiority of the
imagination over the merely analytical reason; and a theory
of poetics which stemmed from the belief that poetry should
take an organic form and that poetry is a reflection of the
poet's mind in action.

Thus, the process the poet undergoes

during composition and the poet's capacities of feeling,
creativity, spontaneity, and the imagination are given
prominence.

Finally, I am including in this definition the

poets' reaction against traditional schooling which I
discuss in the first chapter.
My task here is not to claim that Mill, Arnold, and
Dewey were Romantics in every aspect of the definition I
have set forth, which they certainly were not, nor is it to
do a full-scale study of Arnold, Mill, and Dewey and their
literary and educational theories.

Rather, my interest lies

in showing how these post-Romantics, to use Emig's
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terminology, share tacit Romantic assumptions, and how they
have carried forward certain aspects of Romantic educational
thought which form the shared language and knowledge of
current expressivist rhetoricians.

I am not necessarily

constructing a chronological history of ideas but am
attempting to show how the broad and pervasive influence of
Romanticism has extended into educational philosophies and
the teaching of writing in the twentieth century, and how
Romanticism arises in the most unlikely of places.

These

three men are cases in point.
My choice of Arnold, Mill, and Dewey for this study is,
of course, somewhat arbitrary, but there is

a rationale.

In part this choice is a result of the fact that there are
many similarities between the Romantics and these three
thinkers despite the differences among the three, and that
they all three read the Romantics and have written about
them.

Also, in addition to bearing the influence of

Romanticism, Mill, Arnold, and Dewey are widely published on
issues concerning education and they are three of the bestknown literati, philosophers, and educators of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Matthew Arnold is important to this study in that he is
a central transitional figure linking, as critics like Leon
Gottfried have argued, his era to our own, and his era to
the preceding Romantic era, which was in the last decade of
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its bloom when Arnold was born in 1822.

Arnold is also

perhaps the most influential man of letters during the
Victorian period.
J.S. Mill might seem a less logical choice, as the
great exponent of utilitarianism, which all the Romantics
despised.

His own estimation of the influence Coleridge and

Wordsworth held on his thought, and his recognition that it
was Wordsworth who finally enabled him to become "fully
educated," might alone be reason enough to include him.

But

of further interest is the fact that Arnold and Mill, though
contemporaries, are generally seen as representatives of
antithetical schools of thought.

Arnold is generally held

up as a more conservative and elitist spokesman for
"culture" as a means of bridging the classes, and Mill as a
liberal reformist with socialist tendencies.

Yet, as

critics like G.L Nesbitt and Walter Houghton suggest, in
spite of these differences their views on education are very
similar.

And, as I argue in this chapter, those educational

views are distinctly Romantic in flavor.
John Dewey seems indispensable to the connections I am
attempting to illuminate here.

He is a pivotal figure

spanning the late nineteenth century, where Mill and Arnold
leave off, as far into the twentieth as the early 1950's.
He is probably the most influential American philosopher and
educator of our century, but since, as Thomas Newkirk
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suggests, discussions surrounding writing process theory
have been primarily ahistorical, Dewey has rarely been
invoked (More than Stories 178).

Yet because his own

theories on progressive education and learning incorporate
much that is Romantic in thought, and since Dewey's
progressive education experienced a resurgence in the 1960#s
during the advent of expressivist pedagogies as proposed by
teachers such as Rohman, Murray, and Elbow, we might see
Dewey as a connecting figure between earlier Romantic
educational thought and current expressivist rhetorics.1
Also, I have chosen Mill, Arnold, and Dewey because
some of their respective philosophies appear to have arisen
in reaction to social circumstances similar to those which
spurred the Romantic poets toward the reactions and general
tenets I have pointed to.

What I am noting as "Romantic" in

the thought of Mill, Arnold, and Dewey might well be a
result of similar historical circumstances.
although different in

For instance,

many respects from the Romantics,

Victorians like Mill and Arnold were still responding to,
and in some cases reacting against an establishment
characterized by, unenlightened schools, a bureaucratic
government, churches that seemed aloof from many concerns of
common life, and an industrial system that exploited its
workers— including women and children— and that imposed a
drab materialism on daily life.

As the nineteenth century
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wore on,

in fact, those concerns that set Romantic

philosophies in motion reached an even higher pitch.

There

was little or no change in national schooling, the
government was slow to act even though social changes
demanded quick political reform, and industrialization
reached its peak.
Both Mill and Arnold were deeply concerned with the
state of the government, the problems that arose with
industrialization, and the educational system.

Mill, of

course, bears the stamp of utilitarianism, which aimed to
test the usefulness of institutions in light of reason and
common sense.

Yet he learned from his nervous breakdown and

from Wordsworth and Coleridge that reason is not the be all
and end all.

And Matthew Arnold, like the Romantics who

preceded him, questioned how full and enjoyable life could
actually be in a modern industrial society.

This is a

recurrent topic in his poetry and prose, and he is often
attempting to find possible solutions to the problems he
finds with the established schools, governments, and
churches.
John Dewey was facing historical circumstances in
America that were counterparts of those the Romantics and
Mill, and Arnold faced earlier in the century in England.
Between the years of 1865 and 1918, America developed from a
primarily agricultural country to a modern industrialized
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nation.

This rapid expansion of industrialization resulted

in many of the same atrocities that drew the attention of
outspoken poets, historians, and philosophers like Blake,
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Mill, and Arnold.

Like

workers earlier in England, American employees were helpless
against their employers.

Americans suffered the same

exploitation and abuse which characterized the industrial
policies of nineteenth-century England.
By the time Dewey was formulating his philosophies for
education, America had become fully capitalistic and a world
power.

The rapid change in America, as in England, was not

without its consequences for education.

Schools often

reflected the ideology of American capitalism by pushing for
an education of efficiency, production, and discipline in
order to produce a work force that could continue to fuel
America's prospering industry.

A systematic coverage of

various subjects and a mastery of facts, concepts, and
principles acquired through drill had become the established
and institutionalized norm.

As Dewey's philosophical stance

grew to include ideas from pragmatism, progressive
education, empirical and objective psychology, and
democracy, he offered an alternative to the established
system of schooling.

As I will show, some of the directions

Dewey's philosophy took share general characteristics with
the thought of Wordsworth and Coleridge, thought that we
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have come to call "Romantic."
We can surmise, then, that there is at least a two-fold
source for the Romantic ideas in the philosophies of Mill,
Arnold, and Dewey.

Not only were they inspired by the

Romantics' poetry, theoretical, and educational views, but
historical circumstances similar to those faced by the
Romantic poets elicited responses from them which we have
come to identify as "Romantic."
Moreover, I have chosen Mill, Arnold, and Dewey to
discuss as descendants of particular Romantic educational
thought and as predecessors to current expressivist theories
and practice over specialists in the discipline of rhetoric
proper— Wendell, Genung, and Scott, for instance— because
writing teachers are generally more familiar with Mill,
Arnold, and Dewey than with Wendell, Genung, or Scott.
Until the recent growth of graduate programs in rhetoric,
composition teachers had not systematically been trained in
the history of rhetoric.

Rather, writing instructors have

come through the ranks in English or Education departments
where they have not, for the most part, received educations
in rhetoric but in literary studies and the history and
philosophy of education.

Since Mill and Arnold are

generally required reading for literature students and often
for education students as well, and Dewey is the major
contemporary influence on American education, I would argue
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that expressivist writing teachers have probably been
exposed to, and thus more generally influenced by Mill,
Arnold, and Dewey.
It is with these three threads, then, Matthew Arnold,
John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey, that I begin stitching
together one of the histories from which current Romantic
rhetorics and educational theories arise.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873^
In The Mirror and the Lamp, M. H. Abrams points out
that Mill's essays on poetry define the poet and poetry in
terms almost identical to those of Wordsworth and Coleridge.
Others have recognized that one of Mill's major aims was the
same as that of the Romantics: ’’the improvement of society
through . . . the internal culture of the individual”
(Stillinger viii).

Mill was a voracious reader; he read

Wordsworth, as he tells us in a celebrated passage of his
Autobiography, and he was intimate with Coleridge's works,
including the Biographia Literaria.

In a letter to John

Pringle Nichol dated April 15, 1834, Mill wrote that "Few
persons have exercised more influence over my thoughts and
character than Coleridge has . .

(Literary Essays 304).

Although John Stuart Mill probably did not read Wordsworth's
The Prelude when it was finally published in 1850
(Stillinger ix), he did read Wordsworth's other poems and
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the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, which are also about
education, at least in the broad sense of the cultivation of
the imaginative mind.

I would suggest, then, that

Wordsworth's contribution to Mill's theories is pedagogical
as well as poetic, even though it is unclear whether he read
Wordsworth's largest and most sustained argument on
education.
Mill had several specific connections with Wordsworth.
He first acquainted himself with Wordsworth's poetry in 1828
while in the throes of a severe mental depression and
breakdown.

According to Mill, it was Wordsworth's poetry

that first alerted him to the fact that the educational path
his father, James Mill, had led him down had neglected the
feelings.

Later, in 1829, Mill defended Wordsworth's worth

as a poet in a debate, and in 1833 he wrote a literary essay
on him lauding not only Wordsworth's poems, but the poet's
ability to cultivate emotion and feeling in his readers.

In

1831 Mill met Wordsworth, and considered this meeting one of
the highlights of his life.
There are striking resemblances between Wordsworth's
autobiographical poem and Mill's Autobiography.

They both

chronicle the authors' "early lives, intellectual growth,
crisis and discovery" (Stillinger ix).

And although nearly

every essay written by Mill talks about education in some
capacity, like Wordsworth's The Prelude, Mill's
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Autobiography speaks in depth about education and the role
of imagination in the growth of the philosophic mind.
It is in the Autobiography that we learn of the
specific shape Mill's childhood education took.

He was

educated under the sole tutelage of his father.

His days

were spent in study in "what are considered the higher
branches of education" (Autobiography

19).

By the age of

eight Mill was reading Herodotus, the Memorials of Socrates,
and Diogenes Laertius in the original Greek.

He began Latin

at seven, logic at twelve, and introductions to political
economy by age thirteen.

The educational experimentation

James Mill conducted on his son has many of the attributes
the Romantics found detrimental to the education of the
young.

In an earlier draft of the Autobiography, Mill

revealed that his education was forced through fear rather
than educed through love: "It was one of the most
unfavourable of the moral agencies which acted on me in my
boyhood, that mine was not an education of love but of fear"
(Stillinger 33 Early Draft 66).

In the later version of the

text he recalls that his father was "often, and much beyond
reason, provoked by my failures in cases where success could
not have been expected" (Autobiography 19).

Both Wordsworth

and Coleridge bristled at the custom of using fear as a
catalyst to learning.

Coleridge was especially vocal on

this issue, and Lancaster's tendency to discipline students
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with inhumane punishment provoked Coleridge's fiery ire.

In

his Lecture on the New System of Education, he condemned
Lancaster and his extreme punishments intended to infuse
fear.

In Lecture on Shakespeare XI, Coleridge argues that

education is an active process that begins by instilling
love, and that from the seed of love obedience will
naturally arise.
The imaginative readings that Wordsworth believed an
integral part of childhood growth and that Coleridge
lamented having had taken from him were for the most part
denied to the young Mill.

Although Mill never claims that

his father barred him from imaginative readings, James Mill
neither gave his son books like The Arabian Nights nor
created room for such reading in his curriculum.

Mill

recalls that the only time he had access to tales of fantasy
and adventure was on the rare occasions that family friends
would present him with a book like Robinson Crusoe or The
Arabian Nights as a gift.

Moreover, as an adult, J.S. Mill

lamented the fact that the modern system of education had
deleted the literature of chivalry and romance from the
curriculum. In an essay of 1838, Mill mourned the fact that
"for the first time perhaps in history, the youth of both
sexes of the educated classes are universally growing up
unromantic" {Literary Essays 53).

Mill lauded books which

stimulate the imagination with the heroic people, and keep
alive the "chivalrous spirit."
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James Mill not only neglected to include imaginative
readings in his son's upbringing, but kept his son from
participating in childhood recreation as well. In the
Autobiography, Mill explains that his father shielded him
from the "ordinary corrupting influence which boys exercise
over boys," so that he might not be contaminated with
"vulgar modes of thought and feeling" (Autobiography 22).
Mill was not one of the "real children," rightly educated,
that Wordsworth considered himself and the students that
shared his Hawkshead education to be:
A race of real children, not too wise,
Too learned, or too good; but wanton, fresh,
And bandied up and down by love and hate;
Mot unresentful where justified;
Fierce, moody, patient, virtuous, modest, shy;
Mad in their sports like withered leaves in winds;
Though doing wrong and suffering, and full oft
Bending beneath our life's mysterious weight
Of pain, and doubt, and fear, yet yielding not
In happiness to the happiest upon earth.
(The Prelude V 411-25)
Instead, Mill was Wordsworth's "miracle of scientific lore."
Because of the "deficiencies" in his education, Mill found
himself to be a social "misfit" (Autobiography 24) just like
Coleridge. In a letter to Thomas Poole of October 9, 1797,
Coleridge, describing how the same sorts of deficiencies in
his education made him a social pariah, could have been
writing of Mill as well as himself:
I was fretful and immoderately passionate,
and as I could not play at anything and was
slothful, I was despised and hated by the
boys; and because I could read and spell
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and had, I may truly say, a memory and
understanding forced into almost unnatural
ripeness, I was flattered and wondered at
by all the old women. And so I became very
vain, and despised most of the boys that
were at all near my own age. . . .
Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, Mill believes that normal
childhood play and interaction with other children adds an
essential ingredient to a youth's education.
Mill was not only denied the company of youngsters his
own age, but simple physical activity was limited for him as
well.

Although he took solitary walks daily, these were

subdued and "in general of a quiet, if not bookish turn, and
gave little stimulus to any other kind of mental activity
than that which was already called forth by my studies"
(Autobiography 23).

Wordsworth is also known for his

solitary walks, but he had a balance unknown to Mill, and
indulged in play as well as deep thought; Wordsworth was the
Winander boy hooting back at the owls, while Mill was the
"miracle of scientific lore."
to nature.

Wordsworth opened himself up

He observed nature's ways, allowed his

experiences in nature to stimulate all of his senses.

Mill

was "utterly inobservant: I was as my father continually
told me, like a person who had not the organs of sense.

My

eyes and ears seemed of no use to me, so little did I see or
hear what was before me, and so little, even of what I did
see or hear, did I observe or remember . . . "
24).

(Autobiography

Because his senses were closed to nature he was unable
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to nurture the experiential and emotive aspects of his
intellect.
However, from the vantage point of an adult restored to
health through the cultivation of feelings, Mill remembered
two Wordsworthian-like experiences from his childhood that
"bettered" his education:
From 1814 to 1817 Mr. Bentham lived during
half of each year at Ford abbey, in
Somersetshire . . . which intervals I had
the advantage of passing at that place.
This sojourn was, I think an important
circumstance in my education. Nothing
contributes more to nourish elevation of
sentiments in a people, than the large and
free character of their habitations . . .
[the Abbey] gave the sentiment of a larger
and freer existence, and were to me a sort
of poetic cultivation . . . .
(Autobiography 35-36)
At Bentham's residence in Somersetshire, Mill was finally
made aware of the importance of interaction with nature as a
stimulant to feelings and thus to education.

For the first

time he found himself in circumstances allowing him the
luxury of communing with nature.
The second occurrence Mill writes of was a stay in
France where "the first introduction to the highest order of
mountain scenery made the deepest impression . . . and gave
a colour to my tastes through life" (37).

As unemotional as

this latter passage of Mill's might seem, it recalls
Wordsworth's much more passionate telling of crossing the
Alps.

Perhaps of more direct interest is Mill's mention of
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the "colouration" of his tastes.

What Mill is suggesting is

that the mountain scenery excited his imagination, and once
having excited his imagination, this particular scene stayed
with him throughout life, was stored in his memory, in the
way Wordsworth's mind is "a mansion for all lovely forms."
Also, the language chosen by Mill is strikingly similar to
that used by Wordsworth in his discussion from the Preface
to the Lyrical Ballads on the Poet's ability to imbue
ordinary objects with imaginative vision by throwing "over
them a certain colouring of imagination" (734).2

Mill's

language here, and his discovery that the natural world
elevates the sentiments, reflect Romantic influences and
premises.
It was in 1828 that Mill first began to question the
education his father had so carefully planned and guided him
through.

Mill was suffering from severe depression and had

begun to believe that his education and life had been for
naught.

In his Autobiography Mill comments that two lines

from Coleridge were often in his thoughts: "Work without
hope draws nectar in a sieve, / And hope without an object
cannot live."

It was Coleridge, wrote Mill, "in whom alone

of all writers I have found a true description of what I
felt . . . "

(Autobiography 84).

This despondent state of

thought and feelings made reading Wordsworth for the first
time an important event in Mill's life.

Wordsworth's poems

were "a medicine" for Mill's "state of mind":
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they expressed, not mere outward beauty,
but states of feeling, and of thought
coloured by feeling, under the excitement
of beauty. They seemed to me to be the
very culture of the feelings, which I was
in quest of. In them I seemed to draw from
a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and
imaginative pleasure, which could be shared
by all human beings. . . . (Autobiography
89)
The salve for Mill's intellectual wounds came from
Wordsworth's poetry, and it came in the exact way that
Wordsworth intended his poems to work.

Finally, in the

autumn of 1828 Mill began to re-educate himself through the
cultivation of feeling.3
Previous to this date, Mill's education had been
structured for the sole purpose of building an analytic
intellect.

His education had failed to create feelings in

"sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of
analysis," while the whole course of his "intellectual
cultivation had made precocious and premature analyses the
inveterate habit of [his] mind" (Autobiography 84).

But

once Wordsworth's poetry began to educate the emotive side
of Mill's intellect, Mill came to realize that his "habit of
analysis" had the "tendency to wear away the feelings: as
indeed it has when no other mental habit is cultivated, and
the analyzing spirit remains without its natural complements
and connectives" (Autobiography 83).

Mill is arguing here

for an education that weds an analytical mind to an emotive
one, in order to foster the fully capable and creative mind.
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In many essays written after the advent of his fuller
intellect— after the emotional education began— Mill harshly
derides educational systems that rely on rote memorization
and "cram,” just as Wordsworth and Coleridge had before him.
In "On Genius," for instance, Mill bemoans the wide-spread
tendency to teach this way:
Modern education is all cram— Latin cram,
mathematical cram, literary cram, political
cram, theological cram, moral cram. The
world already knows everything, and has
only to tell it to its children, who, on
their part, have only to hear, and lay it
to rote (not to heart). (Literary Essays
44)
Although in this essay, Mill advocates an education similar
to that of the ancient Romans and Greeks, it is on the
grounds that education at that time consisted "not in giving
what is called knowledge, that is, grinding down other men's
ideas to a convenient size, and administering them in the
form of cram," but on "a series of exercises to form the
thinking faculty itself, that the mind, being active and
vigourous, might go forth and know" (Literary Essays

40).

Just as Wordsworth believed that many teachers were
"guides and wardens of our faculties" who "would control all
accidents" and "confine us down like engines," just as he
believed that an education of cram and memorization led to
students who could do no more than parrot back the facts
force-fed them by instructors, Mill argued that rote

68

memorization resulted in pupils unable to form an opinion of
their own.

In "On Genius," Mill wrote:

At school, what is the child taught, except
to repeat by rote, or at most to apply
technical rules, which are lodged, not in
his reason, but in his memory? When he
leaves school, does not everything conspire
to tell him, that it is not expected he
shall think, but only that he shall profess
no opinion on any subject different than
that professed by other people? (Literary
Essays 43)
Like Coleridge and Wordsworth, Mill knew that what should be
required is "not to be indoctrinated, is not to be taught
other people's opinions, but to be induced and enabled to
think for themselves" (Letter to Rev. Carr Literary Essays
304).
In the Autobiography, Mill stresses even further the
problems that arise in an education of cram:
Most boys or youths who have had much
knowledge drilled into them, have their
mental capacities not strengthened, but
overlaid by it. They are crammed with mere
facts, and with the opinions or phrases of
other people, and these are accepted as a
substitute for the power to form opinions
of their own. And thus, the sons of
eminent fathers, who have spared no pains
in their education, so often grow up mere
parroters of what they have learnt,
incapable of using their minds except in
the furrows traced for them. (20)
We might think this passage a perfectly drawn portrait of
Mill and his education, since, after all, he was educated
for the purpose of carrying on devoutly the ideas of his
father and Bentham.

Mill did so without much reflection
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until after his breakdown and return to health.

Throughout

his writings Mill comments that he had not a creative mind
or genius like his father and Mr. Bentham, but that he had a
mind trained only for interpretation and analysis.
And almost as though J.S. Mill could hear Wordsworth
and Coleridge pointing to him as an example of everything
wrong with education, Mill explains that his education did
contain valuable aspects that would be found in
Wordsworthian and Coleridgeian schemes.

Perhaps the most

important to Mill is that his education was not as passive
as we might be inclined to think.

It was active in that,

according to Mill, his father never just doled out facts and
answers:
Mine, however, was not an education of
cram. My father never permitted anything
which I learnt, to degenerate into a mere
exercise of memory.
He strove to make the
understanding not go along with every step
of the teaching, but if possible, precede
it. Anything which could be found out by
thinking, I never was told, until I had
exhausted my efforts to find it out for
mysel f . (Autobiography 20)
Unlike Wordsworth and Coleridge, Mill does not object to
being introduced to all the "branches of science and
philosophy" as a mere child.

In fact, he does not believe

that any "scientific teaching ever was more thorough,"
or better fitted for training the
faculties, then the mode in which logic and
political economy were taught to me by my
father.
Striving, even in an exaggerated
degree, to call forth the activity of my
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faculties, by making me find out everything
for myself, he gave his explanations not
before, but after, I had felt the full
force of the difficulties. (Autobiography
19)
Mill objects not to what he studied, but to what was left
out of his education: normal childhood activity, an
appreciation of beauty, and the cultivation of feeling and
the imagination.
John Stuart Mill carried forth the ideas of Wordsworth
and Coleridge in his own writings, and as we will soon see,
these Romantic assumptions reappear in twentieth century
composition scholars.

Certainly these ideas included those

of a theory of poetics, as when he writes in "What is
Poetry?" that the poet's task is to be sincere, to give a
truthful picture of his own feelings and state of mind.

But

they also include those ideas pertinent to a philosophy of
education.

From Wordsworth and Coleridge, Mill understood

that the mind cannot thrive if the analytical intellect is
severed from imagination and feelings.
Mill's

Having learned this,

Autobiography, as Jack Stillinger points out,

"focuses on the role of the imagination in the growth of the
Philosophic mind (xii)," and by the time Mill gives the St.
Andrews Inaugural Address in 1867, he insists that there are
three interrelated parts that make up a full education:
"intellectual education, moral education, and the education
of feelings" (Mill on Education 189). Wordsworth's and
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Coleridge's hope for an education that will nurture an
encompassing intellect inspired Mill to incorporate what he
learned from them with his own educative experiences.

In

his writings he passed on to us the Romantics' desire to
cultivate a vital and imaginative mind.

Matthew Arnold (1822-1838)
Matthew Arnold found much fault with the literary and
critical theories of the Romantic age which preceded his own
Victorian era.

Arnold believed Wordsworth to be limited in

many ways and he felt Wordsworth was wrong to ignore the
"modern situation" by turning back to the past in his last
years.

Arnold read Coleridge but he says very little

specifically about him, and what he does say is for the most
part negative.

Moreover, Arnold thought that what he

believed to be the "Romantic cult of the individual" was a
"dangerous extension of prevailing English provinciality and
cultural anarchism" (Gottfried 3, 50).

Nonetheless, he was

well acquainted with the work of the Romantics, and in spite
of his differences with them and his dismissal of many of
their ideas, his own poetry and his philosophical position
on education bears the mark of a Romantic contribution.4
Wordsworth was particularly influential for Arnold's
thought.

Arnold himself cites Wordsworth as one of four
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leading influences on his thought and life, and he refers
often to Wordsworth in his letters, notebooks, and essays,
and celebrates Wordsworth in a laudatory essay.

Wordsworth

was also a close friend of Arnold/s father and the older
poet spent a fair amount of time with the Arnolds.5
Arnold shared more than the writing of poetry and
criticism with the older generation of Romantics.

He also

shared a deep concern for teaching and the state of
education that is reflected in his essays and reports on the
status of British education written during his tour as
Inspector of Schools.

Arnold's tenure as School Inspector

began in 1851, and although he was not particularly pleased
with the appointment, he went on to make it his life's work.
His observation of education systems included not only
English schools, but those on the continent as well.

In

1865 the Schools Enquiry Commissioners assigned him the duty
of investigating the educational system for the middle and
upper classes in France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.
Like Wordsworth, Arnold was interested in a national
education, and his time as School Inspector resulted in many
arguments for the changes he saw as necessary to ensure a
system of education that was workable for the English
masses.
As Arnold toured the schools of the continent and
Britain, he saw still in place many of the problems that
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moved Wordsworth and Coleridge to take a stand on the state
of national education in England.

Like Coleridge, for

instance, he railed heartily against an educational system
that tried to force knowledge of a factual kind into the
minds of children at too early an age.6 In his report on the
French schools, Arnold praised the French system for
recognizing the intellectual limitations of children by not
pushing competitive examinations upon the pupils, and he
condemned the English system for its misuse of exams. The
English school system's insensitivity

to the intellectual

limitations of young minds, in Arnold's view, had the same
effect that Mill objected to in what he calls the "education
of cram."

Inappropriate testing had damaging results:

The French have plenty of examinations; but
they put them almost entirely at the right
age for examinations . . . To put to little
boys of nine or ten the pressure of a
competitive examination . . . is to offer a
premium for the violation of nature's
elementary laws, and to sacrifice, as in
the poor geese fatted for Strasbourg pies,
the due development of all organs of life
to the premature hypertrophy of one.
(Schools and Universities on the Continent
92)
This premature "hypertrophy" means that the students will
never reach a higher intellect capable of judgment,
comparison, and synthesis.
When Arnold speaks harshly of examinations he is not
condemning them entirely,

in fact, his observations of

German schools, where exams were completely foregone,
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convinced him that examinations can be useful.

His negative

criticism of the examinations given in the English schools
is that of Coleridge and Wordsworth before him— they are
used to the wrong ends.

In his Reports on Elementary

Schools, Arnold points out that exams do not necessarily
test any real knowledge that students might or might not
have.

He recalls children getting through the Revised Code

examinations in "reading, writing, and ciphering, without
really knowing how to read and cipher":
To take the commonest instance: a book is
of a certain standard; all the year the
children read this book over and over
again, and no other. When the Inspector
comes they are presented to read in this
book; they can read their sentence or two
fluently enough, but they cannot read any
other book fluently. . . the circle of the
children's reading has thus been narrowed
and impoverished all the year for the sake
of a result at the end of it, and the
result is an illusion. (219-20)
In other words, knowledge for knowledge's sake was
sacrificed to a system that requested the memorization of a
few facts and techniques that could be coughed up on
request.

Learning, in effect, has come to a standstill.

Arnold, through his first-hand observations of the
English school system, records further damage that is done
by

propelling children through a system that does not allow

for natural growth and focuses too heavily on examinations:
nervous exhaustion at fifteen is the price
which many a clever boy pays for over
stimulation at ten; and the nervous
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exhaustion of a number of our clever boys
tends to create a broad reign of
intellectual deadness in the mass of youths
from fifteen to twenty, who the clever
boys, had they been rightly developed and
not unnaturally forced, ought to have
leavened. (Schools and Universities 92-93).
Arnold's concern with an "unnatural" intellectual growth
recalls Coleridge's belief that education should be an act
of educing, of calling forth; "as the blossom is educed from
the bud, the vital excellencies are within; the acorn is but
educed or brought forth from the bud" (Collected Works of
STC Vol. 5 585).

Arnold's argument is also reminiscent of

arguments made by Wordsworth in The Prelude, which was
published the year before Arnold began his tour as
Inspector.

In a well-known passage from Book V of The

Prelude, Wordsworth celebrates his escape from such an
education:
yet I rejoice.
And, by these thoughts admonished, will pour
out
Thanks with uplifted heart, that I was reared
Safe from an evil which these days have laid
Upon the children of the land, a pest,
That might have dried me up, body and soul.
(V 224-229)
Arnold recognizes, in the "nervous exhaustion" of students,
Mill's education of "cram" and the same debilitating
educational system that Wordsworth was lucky to have
escaped.

He felt that the British examinations not only did

not test any significant knowledge, but worse, that they
resulted in "intellectual deadness."

If wrongly and
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untimely administered, examinations obscure the "true aim"
of schools: "to develop our mind and to give us access to
vital knowledge" (schools and Universities 299).
This last phrase of Arnold's resoundingly echoes much
in the educational theories of both Coleridge and
Wordsworth.

Coleridge, for example, separated "education"

from "instruction" as it was commonly applied in the
classroom.

As David Calleo writes of Coleridge's stance:

"True knowledge is not merely information or skill.

It is

the ability to see the fullness of things in their proper
relation. It results in the ability to avoid partial view
and thus to achieve a balanced and sane judgment" (Coleridge
and the Idea of the Modern State 122-23).

Learning does not

take place through examinations or the mere instruction of
facts.

It comes, as Wordsworth argues, through the

cultivating of the "vital soul," and as Coleridge suggests,
through "vital excellencies"— terms quite similar to
Arnold's "vital knowledge."

Without an education that

promotes access to the cultivation of "vital knowledge," the
"truly educated mind," the encompassing intellect will never
be achieved.
In their hope for a synthesizing mind at the end of the
educational journey, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Arnold also
share thoughts on what is necessary to make the encompassing
intellect a possible outcome for students.

For all of them
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the role of the teacher is to do "as much towards opening
their mind, and opening their soul and imagination, as is
possible to be done with a number of children of their age
and in their state of preparation and home surroundings"
(Reports from Elementary Schools 238), or as Mill describes
it, to prepare students to "go forth and know."

Arnold,

like Wordsworth and Coleridge, makes clear that the
curriculum should advance this vital knowledge by "educing"
active participation from students.

He writes of elementary

education that "a great deal of the work in elementary
schools must necessarily be of a mechanical kind."

But in

order to counter-balance the mechanical aspects of the
curriculum, Arnold argues for "creative activity":
whatever introduces any sort of creative
activity to relieve the passive reception
of knowledge is valuable. The kindergarten
exercises are useful for this reason, the
management of tools is useful, drawing is
useful, singing is useful.
(Reports from
Elementary Schools 226)
Whereas Wordsworth, and Coleridge to a lesser extent, would
claim both a student's interaction with nature and reading
as a part of this counter-balance, they do not suggest
specific classroom activities.

Arnold, however,

focuses

more on the actual pedagogical techniques as his position of
School Inspector requires him to do. Thus, Arnold speaks of
drawing and singing in the early curriculum, and reading,
particularly poetry, as the pupil advances through the
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years.
Arnold desires the same movement toward creativity,
imagination, and the encompassing intellect as
and Coleridge do.

Wordsworth

And like them Arnold believes this

movement is achieved, at least in part, through literature,
which has a humanizing and moving effect.

As he makes clear

in an 1860 report on the elementary schools, Arnold was not
against pupils reading, but against them reading "dry
scientific" writings of an "inferior order" (215).

He

argues that in the everyday subjects of the curriculum
(reading, writing, grammar, geography, history, etc.) that
the teacher's design of instruction should be governed by
the "aim of calling forth, by some means or other, in every
pupil a sense of pleasurable activity and of creation; [the
teacher and student] should resist being made a mere ladder
with 'information'"

(Reports 227).

In the same report, Arnold claims that the teaching of
poetry is a valuable and necessary part of the curriculum
because it is the one thing that can ensure the stimulation
of

creative activity. It is Wordsworth he turns to to make

his point:
Wordsworth says, "To be incapable of a
feeling of poetry, in my sense of the word,
is to be without love of human nature and
reverence for God." And it is only through
acquaintance with poetry, and with good
poetry, that this "feeling of poetry" can
be given . . . it [poetry] inspires the
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emotions so helpful in making principles
operative. (Reports 223-24)
The importance that Arnold gives to "the emotions" is
noteworthy here.

He is suggesting, with distinctly Romantic

language, a distinctly Romantic idea: that emotions are
necessary for a full intellect to

become "operative."

In a

curriculum where memorization is the major instructive mode,
the mind is dulled unless there is an exercise of
"pleasurable" and "creative activity . .

. quite different

from the effort of learning a list of words to spell, or a
list of flesh-making and heat-giving foods, or a list of
capes and bays, or a list of reigns and battles, and capable
of greatly relieving the strain from learning these and of
affording a lively pleasure" (Reports 226).

Although we

need not agree with Arnold that poetry is the only or best
way to make all, including the imaginative, "principles
operative," his point is nonetheless important:

that at

least some of the mechanical exercises in school must be
replaced with those which open the mind and soul through
"vital knowledge."
There is yet another affinity among Coleridge,
Wordsworth, and Arnold.

When drawing some further thoughts

together in a general conclusion to Schools and
Universities, Arnold describes what good instruction should
and should not entail:
The aim and office of instruction, say many
people, is to make a man a good citizen, or
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a good Christian, or a gentleman; or it is
to fit him to get on in the world, or it is
to enable him to do his duty in that state
of life to which he is called. It is none
of these, and the modern spirit more and
more discerns it to be none of these.
These are at best secondary and indirect
aims of instruction; its prime direct aim
is to enable a man to know himself and the
world. Such knowledge is the only sure
basis for action, and this basis it is the
true aim and office of education to supply.
(Schools and Universities 290).
Arnold/s position here bears a distinct resemblance to
Coleridge's argument for self-reflective knowledge, and as
will later become clear, it anticipates the current
express ivists' concern with writing from and for the self.
As passages previously quoted from the Aids to Reflection
indicate, Coleridge believes that without reflection an
essential means to knowledge in its fullest sense is
missing.

Self-reflection and self-knowledge are certainly a

part of Wordsworth's profile for the fully educated mind. In
fact, in his view it is that ability which nurtures the
strongest intellect of all— the intellect of the creative
poet.

It is also in knowing oneself, then, that the

educational theories of Arnold, and of Wordsworth and
Coleridge converge.
Although the means each urges by which students should
achieve a schooling that promotes the growth of a
philosophic mind might differ slightly on various points, it
is clear that Matthew Arnold, like Wordsworth and Coleridge
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before him, sought a restructuring of the educational system
in order to allow for that growth.

He joined with

Wordsworth and Coleridge in the belief that reading is an
important part of intellectual growth, but that it is
usually forced upon the students in such ways as to "only
increase a child's stock of what is called information"
rather than to "contribute to the opening of the soul and
imagination" (Reports 239).

Arnold agrees that the

"philosophic mind" is gained through self-reflection and
self-knowledge, and that the true aim of education is to
develop the powers of the mind and to give students access
to vital knowledge" (Schools and Universities 299).
three poets believe that

All

knowledge in its fullest sense

takes place through activity and creativity of the mind. In
an 1874 report on the elementary schools, Arnold reminds his
readers that "the animation of mind, the multiplying of
ideas, the promptness to connect, in thoughts, one thing
with another, are what are wanted" (221).

This statement of

Arnold's could easily be attributed to Wordsworth or
Coleridge, so close is it in thought and phrasing to many of
their statements

on learning and the imagination.

John Dewev (1859-1952^
In discussing this next educator, John Dewey, I have
moved, albeit rather rapidly, from Victorian England to
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modern America.

Although this leap might seem a vast one,

Dewey is one of America's most renowned philosophers and he
wrote prolifically on American education.

He is, in many

ways, one of the few American counterparts to the British
philosophers and intellectuals like Mill and Arnold.
Moreover, as we will see, he shares key philosophical ideas
with the Romantics and with Mill and Arnold, which, X
believe, become part of the general theoretical pool from
which expressivist rhetoricians draw.
If we were to distill one basic concept of his
philosophy from all of his writings it would be his belief
that learning is a social process.

Dewey is often seen as

the forefather of social constructivism.

He believes in

collaborative learning and that as humans we are shaped by
our culture:
through the influence of the social
environment each person becomes saturated
with the customs, beliefs, the purposes,
skills, hopes and fears of the cultural
group to which he belongs. The features of
even his physical surroundings come to him
through the eyes and ears of the
community." (Education Today 295)
Since, as the previous passage indicates, Dewey appears to
be a social philosopher, it might seem strange that I find
him crucial to the history of Romantic educational
philosophies that I am constructing here.

If we remember,

however, that my purpose is not to build a case for Dewey as
a Romantic, but rather to show how certain aspects of
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Romantic philosophies have been handed down to current
educators and teachers of writing, the connections I will
make here remain important.
The extent of Dewey's familiarity with Romantic thought
is probably best encapsulated in Art as Experience.

It

becomes clear in this book that Dewey was well versed in the
writings and theories of Schiller, Blake, Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Lamb, and Hazlitt, to name a few.
Although Dewey cautions against erring by accepting too
unthinkingly Romantic theories of art because, he suggests,
they can go beyond "individual” to "eccentric" (286), he
nonetheless holds a primarily expressive theory of art.

He

believes, for instance, in the "inherent role of
individuality in the matter of a work of art" (286), the
importance of perception and individual experience to art,
and in the Romantic version of the creative imagination.
Dewey writes forcefully in defense of experience and
perception in Art and Experience.

"It is mere ignorance,"

he argues, "that leads them [critics of expressivism] to the
supposition that the connection of art and esthetic
perception with experience signifies a lowering of their
[the works of art] significance and dignity" (25).

Dewey

argues as an expressivist when he suggests, in antithesis,
that "Experience . . .

is heightened vitality" (25).

In
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other words, experience is vital and it enables the creation
of art and knowledge.

Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, Dewey

sees the act of experiencing taking place, at least in part,
through "perception” and participation with the world.
According to Dewey, the senses are the way in which a "live
creature participates directly with the ongoings of the
world" (28).

And again, we are reminded of Arnold's call

for "creative principles" and Mill's desire to "go forth and
know."

This perception and participation, then, leads to

experience, which in Dewey's argument leads to art.
He also makes the case, as Wordsworth and Coleridge do,
that perception is more than mere nonparticipatory
recognition, more than senses being bombarded by an external
world; it is not completely passive.

Dewey writes that

"perception replaces bare recognition."

In this replacement

there is "an act of reconstructive doing and consciousness
[which] becomes fresh and alive" (Art as Experience 59).

It

is this act of "reconstructive perception" that Wordsworth
writes of in "Tintern Abbey";

"with gleams of half-

extinguished thought, / With many recognitions dim and faint
. . . / The picture of the mind revives again: / . . . not
only with the sense / Of present pleasure, but with pleasing
thoughts / That in this moment there is life and food / For
future years" (53-65).

What Wordsworth remembers and

comforts himself with as he stands on the banks of the Wye
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is the knowledge that through an active perception in the
present, he can reconstruct the perception of the past, and
his memory and experience will always be able to become
"fresh and alive."
Dewey's "undergoing phase of experience" is receptive
but not passive.

"It involves surrender.

But adequate

yielding of the self . . . through a controlled activity
that may well be intense" (Art as Experience 59).

What

Dewey has described here is particularly fitting to
Wordsworth's "wise passiveness" and "spots of time," where
the poet receives Nature in all her power, surrendering to
the force of "dizzying raptures" so that the world wheels by
with great intensity.

When older and a poet, Wordsworth

reconstructed his art from the "yielding of self" to
experience.
Also apparent in Dewey's explanation of undergoing
experience as it relates to art is the importance of a
spontaneous overflow of feeling which both he and Wordsworth
find necessary for artistic expression.

Dewey, however, is

not satisfied that the experience itself will lead to art;
art is not just the overflow of spontaneous emotion, but
contemplated spontaneous feeling.

Dewey enlists Wordsworth

to explain that it is the spontaneous overflow of "emotion
recollected in tranquillity" that leads to expression (75),
a concept we shall see that is crucial to current
expressivist theory as well.
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Dewey's tie to Wordsworth and Coleridge is also seen in
his discussion of the imagination.

In Art as Experience,

Dewey bases his ideas about imaginative experience on
Romantic theories of the imagination,

in fact, he cites

Coleridge on the "esemplastic Imagination” :
"The poet," he said, "diffuses a tone and
spirit of unity that (as it were) fuses
each to each the faculties of the soul with
the subordination of each according to
relative dignity and worth, by the
synthetic and magical power to which I
would exclusively appropriate the name of
Imagination." (272)
Dewey notes of this passage that Coleridge used "the
vocabulary of his generation" which referred to the
faculties and imagination as separate.

Although he

disagrees with Coleridge's "verbal mode" in this definition,
Dewey agrees with Coleridge's meaning of the "imaginative
experience" (Art as Experience 272).
Dewey's own description of the imagination is Romantic
in flavor.

He sees the imagination as animating, feeling,

and actively composing an "integral whole":
it designates a quality that animates and
pervades all processes of making and
observation. It is a way of seeing and
feeling things as they compose an integral
whole.
It is the large and generous
blending of interests at the point where
the mind comes in contact with the world.
When the old and familiar things are made
new in experience there is imagination.
(Art as Experience 271)
Dewey's language echoes Coleridge's explanation of the
Primary and Secondary Imagination from the Biographia
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Literaria:

we can pair Dewey's "animates,” "pervades,"

"observation," and

"blending of interest" to make "old"

things "new" with Coleridge's creative Imagination.

Dewey's

description of the imagination also recalls Wordsworth's
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads.

Dewey's statement "when the

old and familiar things are made new in experience there is
imagination" is an apt understanding of Wordsworth's project
in the Lyrical Ballads:
The principal object, then, proposed in
these Poems was to choose incidents and
situations from common life, and to relate
or describe them, throughout, as far as was
possible in a selection of language really
used by men, and, at the same time, to
throw over them a certain colouring of
imagination, whereby ordinary things should
be presented to the mind in an unusual
aspect[.]
(Preface to the Lyrical Ballads)
Wordsworth is reconstructing the familiar language of the
"common man" so we can experience it anew; he has, in
Dewey's terms, taken "old and familiar things" and made them
"new in experience."

By throwing over the common language

of the common man a "certain colouring of imagination,"
Wordsworth's mind has, as Dewey writes, "come in contact
with the world."
Dewey's earlier work of 1887, Psychology, which he
states is a book "expressly for use in class-room
instruction," looks, by its table of contents, much like an
argument for faculty psychology.

But, as he writes of

perception, memory, imagination, thinking, intuition,
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feeling, and the will as interrelated processes, it begins
to look more like a Romantic manifesto.

Here he

distinguishes among the "Mechanical Imagination," "Fancy,"
and the "Creative Imagination."

"The Mechanical

Imagination," he says, "proceeds by the laws of association
and dissociation . . ." while the Fancy "throws itself about
all things, and connects them together, through the medium
of feeling . . .

It affords keen delight rather than serves

as an organ of penetration" (Psychology 171).

Different

still, according to Dewey, is the Creative Imagination,
which is not confined to isolation and
combination of experiences already had,
even when these processes occur under the
influence of sensitive and lively emotion.
It is virtually creative.
It makes its
object new by setting it in a new light. It
separates and combines, indeed; but its
separations and combinations are not the
result of mechanical processes, not of the
feeling of the moment. They are filled
with a direct and spontaneous sense of the
relative values of detail in reference to
the whole. (Psychology 171).
As in Art as Experience, Dewey's descriptions of the
imaginative experience and the lesser powers of the
Mechanical Imagination and the Fancy are essentially those
of Wordsworth and of Coleridge.

If we recall Wordsworth's

discussion of spontaneity, of "separating unity into number"
and "consolidating number into unity," as well as
Coleridge's "dissolving" in order to "unify," the Romantic
influences on Dewey's thought become more apparent.

Dewey

89

also finds an understanding of imaginative processes
necessary and important to class-room instruction,
reinforcing, it seems to me, Coleridge's and Wordsworth's,
as well as Mill and Arnold's, instistence on the importance
of the creative imagination within the educational arena.
Many of Dewey's educational ideas correspond, in fact,
to those of Wordsworth and Coleridge's.

Again, I am not

suggesting that Dewey accepted all aspects of Romantic
educational theory.
not.

He makes a point of saying that he does

He made explicit objections, for instance, to the use

of the analogy of the development of a seed into the fullgrown plant, an analogy he ascribes to Rousseau but which
was pervasive among English Romantic poets.7

Dewey believed

that the "growth of a seed is limited as compared with that
of a human being . . .It has not got the capacities for
growth in different directions toward different outcomes
that are characteristic of the more flexible and richly
endowed human young" (Education Today 289).

He also objects

to the more "exaggerated parts of Rousseau's doctrines":
sentimental idealization of the child's
immaturity, irrational denial of superior
worth in the knowledge and mature
experience of the adult, deliberate denial
of the worth of the ends and instruments
embodied in social organization.
Deification of childish whim, unripened
fancy, and arbitrary emotion is certainly a
piece of pure romanticism. (Education Today
69)
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It is clear from the tone of this passage that Dewey does
not accept "romanticism" when it is defined in terms of
"whim" or "arbitrary emotion," and although Dewey does not
directly address these criticisms to Wordsworth and
Coleridge, he surely would have objected to Wordsworth's
belief in the child as a Philosopher.

Coleridge, however,

was much more closely aligned to Dewey's way of thinking on
this issue, and he himself takes Wordsworth to task.

In the

Intimation Ode, Wordsworth suggests that the child is by
nature a philosopher.

In Book XXII of the Biographia

Literaria, however, Coleridge disagrees with Wordsworth and
writes:
In what sense is a child of that age a
philosopher? In what sense does he read
"the eternal deep"? In what sense is he
declared to be "for ever haunted" by the
Superior Being, or so inspired as to
deserve the splendid title of a mighty
prophet, a blessed seer? by reflection? by
knowledge? by conscious intuition? or by
any form or modification of consciousness?
(Walsh 18-19)
Like Dewey, Coleridge finds this particular position on
childhood a "sentimental idealization" and a "deification"
of the child.

Although Coleridge shares a belief in natural

development of the child with Dewey, Dewey differs not only
from Coleridge but from Arnold and Mill as well, because he
was reading about "experimental" and "emergence" psychology.
In fact, he was beginning to establish a theory of
"developmental" psychology.
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Nevertheless, in spite of a more socially focused
educational philosophy and certain objections to Romantic
analogies and ideas, Dewey repeats many of Wordsworth's and
Coleridge's arguments against the old traditions of
schooling.

He argues against a method of education that saw

the mind of the student, in a metaphor that Coleridge might
particularly have liked, as a "phonographic disc upon which
certain impressions were made by the teacher, so when the
disc was put on the machine and the movement started.

. .it

might reveal what was described upon it" (Education Today
242).

In antithesis to this traditional schooling, Dewey

argued for a child-centered curriculum and progressive
schools which, I believe, draw heavily from a Romantic
philosophy of education.
A passage from Dewey's "Progressive Education and the
Science of Education" will help illuminate my point,

in

arguing for Progressive schools, Dewey writes that they
"exhibit as compared to traditional schools"
a common emphasis upon respect for
individuality and for increased freedom; a
common disposition to build upon the nature
and experience of the boys and girls that
come to them, instead of imposing from
without external subject-matter and
standards . . . Emphasis upon activity as
distinct from passivity is one of the
common factors. (John Dewey on Education:
Selected Writings 170)
Three of the basic elements crucial to an educational theory
grounded in Romantic philosophy, the importance of the
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individual, personal experience, and an emphasis on activity
as opposed to passivity, are advanced in this passage.
Even though Dewey never forgets that individuals are
culturally shaped, he remains adamant in his belief that the
individual and individuality are important.

Like the

Romantics, Dewey realized that the individual was being lost
in modern industrial society. He urged a firm stand against
the suppression of the individual, and he argued that the
only way to fight against this suppression was by looking
inward.

In other words, the responsibility is ours as

individuals to "cultivate our own gardens" so that we might
make changes in society.

"Looking inward" to the self also

becomes a mainstay of expressivist pedagogy later in the
twentieth century.
"Individualism and socialism are one," he wrote. "Only
by being true to the full growth of all the individuals who
make it up, can society by any chance be true to itself"
(The School and Society 7).

Dewey wishes to underscore the

value of individuality, and in "Mediocrity and
Individuality," he argues for the use of the word
"individuality" over "individualism" in order to make clear
that his focus on the individual is positive:
Individualism is about the most ambiguous
word in the entire list of labels in
ordinary use. It means anything from
egotistically centered conduct to
distinction and uniqueness. It is possible
to say that excessive individualism is an
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outstanding curse of American civilization,
and that absence of individualism is our
marked deficiency. When the former remark
is made, economic and legal conditions are
in mind; when the latter, intellectual life
is in question. Individuality is a surer
word; it carries with it a connotation of
uniqueness of quality, or at least of
distinctiveness.
It suggests a freedom
which is not . . . external but which is
intrinsic and constructive.
(Education
Today 164)
It was this same need for "intrinsic" and "constructive"
freedom in an ever growing industrial society prone to
suppressing individuality that spurred the Romantics to
their reliance on, and defense of, the individual.

Thus,

what became important was the uniqueness and individual
processes of mind that lay behind their art.
The importance of the individual is one of the basic
concepts underlying Dewey's argument for Progressive schools
and child-centered learning.

To change from the receptive

education promoted by the "pipeline" or "phonographic disc"
method of teaching to a creative and active education,
requires, according to Dewey, "studying and treating
individuals in their distinctive and unique qualities"
(Education Today 69).

The question of the place of

experience in the role of education is not, in practice,
separate from that of the role of individuality.

Dewey sees

experience as the foundation which will lead to an education
that honors individuality, an active rather than passive
education, and which can eventually lead to the sort of
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educated intellect that Wordsworth calls the "philosophical
mind."

"Moral and intellectual powers increase in vigor,"

says Dewey, when a "spontaneous interest and desire to
accomplish something are behind them" (Education Today 79).
In Dewey's educational scheme, experience becomes the
motivation for learning.

A typical evil that Dewey finds

prevalent in traditional schools is the lack of any positive
motivation.

Since "the lack of any organic connection with

what the child has seen and felt and loved makes the
material purely formal and symbolic" (The Child and the
Curriculum 24), the learner has no connection or interaction
with the material and cannot learn in the true sense of the
word.

The student can merely parrot back what has been read

or heard.

As Coleridge argues, true learning is organic, is

"educed" and not externally imposed.
In The Child and Curriculum, Dewey argues that if the
"subject-matter . . .

be such as to have an appropriate

place within the expanding consciousness of the child, if it
grows out of his own past doings, thinkings, sufferings
. .

. n o device or trick of method has to be resorted to in

order to enlist interest" (27).

This is exactly

Wordsworth's point when he writes disdainfully of his
Cambridge education where academic prizes became the "trick
of method."

It is also Coleridge's point when he responds

with such ire against the Lancastrian system of punishment.
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Dewey is in complete agreement with Wordsworth and Coleridge
when he argues that
the externally presented material,
conceived and generated in standpoints and
attitudes remote from the child, and
developed in motives alien to him, has no
such place of its own. Hence the recourse
to adventitious leverage to push it in, to
factitious drill to drive it in, to
artificial bribe to lure it in. (The Child
and Curriculum 27).
For Dewey, as for Wordsworth, Coleridge, Mill, and Arnold,
experience generated through perception and an organic
connection between child and subject matter is the more
beneficial path to knowledge than the external method of
drilling facts into passive brains.
Dewey also shares with Wordsworth and Coleridge the
same educational means by which to gain the experience so
crucial to the encompassing intellect: interaction with
nature. In "Democracy in Education," Dewey suggests that in
order to "free the processes of mental growth," "the child
[should be taken] out of doors, widening and organizing his
experiences with reference to the world . .

No real

knowledge is gained about nature, for example, unless it is
"nature study when pursued as a vital observation of forces
working under their natural conditions, plants and animals
growing in their own homes, instead of mere discussion of
dead specimens" (Education Today 71).
Just as Wordsworth suggests it is "murder to dissect,"
Dewey rejects the analytical approach to learning about a
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subject like botany where students are "pulling these
flowers to pieces and giving technical names to the
different parts," without an understanding of the
a whole.

plant as

And to understand it as an integral whole, the

student must see the plant as it is in nature, must see it
in relation to, and interaction with, the soil, water, sun
and air.

In a stance truly reminiscent of Wordsworth, Dewey

argues that "we cannot overlook the importance for
educational purposes of the close intimate acquaintance with
nature at first hand," because in this interaction with
nature comes "continual training of observation, of
ingenuity, [of] constructive imagination . . . "
and Society 11).

(The School

It is this point that Wordsworth makes in

the poem "Tables Turned."

To "hear the woodland linnet" has

more of "wisdom in it," says the poet, than the "dull and
endless strife" of books ill used.

Also like Wordsworth,

Dewey believes that books are misused in traditional
schools.

He is aligned with Wordsworth when he remarks that

it is not a "Philistine attack upon books and reading" that
he has in mind, that the question is not "how to get rid of
them, but how to get their value . . . "
29).

(Education Today

In a Wordsworthian educational scheme, the student is

miseducated if books are not tied to experience, perception,
imaginative activity, and interaction with the world.
Because of his freedom to read what excited him, and because
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of the Hawkshead school which promoted an education of
experience, Wordsworth was an avid reader, and, as Book V of
The Prelude points out, his readings were of great influence
in the shaping of his philosophical mind.

Wordsworth, in

fact, fits the description of Dewey's ideal for learning
through reading:

"the child should have a personal interest

in what is read, a personal hunger for it, and a personal
power of satisfying this appetite" (Education Today 29).
Dewey realizes that a full intellect cannot be nurtured
without the growth of personal experience and without
interaction with nature, for without these, there is no
nourishing of what Coleridge calls "vital excellencies" and
Wordsworth the "vital soul."

As Dewey talks about methods

of learning to read he is arguing that only a "vital
relation" to the subject at hand will breed successful
learning:

most methods "lack the essential of any well-

grounded method, namely relevancy to the child's mental
needs.

No scheme for learning to read can supply this want.

Only . . . putting the child into vital relation to the
materials to be read" (Education Today 28).

True learning

that moves students toward an encompassing intellect must
arise out of the cultivation of Wordsworth's "vital soul,"
Coleridge's "vital excellencies," and out of what Dewey
calls "vital relations" and "vital observations."

If this

is neglected, the student will lack what Dewey has called
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"spontaneous interest" and will instead be "thrown into a
passive, receptive, or absorbing" educational setting where
true learning cannot take place. (Education Today 13).
Like Arnold, Dewey further incorporates Romantic
concepts in his view that "reflection" is a crucial aspect
of the journey toward the encompassing intellect.

He makes

his belief in this matter clear in an essay entitled "Why
Reflective Thinking Must Be an Educational Aim."

Like

Coleridge, he finds that the reflective mind is a
prerequisite to the truly educated intellect:
A person who has gained the power of
reflective attention, the power to hold
problems, questions, before the mind, is in
so far, intellectually speaking, educated.
He has mental discipline— power of the mind
and for the mind. (The School and Society
147).
Coleridge in Aids to Reflection makes similar points and
urges his readers to "Reflect on . . . thoughts, actions,
circumstances . . . "

because not to engage in reflection

results in a mind unable to make connections, unable to
observe the whole.

And as Dewey seconds, "reflective

thinking is a process of detecting relations . . ."
(Education Today 247).8
Coleridge suggests that through reflection we will
nourish a sense of "distinction" and cultivate a questioning
and active mind.

In The School and Society, Dewey makes an

almost identical argument:
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True reflective attention, on the other
hand, always involves judging, reasoning,
deliberation; it means that the child has a
question of his own and is actively engaged
in seeking and selecting relevant material
with which to answer it, consider the
bearings and relations of this
material . . . .
(148) [original emphasis]
The questioning that arises out of reflection leads to
Coleridge's sense of "distinction" which is like Dewey's
selecting of "relevant material."

Finally, for Dewey as for

Coleridge, self-reflection and reflective thinking are
necessary ingredients to intellectual success.

In "The

Process

and Product of Reflective Activity: Psychological

Process

and Logical Form," Dewey wrote that something is

"achieved through conquering, by personal reflection, the
difficulties that prevent immediate overflow into action and
spontaneous success" (Selected Writings 257), or as Arnold
puts it, reflection and self-knowledge are prerequisites to
action.
In John Dewey's educational stance on Progressive
schools and child-centered curricula, we find many
affinities with the Romantics' philosophy on education and
learning.

Dewey argued for Progressive schools, for

instance, because he believed, as did Wordsworth and
Coleridge, that the traditional schools were "hostile to
genuine mental activity and to sincere emotional expression
and growth" (Selected Writings 170-71).

He also objected to

the "separation and compartmentalization of emotion and
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thought, practice from insight, imagination from 'executive
doing'" (Art as Experience 27).

Dewey felt that the mind

could not be educated to its fullest potential in
traditional schools because method relied on Mill's version
of "cram":
emotion.

passivity, drills, and reason separated from
Thus, like the Romantics, he sought an education

that fosters emotion and imagination in conjunction with
analysis and reason.
Not only does Dewey define the same problems with the
school systems as do Wordsworth and Coleridge, but he offers
the same solution when he suggests the "introduction of more
active, expressive, and self-directing factors" (The School
and Society 29).

Dewey is incorporating Romantic ideas into

his own philosophy.

As he writes his educational arguments

for us, he keeps alive some of the ideas articulated by
Wordsworth and Coleridge more than a generation earlier.
Clearly Dewey is passing on some of the most important
concepts and ideas of a Romantic philosophy on education
when he argues that "It is a method of discovery through
search, through inquiry, through testing, through
observation and reflection— all processes requiring activity
of mind rather than merely powers of absorption and
reproduction" (Education

Today 242).

In my discussion of Arnold, Mill, and Dewey, I have
begun to show how pervasive Romantic ideas are, and to make
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explicit part of the "tacit tradition" from which the
current philosophies of Romantic rhetorics arise.9

I have

attempted to illuminate how these three educators, by
enfolding Romantic assumptions and ideas into their own,
have carried forward certain aspects of Wordsworth and
Coleridge's literary and educational thoughts and theories,
and thus point to several avenues by which the Romantic
influence has entered the realm of education and
expressivist composition theory.

I have also shown how

Romanticism emerges even in the most unlikely of places, and
that to reject Romantic philosophies is to discard the key
concepts of Matthew Arnold, John Stuart Mill, and John
Dewey.
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Endnotes

1 This resurgence of Deweyen-like thought is
easily seen in the 1966 Dartmouth Conference on the
teaching of English. The conference participants
encouraged an active rather than passive model of
learning and emphasized self-expression in writing and
language use.
2 M. H. Abrams has pointed out in the Mirror and
the Lamp that in the two essays "What is Poetry?" and
"The Two Kinds of Poetry," Mill relied heavily on
Wordsworth's Preface.
3 Mill's explanation for the healing reads like a
shortened version or paraphrase of Wordsworth's
statement of purpose in the Preface:
to choose incidents and situations from common
life, and to relate or describe them, throughout,
as far as was possible in a selection of language
really used by men, and at the same time, to throw
over them a certain colouring of imagination,
whereby ordinary things should be presented to the
mind in an unusual aspect; and, further, and above
all, to make these incidents and situations
interesting by tracing them, truly though not
ostentatiously, the primary laws of our nature:
chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we
associate ideas in a state of excitement. (Preface
734)
4 Gottfried examines the Romantic influence on
Arnold's poetry and theory of poetics.
5 At one time, Wordsworth even helped the young
Arnold study for an examination.
(Gottfried 6)
6 Coleridge argued that the growth of the
intellect takes place in progression, that the child
begins with a capability limited to appreciating only
"A, and B, and C; but not ABC=X" (Inquiring Spirit
204).
7 M.H. Abrams takes note of the importance of the
plant metaphor to the Romantics in The Mirror and the
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Lamp.
8 Dewey had read Coleridge's Aids to Reflection
and occasionally quotes from this work.
9 Perhaps more than one reader will have noticed
that as this history has unfolded I have neglected to
mention the role that the American counterparts to the
British Romantics might play in past or current
Romantic educational philosophies and rhetorics.
I am
thinking specifically here of the American
Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson. But since I am
not giving a full trajectory or geneology of Romantic
ideas in educational thought and practice, Emerson need
not be a major figure in my study. Further, James
Berlin has already noted Emerson's tie to Romantic
rhetorics and to the practices being established in
current composition textbooks by teachers such as Ken
Macrorie, William Coles, and Donald Stewart.
(See
Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American
Colleges and the 1982 CE article, "Contemporary
Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories".)
I am inclined to remind readers, however, that
Emerson himself is directly shaped by the influence of
the British Romantics, and especially by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. As the American critic F.O. Matthiessen
points out in the acclaimed American Renaissance,
Emerson's belief in the organic principle comes
directly from Colderidge. In fact, Matthiessen even
argues that "the most immediate force behind American
transcendentalism was Coleridge, who gained many ardent
readers in New England . . ." (6).
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CHAPTER III

DISCOVERY, EXPERIENCE, REFLECTION, IMAGINATION:

ROMANTIC

COMPLEXITIES IN ROHMAN, MURRAY, ELBOW, AND BERTHOFF

I have elaborated on the Romantic ideas in the
educational philosophies of Mill, Arnold, and Dewey because
scholars in the field of composition and rhetoric generally
have not considered them as Romantic in any way, nor as
having perpetuated key concepts and "governing ideas" of
Romantic educational philosophies which, in turn, are major
elements in current expressivist rhetorics.

Mill, Arnold,

and Dewey share much of the same philosophical ground as
current expressivists.

As a result they have had a broad

influence on writing teachers, creating a tacit climate of
opinion which we don't recognize as Romantic but which, in
large part, is.

The "vital" elements— feeling, experience,

reflection, imagination— are as important to the current
expressivists as to the three earlier philosophers.
Moreover, these Romantic ideas and "vital elements"
that current expressivists share with the Romantics and with
Mill, Arnold, and Dewey appear to be in response to
historical contexts similar to those that sparked the
original philosophies of the Romantics and the subsequent
expressivist ideas of the later philosophers.

In other
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words, the pedagogies and theories of people like D. Gordon
Rohman, Ann Berthoff, Peter Elbow, and Donald Murray arose
in reaction to the conservative "establishment" which
prescribed a teaching practice of skill, drill, and rote
memorization and which subscribes to a mechanized view of
writing instruction.
By the 1950's American education had swung into another
conservative phase.

Although "progressive" and "new"

educational philosophies were not obsolete, they no longer
held center stage.

Technology continued to advance and

Russia's launching of Sputnik in 1957 pushed the United
States fully into the technological race.

As the nation

progressed as a leader in technology education did reap some
benefits.

Yet, there were negative outcomes from this

technological growth as well.

Teaching practices became

more automated and mechanical, and encouraged student
passivity.

William Van Gil, the Chair of the Department of

Secondary Education at New York University during the early
1960's, noted that the ideas that had occupied John Dewey
were no longer being widely spoken about, and teaching
practices seemed to revert to a traditional view of the
student as a vessel to be filled with knowledge.

This time,

however, the traditional approach had a new technological
twist;
American education in the early 1960's is
engrossed with the application of
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technology to education, by means of
educational television, language
laboratories, courses on film, and
programed learning through teaching
machines. (Van Til 67)
Although we have come to use technology in the classroom
more advantageously in the last decades of the twentieth
century, during the time in which expressivists rhetorics
began to emerge in the 1960's "teaching machines" and
"programed learning"

had become a part of the American

classroom, promoting

once again a mechanical view of

teaching and learning.

This general mechanical approach to

teaching was reflected in writing instruction as well.
"Current-traditional" rhetoric was in vogue, and by the
1960's most writing classes focused on mechanical skill and
"correct" style, and

any emphasis on process and the

student's role in self-expression

was rare. Writing

was not

seen as generative nor as an act of discovering meaning.
When students wrote they did not focus on invention or ideas
but rather were taught to focus on the product and to
practice writing in certain models or modes.

In reaction to

this, the pedagogies that we have come to call "Romantic" or
"expressivist" reentered the educational conversation.

D.

Gordon Rohman's work on "pre-writing" refocused composition
instruction from mechanics, style, and product to invention
and process.

The 1966 conference at Dartmouth College on

the teaching of English emphasized self-expression and an
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active rather than passive model for the teaching and
learning of writing.
What I am arguing, then, is that expressivist rhetorics
are linked to the Romantics and to Mill, Arnold, and Dewey,
in that they arose in response to similar kinds of social
circumstances or historical patterns and not only through
direct influence.

Expressivists such as Berthoff, Elbow,

and Murray build their theories on foundations similar to
those of the earlier poets and philosophers.

In fact, the

crux of expressivist theory is based on a desire to create a
pedagogy that not only cultivates writing capabilities, but
develops students7 minds to their greatest capacity.

A

pedagogy that works toward these ends according to
expressivist doctrine, relies on what I have identified in
the philosophies of the Romantics and in Mill, Arnold, and
Dewey as discovery, experience, reflection, and imagination.
These are the Romantic ideas that have flourished in
response to mechanical and passive educational philosophies
and product-centered writing instruction.

While neo

classical rhetorics and cognitive writing theories also
arose in reaction to product-centered writing instruction,
these approaches still viewed writing as a linear and
hierarchical activity which could be analyzed in terms of
separate units or stages.

Expressivist theory, however,

does not view the act of composing as linear or
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hierarchical, but rather as a blending of experience,
reflection, discovery, analysis, synthesis, reason, and
imagination.

It is in this recursive blending of these

"vital" actions that we can see the Romantic legacy.
This project is not, however, a definitive genealogy of
Romantic ideas, but, in its larger scope, a critique of
anti-Romantic and anti-expressivist arguments and most
importantly a defense of Romanticism in its original
richness, a richness that has contributed not only to the
work of three very influential philosophers, but to
expressivist rhetorics as well.

There are many names, in

fact, that I might invoke in a discussion of the influence
of Romanticism on current composition theory:

James

Moffett, William Coles, Ken Macrorie, James Britton, Walker
Gibson, Toby Fulwiler, Janet Eraig, D. Gordon Rohman, Peter
Elbow, Ann Berthoff, and Donald Murray.

I will focus on the

last four, all of whom have been associated at some point
with expressivist rhetorics.

Discussions on the aspects of

their pedagogy and theory that relate directly to the
tradition of British Romanticism, however, have been few in
number and limited in scope.

If, for example, the

relationships have been noted between freewriting and
spontaneity, or between pre-writing and the imagination, the
notation of likeness has been merely cursory and without
full recognition of the complexity and depth of the ties to
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the Romantic poets.

I have chosen these four scholars,

moreover, because D. Gordon Rohman's highly influential
article in 1965 on pre-writing is a key expressivist
document, and because Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff are the
most often beleaguered representatives of the expressivist
movement.

They are recognized as having Romantic

assumptions at their theoretical center, but at best this
recognition is cursory and is seen as a negative attribute.
Yet, the grounding for their theories includes the most
admirable of Romantic assumptions:

the belief that students

should be given every opportunity to cultivate the
encompassing intellect.
As I have noted, the expressivist ties to Romanticism
have thus far been merely surface recognitions.

Lester

Faigley, for example, notes that "good writing" according to
expressivists includes essential qualities of Romantic
expressive poetry ("Competing Theories of Process 529).

He

mentions "integrity, spontaneity, and originality," but he
does not explore the complexity and richness of the larger
Romantic philosophy from which expressivist ideas such as
spontaneity arise.

Similarly, Richard Young, although he

admits that we lack "the historical studies" that permit
generalizing with confidence, notes that the expressivist
position seems
a reaffirmation of the vitalist philosophy
of an old romanticism enriched by modern
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psychology,
it maintains that the
composing process is, or should be,
relatively free of deliberate control; that
intellect is no more in touch with reality
than non-logical processes; and that the
act of composing is a kind of mysterious
growth fed by what Henry James called "the
deep well of unconscious cerebration (1934
p. 23)." Above all, it insists on the
primacy of the imagination in the composing
process. ("Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks"
55)
Young points to the expressivist ties to Romanticism but he
glosses over the major elements without supplying any of the
"historical studies" that would show whether current
expressivists actually are descendants of Romanticism, and
if so, how these ideas of "mysterious growth," "unconscious
cerebration," and "imagination" play themselves out in
expressivist theory and pedagogy.
What I will show, through a less cursory examination
than either Faigley or Young offer, are the specific ways in
which certain Romantic ideas are incorporated into the
theories and pedagogies of current expressivist
rhetoricians.

What will become evident as the expressivist

ties to Romanticism are more fully articulated is that the
theories and pedagogies of teachers such as Donald Murray,
Ann Berthoff, and Peter Elbow form a coherent group of ideas
that are founded on shared assumptions which do indeed
include the "primacy of the imagination," as well as
"unconscious cerebration," and "spontaneity."

This is not

to say, however, that each of these expressivist scholars is
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identical to the others in theory or practice, for
certainly, as Lovejoy argues for Romanticism, "there is
. . . plurality of romanticisms, of possibly quite distinct
thought-complexes" (68).

Yet, just as Wellek counter argues

in the debate on Romanticism, I would submit that among
expressivists there are, in spite of various differences, "a
unity of theories" that "form a coherent group of ideas"
("The Concept of Romanticism" 182).

Thus far,

as the

passages from Young and Faigley suggest, the identification
of these unifying theories have been

merely noted

buthave

not been explored in any depth.
Before turning directly to Rohman, Berthoff, Elbow and
Murray, however, I would like to begin with a brief
digression on Francis Christensen as a way of further
showing how the Romantic influence will often appear in
theorists and teachers who have not typically been labeled
expressivists. Christensen, I suggest, was in fact Romantic
in his philosophy on the construction of sentences and
paragraphs even though he is often defined as a "formalist,"
a term usually used in opposition to expressivism (Gere 31).
Christensen's "A Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence" first
appeared in the October 1963 issue of College Composition
and Communication.1

Although Christensen is not generally

perceived as an expressivist, this essay and the work that
followed on the generative paragraph are grounded in

113

Romantic theories of language.

My point in looking briefly

at Christensen is to underscore my belief that the Romantic
influence is more pervasive and profound than we have
realized.
In "The Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence,"
Christensen expresses his discontent with the traditional
approach to the teaching of sentence-production.

He

suggests that "tear-out work books and four-pound
anthologies" are ways of avoiding the hard work it would
take to make a difference in student understandings of
language.

It may not seem likely, at first glance, that a

discussion of the grammatical unit of the sentence, written
from such a great distance in time from Wordsworth and
Coleridge, would bear their influence.

But the method

Christensen would like to see in place of workbook drills is
Romantic in theory.

"We need," he argues, "a rhetoric of

the sentence that will do more than combine the ideas of
primer sentences.

We need one that will generate ideas"

(Graves 110).
Christensen perceives language as the Romantics do: as
productive and creative.

He suggests that when writing is

successful it is not merely ornamental and static.

Thus,

Christensen offers the cumulative sentence as the foundation
for generative writing because it is "dynamic rather than
static, representing the mind thinking" (111-12).

The
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representation of the "mind thinking" is a key Romantic
concept.

Christensen's position here is the one articulated

by Wordsworth and Coleridge in response to the eighteenthcentury view of language.

It is their belief that language

is creative, and their poems in effect are meant to be the
linguistic representative of "the mind thinking."2
Moreover, Wordsworth rejected the use of personification
when used merely as ornamentation, because like Christensen
he sees language as generative.

When using personification

in his own poetry, Wordsworth insisted that he was not using
it for ornamentation, but that it grew naturally out of the
passion and the language and context of the creative moment.
In his discussion on the grammar of the sentence,
Christensen relies on organic analogies in order to
establish that the cumulative sentence mirrors live and
productive language in action.

The cumulative sentence,

says Christensen, is "probing its bearing and implications,
exemplifying it or seeking an analogy or metaphor for it, or
reducing it to details.

Thus the mere form of the sentence

generates ideas" (112).

Coleridge's position on language

also relies on an organic theory.

In the Preface of Aids to

Reflection he reminds us that words are "living powers," and
in a letter to Godwin that words are "parts and germinations
of the Plant," they are "Things, and living Things
too"(Collected Letters of STC Vol. 1 626).
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In this cursory gloss of Christensen's position on
language, we can see that the "Generative Rhetoric of the
Sentence" bears a Romantic influence.

And in his argument

against a traditional grammar and for a generative one,
Christensen is searching for a theory and method that
reveals "the language as it operates" rather than one that
"leaves everything, to borrow a phrase from Wordsworth, 'in
disconnection dead and spiritless'" (112).

I am not

suggesting that the Romantic influence is the only one that
Christensen's work reveals.

It would be hard to imagine,

for instance, that an article written in 1963 about
"generative" language might not bear the mark of Chomsky as
well.

What I am suggesting, however, is that the Romantic

influence is perhaps more pervasive, profound and valuable
than we have previously explored, and in my consideration of
Rohman, Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff I hope to illuminate
what some of those deeper Romantic ties might be.

D. Gordon Rohman
It is much less surprising to find Romantic metaphors
and Romantic ways of "knowing and doing" in D. Gordon
Rohman's 1965 article on Pre-Writing ("Pre-Writing: The
Stage of Discovery in the Writing Process") than in
Christensen's "The Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence."
The assumption underlying the practice of pre-writing is
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that students can write well, with "originality" and
"spontaneity," if they can just discover the "exceptional
power of revealing experience by expressing it first to
[themselves] (Pre-Writing), and then to others
(Communicating) so that we recognize the experience as our
own too" (108).

Rohman believes, then, that pre-writing

allows the writer to discover experience.
Further, pre-writing for Rohman is tied to generative
thought, and thinking he describes as "that activity of mind
which brings forth and develops ideas, plans, designs, not
merely the entrance of an idea into one's mind; an active,
not a passive enlistment in the 'cause' of an idea . . ."
(106).

Thus, pre-writing is a creative act, defined in

terms kindred to the Romantic Imagination. In fact, in their
study on pre-writing, Rohman and his colleagues "sought ways
for students to imitate the "creative principle" itself
which produces finished works" (107).

Much like Arnold's

call for non-mechanical exercises that would introduce
"creative activity," the pre-writing activities are meant to
stimulate the imagination, the "dynamics of creation," so
that good writing can occur.

And "good writing" itself is

an imaginative act according to Rohman, which closely
resembles Coleridge's description of the creative
imagination;
The meaning of writing is the meaning of
the combination, the pattern that the
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meaning of the many words makes when fused
by a writer/s consciousness in the moment
of "discovery." (107).
Good writing comes from shaping, through a combinatory act
(Secondary Imagination), patterns determined in an
experience (Primary Imagination), an experience discovered
through pre-writing.

Worthwhile writing, says Rohman in a

truly Romantic fashion, is that discovered "combination of
words" which allows for "fresh and original" insight.
In order to help students "imitate the creative
principle itself," Rohman and his colleagues employed the
keeping of journals, the practice of religious-like
Meditation, and the use of analogy as teaching techniques.
The use of analogy, writes Rohman, enables us "to know
anything in our present simply because we have known similar
things in our past to which we compare the present.

Each

act of present 'knowing' associates the present with the
past as another instance" (111).

This associative or

analogical "knowing" is a way of "rearranging and
reassembling the focus of our experience" (111).
use of analogy is creative.

Thus, this

Further, argues Rohman,

analogy also provides practice with the
concrete world of the five senses, and, by
enlisting the student writer in a
personally-experienced encounter with his
subject freshly seen from the perspective
of a new analogy, we have provided him with
the "motor" to make his subject "go" for
him.
(Ill)
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In other words, analogy can help the student, as Wordsworth
puts it, to "throw over" an incident "a certain colouring of
imagination," and thereby lead to poetry in the poet's case,
and good writing in the student's.
Since Rohman's assumption is that writing is a
"personally transformed experience of an event," he suggests
the technique of Meditation as a method that might give
students "an inner knowledge transforming their 'events'
into 'experiences'" (109).

What he is after here, though

perhaps in a less extreme way, is the sort of mystical
experience that Wordsworth retells in the boat-stealing
episode in The Prelude.

Taking the boat onto the lake was

merely an event, but Wordsworth's "meditative" powers, his
ability to "transform" this event into an experience,
brought the mountains alive and closing rapidly upon his
back.

This was an event that he transformed into an

experience powerful enough to play a part in shaping the
philosophical mind of the poet. Rohman sees the practice of
Meditation achieving the effect of an experience no longer
merely happening "to you but in
with the young Wordsworth.

you" just as it happened

Since Pre-Writing and Meditation

issue "from the same sort of dynamic interplay of self and
world," the Meditation can help lead to the imitation of the
creative principle that Rohman assumes Pre-Writing is.
Rohman#s students were also asked to keep journals in
which they wrote daily. They were given a long list of
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questions that would hopefully provoke them to discovery of
"what they believed, what they felt, what they knew" (109).
Rohman and his colleagues were attempting to guide the
students into the kind of reflective state that Coleridge,
Arnold, and Dewey demand of the educated mind. Rohman
explains that "in the process of introspection, formalized
by the daily writing in the journal, we hoped to mobilize
the consciousness of every student writer" (109).

In other

words, his hope is to foster, through reflective writing,
the "distinct consciousness" that Coleridge claims comes
from the same source: self-reflection.
In D. Gordon Rohman's initiatory article on Pre-Writing
(bear in mind that in the twenty-five years following its
publication that pre-writing became a term inevitably
associated with expressive rhetorics), we can find a
methodology that is based on Romantic assumptions about the
creative imagination.

He believes that as teachers we must

foster experience and reflection in our students so that the
"creative principle" can be imitated through pre-writing.

Donald Murray
Donald Murray, one of the best-known writing teachers
in the field, has been talking and publishing about the
process of writing since the early 1960's.

He might be
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seen, in fact, as one of the earliest of what we today are
calling expressivist rhetoricians.

He is usually noted as

such because of his insistence on the importance of the
process as opposed to product and the value he places on
individual voice.

At any rate, he is clearly another

composition specialist whose theory and practice have deeper
roots within the Romantic tradition than those usually
observed.

Murray often argues, for instance, that writing

courses must go against the traditional classroom techniques
and curricula.

He makes this case because, as Wordsworth

and Coleridge were over a hundred and seventy years ago, he
is aware that real learning rarely takes place in classrooms
that focus on rote memorization and passive reception of
facts.

He strongly believes that students do not learn to

write under the circumstances or method of teaching that
Dewey calls the "phonographic disc" method in which
teachers' impressions are "described" upon the student's
mind.

In response to writing courses grounded in the

traditional educational schemes, Murray offers a theory and
pedagogy of composition which he hopes will foster what I am
calling the encompassing intellect.
Like other Romantic philosophies on pedagogy, Murray's
model for the teaching of writing is based on discovery of
the inner self, perception, and reflection. These, in turn,
lead to imaginative thinking and writing.

While reflecting
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on a piece of his own writing, for instance, he chronicles
the progression from perception to the moment when the
writing comes together:
There is the surprise of perception that I
experience when the character in my novel
saw no color. There is the surprise of
recollection when I heard that terrible
cough left over from a previous war. There
is the surprise of connection when I relate
my surprise in writing . . . There is the
surprise of celebration when we re-create
something. . . the surprise of pattern when
a whole complex of connections click into
place on the page, [emphasis added]
("Writing and Teaching for Surprise"
Expecting the Unexpected: Teaching Myself—
and Others— to Read 9)
In this discussion on surprise we can see a list of terms
that as a whole are clearly Romantic in complexion:
"perception," "experience," "recollection," "connection,"
"re-create," "pattern," "whole."
As the Romantics argued, to see, feel, hear, smell,
and taste the outer world allows for the growth of the inner
self; to actively engage the senses tills the soil of the
soul for the fertile harvest of experience.

The ability to

perceive through all the senses leads to what Wordsworth has
called a more "lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and
tenderness . . .

a greater knowledge of human nature"

(Preface to the Second Edition of the Lyrical Ballads 737).
And, in "Frost at Midnight," while speaking of the future
education and mental growth of his infant son, Coleridge
likewise stresses the importance of communing with, of
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perceiving through the senses, the mountains, lakes, and
shores of the natural world.

Along with this external

world, "Frost at Midnight" portrays the poet's mind at work,
looking inward,

perceiving, as it were, the internal world

of the self.
Murray, recognizing the importance of gaining
experience through perception, has incorporated this
Romantic philosophy into his teaching.

The full intellect,

and thus the capable writer, is like the satellite, says
Murray.

The writer actively places herself in strategic

places so that she is always "receiving" and "collecting"
(IVrite to Learn).

Murray's metaphor of the satellite

antenna, though it might appear a non-Romantic metaphor, is
in some ways analogous to Wordsworth's "wise passiveness."
Although this receiving through the senses can be

merely

passive, it is, as Wordsworth suggests, "wise" because the
passive receptiveness is the basis for perceiving and
experiencing, and being wisely passive leads to growth of a
great mind.

Murray has said that the writing course is the

practice of perception (Learning By Teaching 117).
"Internal Revision: A Process of Discovery," Murray
discusses what he calls "prevision":
This term encompasses everything that
precedes the first draft— receptive
experience, such as awareness (conscious
and unconscious), observation, remembering;
and exploratory experience such as

In
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research, reading, interviewing, and notetaking. (Learning by Teaching 73).
Experience, the process of taking inward what the world
offers, is an important step toward effective writing, and
learning to perceive leads to experience.
The reflective state is also a must in learning to
write well for Murray. If we do not cultivate reflection,
according to Murray, we will not be able to make meaning
through language.

Today's world does not allow the time

needed for the inward looks afforded by reflection, and
thus, Murray makes a point of starting the day with
stillness in which he may "stare vacantly out the window"
and into himself, "notebook open, pen uncapped" (Reading for
Surprise" Expecting the Unexpected 21).

If he bypasses the

reflective state, the writing will not work.

It will be

like trying to make "mashed potatoes pass through a
keyhole."

In order for it to work, we must return to that

"reflective state" where we can "play with language,
connecting and disconnecting, listening for voice" ("Writing
and Teaching for Surprise" Expecting the Unexpected 8).
This reflective state can also result in what Murray
calls surprise. Surprise for him is like Wordsworth's and
Dewey's

spontaneity.

from within us.

It is when something suddenly arises

It is finding the unexpected.

It is when

we put ourselves in touch with the perceptions, feelings,
and experiences that we have internalized.

It is yet
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another form of self-discovery.

And the "wonderful thing

about surprise" says Murray in "Writing for Surprise," is
that "the more you experience surprise the easier it becomes
to experience it.

Surprise breeds surprise.

And you can

learn to be patient at your desk waiting for surprise to
land" (Expecting the Unexpected 6).

Once it has "landed,"

this surprise is likely to be the nugget for a good piece of
writing.
It is important to note here that surprise in Murray's
terminology, and spontaneity in the Romantics', is not
something that just happens if people are lucky, and does
not happen if they are down on their luck.

Rather, surprise

and spontaneity are cultivated through receptivity and
reflection.

It comes out of perception, feeling,

experience, and practiced reflection.
opening the mind to experience.

They come from

As David Perkins explains

in Wordsworth and the Poetry of Sincerity, spontaneity
begins in a concrete immediacy, and goes on
to ponder it in discursive terms. Out of
a particular experience and reflection upon
it, the poetry builds toward a moment of
insight, when a general truth seems to
break upon the mind with compelling force.
(23)
Surprise for Murray is this "moment of insight" as it
"breaks upon the mind."

Thus, the habit of reflection

allows for the mind, as Wordsworth puts it in the Preface,
to be "connected with important subjects" (Second Edition
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735).

Once the connection is made, Wordsworth can compose

"blindly" (Preface Second Edition 735), just as Murray lets
his pen be "the blind man's cane."
Murray's privileging of surprise is also tied to the
Romantic idea of

organicism.The writing should come

as

"easily as leaves to the tree" as Keats argues, from a "germ
within" as Coleridge suggests, or as the "tree does from the
vital principle that actuates it" as Wordsworth says.

Not

to let the writing take this organic path is to place the
writer at risk.

Murray cautions, for instance, that "we run

the danger of closing down thinking, exploration, and
discovery" if we impose pre-established form to the
surprise, the insight, or the writing.

What we must do,

urges Murray, like the Romantics before him, is to trust to
the organic nature of creating meaning— the organic nature
of the imaginative act.

It is a mistake to "pay too much

attention to genre at the wrong time," he warns ("First
Silence, then Paper" Expecting the Unexpected 45).

Instead,

we need to allow the surprise, the thought, the word, or the
line to "lead us to form.
Further, it

And it should" (45).

is Murray's belief that if we have a theory

and pedagogy forwriting that cultivates

discovery,

perception, and reflection, we not only have a basis for
surprise and spontaneity, but for the imaginative act of
making meaning out of language as well.

He sees writing as
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active and creative, for instance.

It calls on innumerable

imaginative processes. It is, in his view, ever moving, ever
changing perception, collecting, focusing, and ordering.
Writing makes "meaning out of chaos" ("Reading for Surprise"
24).

The language that Murray uses when he speaks of this

act of meaning making is akin to the Romantic imagination:
Words . . . allow us to play with
information, to make connections and
patterns, to put together and take apart
and put together again, to see what
experience means. In other words, to think.
(Write to Learn 3)
Murray's passage echoes Wordsworth's definition of the
imagination as a "modifying power" capable of "consolidating
numbers into unity, and dissolving and separating unity into
number."

It is very close to Coleridge's definition of the

Secondary Imagination which, Coleridge claims, shapes
perception and experience into patterns and connections by
fusing together and taking apart.
In Donald Murray, then, we can find kinships with the
Romantic poets.

Some of these ties are to the more complex

Romantic traditions that he also shares with Mill, Arnold,
and Dewey such as the belief in discovery, feeling,
perception, experience, and reflection.

We can note

parallel theories of organicism and similar descriptions of
imaginative acts.

Finally, we can recognize, in Murray's

strategies for the teaching of writing, the Romantic poets'
educational ideas for the fostering of the philosophical
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mind.

We can see Murray's attempts to cultivate the

intellect so that the student's imaginative mind can make
meaning through language.

As Murray tells his students, in

words which resonate a clear Romantic tone, "write and look
to yourself, pay attention to what you feel, what you say,
how you say it, how you create a situation that makes your
best writing possible" ("Reading while Writing" Expecting
the Unexpected 108).

Peter Elbow
Peter Elbow, well-known as a composition theorist since
the late 1960's, must be acknowledged in any discussion of
Romantic rhetoric.

Current scholars in the field

continually place him as an expressivist, primarily, it
seems, because of his focus on freewriting and voice.

Both

freewriting and voice are philosophical and pedagogical
aspects of any discussion on writing for Elbow, because they
naturally arise out of a concern with the writing process.
Freewriting, as Elbow describes it, is simply writing
without stopping for five or ten minutes, simply letting the
words tumble out and onto the page.

The goal is not good,

polished writing, but a stream of consciousness. The focus
is on the process, not the product. If we write freely
during the first stage of our writing process according to
Elbow, we "will warm up all [our] faculties" (Writing With
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Power 10).

In Writing Without Teachers, Elbow describes

this process as "cooking" and "growing"— metaphors that
would feel quite comfortable to the Romantics.

Once the

faculties are warm, the possibility then exists for entire
pieces of writing to

"cook perfectly" in our heads.

These

pieces will "grow out of that magic which some excellent
writers can call on at will: simultaneous creativity and
critical thinking" (Writing With Power 10).

The sort of

spontaneity that Elbow suggests happens with freewriting is
the surprise that Murray cultivates.

This spontaneity comes

from stimulating what lies within our unconscious.

Once

tapping what lies below our consciousness the good writing
can begin to flow, just as Coleridge claimed it did for him
in the creation of Kubla Khan.
Elbow also claims that freewriting can help in the
development of a writer's voice, and what voice in writing
implies for him is "words that capture the sound of an
individual on the page" (287).

"Writing without voice,’* he

claims, "is wooden or dead because it lacks sound, rhythm,
energy, and individuality" (299).

Elbow's project for the

contemporary writer is like that of the Romantic poets for
their poetry.

They rejected, for instance, much of

eighteenth-century poetry which they felt was "dead and
spiritless" precisely because it lacked the "energy and
individuality" which came with infusing the writing with the
experiences, feelings, passions, and voice of the poet.
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In his quest for what he identifies as voice, it is
easy to assume that Elbow neglects quality.

Elbow himself

acknowledges that he faces these charges (WWP 300), but one
way in which he finds freewriting valuable is that in spite
of the fact that it can turn out "careless, excessive, or
self-indulgent writing," it can also nurture voice and lead
to good writing. Thus, in his answer to the charges that he
ignores quality, Elbow retorts:
My theory of voice helps me trust my own
taste and deal with the accusation that I
don't care about quality.
I now see that
caring about quality has two different
meanings and springs from two different
temperamental approaches to writing. On
the one hand caring about quality implies a
hunger to stamp out terrible writing. A
hunger to destroy defects, failing, excess,
and ugliness. I don't have this hunger.
I
am content to let people write much that is
bad . . . On the other hand, caring about
quality implies hungering for excellencies,
wanting the real thing, not settling for
mere adequacy. That's me. I want the
moon. (301)
Elbow is not ignoring quality. He is out to get what is
"real" and moving, exactly I would add, what the Romantics
wanted for their poetry.

As Elbow unabashedly admits, he

and his students produce much that is not top-notch writing,
just as the Romantics wrote a great deal of second-rate
poetry.

Nonetheless, Elbow's students do produce good

writing and the Romantics have given us some of the greatest
poetry of the English language.
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Elbow also argues that there are many benefits that
arise from student writers' search for voice.

It can lead

them "toward new thought, feelings, memories and new modes
of seeing and writing" (Writing with Power 284).
it leads to discovery on many levels.

In effect,

It also prompts

reflective writing which leads to a "greater connection
between their writing and themselves," which in turn leads
to "growth or development" (284).

Reflection occurs because

the search for voice means exploring "angry feelings,
perhaps depressed feelings, perhaps a particular area of
their lives" (284).

Coleridge felt that a lack of

reflective thinking and writing led to stasis, but that
active self-reflection led to mental growth;

Arnold

believed that the instructor's "prime direct aim is to
enable a man to know himself and his world" in order to take
any worthwhile action which could lead to intellectual
development; Elbow believes that freewriting and the search
for voice are catalysts to reflective thinking and writing
which result in "growth or development" (284).

The growth

Elbow speaks of might come about through writing to voice
anger, hurt, or betrayal.

The crux here is feelings, and

giving vent to feelings gives way to the sorts of healing
and growth that Mill found inherent in Wordsworth's poetry.
Elbow is careful to explain more fully what he means by
feelings and emotions as they relate to good writing,
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however.

He is aware that he may have "made real voice

sound as though it is always full of loud emotion" (312).
His message is not that writers must always be writing lots
of "strong feelings," but that they must "experience" what
they are writing about.

He means something "much closer to

'should see and hear7 than 'should feel strongly7" (333).
Elbow grants that feelings naturally occur when we
experience something fully but that strong feelings alone do
not make good writing, and often, in fact, make bad writing.
To be good, says Elbow, writing must come out of the "event
or scene itself" (334).

In order to experience something

again we must go back and "see, smell, and hear everything":
Direct all your efforts into experiencing—
or re-experiencing— what you are writing
about. Put all your energy into connecting
with the object. Be there. See it.
Participate in whatever you are writing
about and then just let the words come of
their own accord.
(335)
Elbow further concentrates on ways of experiencing and
ways to bring about re-experiences because like Wordsworth
he believes that the ability to really experience something
is educated out of children:
As children get older and more
sophisticated, they get better at making
the kind of refusal to experience that most
adults are good at. At a certain age— often
adolescence— we see a child working
overtime to strengthen these refusal
muscles. (321)
In poems like "We Are Seven," Wordsworth is arguing that the
ability to imagine, to experience or re-experience, has
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vanished by adulthood.

The adult in this poem insists that

the little girl and her siblings are five in number, not
seven, since two "in the church-yard lie."

The child,

however, is re-experiencing play as it was when her siblings
were alive: she is able, as Elbow puts it, to "see, hear,
and smell everything":
seven!'."

"'Nay'," says the child, "'we are

Like the Romantics' desire to maintain the "fresh

gaze of a child with the obstinate integrity of a man
consulting his own experience, and hence thinking outside
traditional categories or interpretations" (Perkins 65),
Elbow wants his students to be able to experience in order
to think and write well.

Ann Berthoff
Ann Berthoff is forthright about her ties to
Romanticism, and in fact, calls on Coleridge at every turn.
He is, according to Berthoff, "our best guide in developing
a philosophy of rhetoric" (The Making of Meaning 64).

Her

philosophy and pedagogy of composition are based on the idea
of "reclaiming the imagination" and she uses Coleridge's
definitions of the imagination as her starting point.
Berthoff argues for the "reclaiming of the imagination"
as a necessity because positivists have relegated it to what
they call the "affective domain."

Berthoff understands,

however, that in its complexity the Romantic imagination
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does not pertain solely to emotions and feeling as opposed
to thought.

She sees the imagination, as Coleridge does, a

way of knowing and making meaning.
thought as well as feeling.

Its domain includes both

The imagination, in Berthoff#s

scheme, is synonymous with the "active mind."

It is akin to

Arnold's "vital knowledge" and Mill's "vigourous" mind.

She

defines and redefines the imagination throughout her various
works in Coleridge's language:

it is "the shaping spirit";

it is a "doer, an agent"; it is the "form-finding formcreating power"; it is, she says, as Coleridge wrote "in one
of the most famous passages in the literature of criticism
. . ., 'the living power and prime agent of all human
perception'" (The Making of Meaning 28).
Berthoff's point is that once we have restored
imagination to its proper realm, we have the perfect theory
on which to build a pedagogy for composition because it
gives us a basis for generating a concept of "forming":
Its power lies in the fact that it makes
possible so many fruitful analogies between
writing and all other acts of mind whereby
we make sense of the world. Imagination
can help us form the concept of forming.
Forming depends on abstraction,
symbolization, selection, "purposing"; it
requires or enables us to coordinate and
subordinate, to amalgamate, discard, and
expand; it is our means of giving shape to
content.
(The Making of Meaning 4)
Here we not only see Berthoff's allegiance to the Romantic
definition of the imagination, but to the idea that
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language, or writing, is in itself a creative and forming
act as well.

"When we write," she says, "we represent our

recognitions of relationships: that is what composing means"
(Reclaiming the Imagination: Philosophical Perspectives For
Writers and Teachers of Writing 1).
For Berthoff as for the Romantics and Mill, Arnold, and
Dewey, the imagination is a crucial part of a fully capable
intellect, and she relies on the Romantic means of nurturing
the imagination in her own method of teaching.

She suggests

that as teachers we must realize that "perception" is an
important model for the "process of making meaning" (The
Making of Meaning 46).

She argues that every composition

course should begin with activities meant to stimulate
observation because the ability to see and re-see is vital
to the imagination.

Observation is so important because

looking closely is active and engages the mind.

Without an

actively engaged mind, no composing will take place.

She

recommends writing assignments such as a detailed record of
ten minutes of observation and reflection carried out daily
for a week.

Close "descriptions and speculations in

response to a seashell, a milkweed pod, a chestnut burr, or
any natural object" could reap a rich harvest for the mind.
But we must remember to "think of perception as visual
thinking" or as Dewey would also argue, observation becomes
a mechanical exercise for the sake of producing "vivid
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detail about nothing much" as opposed to what it really is:
the "mind in action" (64).
A theory of imagination not only provides occasions for
the practice of perception, in Berthoff/s estimation, but it
gives us a new way to approach language instruction, even at
the very basic level of the sentence.

She concedes that

"drill can teach youngsters— and college freshman— how to
correct faulty sentences in workbooks," but drill is
inadequate because it "cannot teach them to write
substantial, readable sentences" (The Making of Meaning 24).
To really "compose" sentences and not just glue together
"somebody else's pretend subsentences, we will have to know
something about language as . . .
knowledge" (24).

a means of making

Language, and thus writing, for Berthoff

as for her Romantic mentor, are alive and powerful.
creates meaning.

Writing

It is an act of forming and shaping.

is the recognition of relationships.

It

The process of

composing is analogous to the imagination in action.
Berthoff offers the double-entry notebook as a
pedagogical technique that arises from a theory of the
imagination, and thus one that can teach students to "really
compose."

Her approach is to have students write

continuously in a spiral-bound notebook.

On the right side

they make reading notes on "direct quotations, observational
notes, fragments, lists, images— verbal and visual" (The
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Making of Meaning 45).

On the other side they make notes

and observations about their original entries.

The double

entry format, suggests Berthoff, "provides a way for the
student to conduct that 'continuing audit of meaning' that
is at the heart of learning to read and write critically.
The facing pages are in dialogue with one another" (45).

in

the double-entry notebook Berthoff brings the processes of
reading and writing together.

She believes that writing in

this way can help develop a critical method of reading as
well as writing because it gives students access to watching
a text come into being, in this case their own.

It also

encourages the habits of "reflective questioning in the
process of reading" (45), which, we will remember, is what
Coleridge urges us to do in Aids to Reflection.

If we do

not consider each part of the text in relation to ourselves
through this kind of reflective questioning, then, according
to Coleridge, we cannot cultivate the "educated mind" or
what I call the encompassing intellect.
Berthoff also finds the double-entry notebook useful in
that it sets up a dialectic in the juxtaposition of entries,
which is important to Berthoff*s method and theory of
imagination because she believes that composing is a
dialectical process.

Through this dialectic students are

able to generate new meaning.

Here again her affinity with

Coleridge is a strong one. In the creation of art, in the
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voluntary action of what Coleridge calls the Secondary
Imagination, are embedded reflective and dialectical
processes.

For Coleridge this dialectic takes the form of

the "reconciliation of opposites." As the mind is engaged in
the creative act of finding "multeity in unity," it engages
in a dialectic of self and world, matter and spirit, nature
and mind, object and subject.

As the mind engages in this

dialectic, meaning is forged through a "progression of
contraries."

Berthoff's aim for the composition of new

meaning through dialectic is similar.

When students write,

observe, and reflect about nature, about objects, about
their world, about their reading, writing, and thinking in
the double-entry journals, they are faced with the
dichotomies between subject and object, self and world, mind
and nature.

As they return to their original entries to

summarize, formulate, find likeness in difference, they are
performing the creative act of composing— forming new
meaning.
If this dialectical process seems potentially chaotic
for students, it is.

In "Learning the Uses of Chaos,"

Berthoff argues that "learning to write is a matter of
learning to tolerate ambiguity" (The Making of Meaning 71).
She notes that chaos is scary for both students and
teachers, but that if we give in to it and understand it can
enhance composing.

"Meanings," argues Berthoff, "don't come
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out of the air; we make them out of a chaos of images, halftruth, remembrances, syntactic fragments, from the
mysterious and unformed" (70).

It is these sorts of

"mysterious and unformed" images and remembrances from which
Coleridge claims to have created the poem "Kubla Khan."

And

likewise, it is from chaos that the Kubla Khan decrees his
"stately pleasure dome" within the poem.

If, as teachers,

we can encourage our students to accept chaos by cultivating
Keats's negative capability as Berthoff argues we can, or as
Coleridge has done in the creation of "Kubla Khan," they
begin to find meanings which "can be discerned taking shape
within it" (70-71).

Berthoff suggests that the way to do so

is to design assignments that let student writers discover
the potential of language by playing with it, working it,
pushing it to its limits.

They must reflect on it and

recognize that it is dynamic.

If we can design courses that

allow this then students will learn to tolerate ambiguity
and chaos.

And since chaos generates language, argues

Berthoff, students "can learn to write by learning the uses
of chaos, which is to say, rediscovering the power of
language to generate the sources of meaning" (70).
Ann Berthoff is one of the most philosophical of
composition scholars writing today.

Much of her philosophy

is grounded in the complex theories of knowing and creating
that Coleridge set forth in the Biographia Literaria, and
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she continually relies on his definitions of the
imagination.

She understands, as Coleridge did, that in

order to write or compose we must "learn to intuit,” to "see
how things are related," to "grasp" the "relationship of
parts to the meaning of a whole" (The Making of Meaning 57).
She demands that we "reclaim the imagination," because once
we have done so, we have a method for teaching that
"recognizes the human need and ability to shape,
discriminate, select" (29).

Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff, the three scholars still
active in the teaching of composition, are not carbon copies
of each other.
vary.

Their interests, theories and pedagogies do

Yet, they also share certain characteristics and

assumptions that arose in the 1960 #s with the advent of the
New Rhetoric which sparked an interest in writing as a
process.

They hold the belief that writing is a complex

process, and thus writing pedagogy should focus on this
process, and they contend that our students will not learn
to write well until they understand writing as a process.
This is not to say that the written "product" is not
important.

Rather, they argue, a poem, a story, an essay,

or a research paper does not mysteriously appear, in
finished form, on the page or screen in front of us.
Their theories differ from other process-oriented
writing theories such as neo-classical and cognitive
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approaches, however, in that an expressivist does not see
the process in terms of linearity, hierarchy, and in
discrete units that can be clearly separated into stages.
Linda Flower, the leading proponent of cognitive approaches
for writing instruction, has written that her goal is to
make "unconscious actions a little more conscious:

to give

writers a greater awareness of their own intellectual
processes, and therefore the power and possibility of
conscious choice" (Problem Solving Strategies for Writers
vi).

Her desire to make more conscious the "unconscious

actions" indicates that Flower finds the expressivist
attempts to cultivate the imaginative intellect ineffective
because they result in a model for composing that is too
muddled.

In other words, the expressivists' rather global

approach to the writing process remains unarticulated and
thus unconscious.

Yet, expressivists also try to make

"conscious" how these more "unconscious actions" of the
writing process work.

Having students write about and

examine their writing and thinking is an attempt to
articulate the more unconscious aspects of writing; and
certainly, Donald Murray's pedagogical use of professional
writers talking and writing about their works is also an
attempt to make conscious the actual working out of the
writers' imaginative and composing processes.
It is not in trying to make conscious the unconscious,
then, that expressivists and cognitivists differ.

Rather,

141

it is in how to make this transformation take place.
Flower, in order to bring forth the hidden aspects of
composing, separates the process of writing into
"distinctive parts" (vii).

She builds a model of composing

that can take place in stages.

While expressivists do not

object to Flower's using scientific methods to research the
ways in which writers compose, they do object to a pedagogy
that is founded on the hierarchical models that represent
her vision of the composing process.

Expressivists fear

that this separation of the process into parts and stages
can lead students and teachers to view writing in a
simplistic light.

They also believe that the cognitivist

approach tends to sever the affective realm from the
cognitive creating the potential to reduce the complex human
intellectual and imaginative aspects of writing to a
mechanical set of writing strategies.
Cognitivists, then, believe that expressivist theories
are too nebulous to help students become better writers.
And while expressivists can find value in cognitivist
approaches as a research tool, they find fault with a
pedagogy that bases itself on cognitivist composing models
because, according to expressivist scholars, writing is not
a set of distinctive processes but a process of discovery
and coming to knowledge through an imaginative act.

Writing

is an act of the whole being for expressivists, and it is
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through reflecting, questioning, feeling, experiencing,
reasoning, and imagining that writers come to be.

While

this might seem an ambitious and ideal approach to writing
instruction, I would argue that it is just such an ideal
that we need to hold in order to truly educate students in a
system that denies the emotive, creative, and imaginative
aspects of the intellect.
The expressivist theories of Rohman, Berthoff, Murray,
and Elbow, arose in reaction to a conservative educational
system which denied the more creative aspects of the
intellect and which promoted a theory of writing instruction
that privileged passive learning, rote drills, and the
written product over the process.

Twenty years later we are

still facing a less than enlightened educational system and
Elbow, Murray, and Berthoff are still working against this
system, each in his or her own way.

Rather than standing in

front of a classroom filling passive students with
grammatical rules and the "correct" reading of a work of
literature, these teachers are placing students in an active
and participatory role in their own learning processes.

Ann

Berthoff's students, for instance, work in dialectical
notebooks, responding in writing to what they read, think,
and observe.

Rather than being told how to read and write,

her students develop, through work in the double-entry
notebooks, their own methods for critical reading and
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writing by engaging in "reflective questioning."

Peter

Elbow uses groups for developing a critical method of
reading and writing.

Students working together in these

groups engage in dialogue about the texts being written and
read.

They are actively thinking, reflecting, questioning,

and discovering.

Likewise, Donald Murray subverts the

traditional teaching model by making the student/teacher
conference the center of his pedagogy.

When the student

enters into a discussion with Murray she is the "expert" and
she makes decisions about her own writing.

Through this

close one-on-one dialogue, she learns to probe, question,
reflect, and discover for herself.

She may indeed be an

inexperienced "expert," and she may in fact make many
ineffective decisions about her work.

But, as Murray would

argue, it is in these false starts and failed attempts that
real discovery, real learning, and thus real writing, takes
place.
I have chosen to focus my discussion on D. Gordon
Rohman because his article on pre-writing is a key
expressivist document, and I have selected Murray, Elbow,
and Berthoff because I find them the most often identified
as expressivists, and also the most misunderstood or
caricatured as expressivists.

While scholars and teachers

might recognize that these three have ties to Romanticism,
they have not examined the underlying assumptions in depth.
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The Romantic and expressivist privileging of spontaneity,
for instance, is not usually understood as a skill that
arises only as the result of practice and through
cultivating a certain habit of mind.

In extending this

examination of the ties between the Romantics and Murray,
Elbow, and Berthoff further than other critics have, I am
attempting to show that the theories and practices of these
four contemporary scholars are a complex and valuable
reincarnation of what is most worthwhile in the educational
and poetic theories of the original Romantics.
Their Romantic pedagogies foster in students the
ability to create knowledge through writing.

Rohman,

Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff promote teaching practices which
cultivate "authentic" voice— a voice which, contrary to what
most of our students come to us with, is powerful and alive.
And particularly interesting in light of the pervasive view
that expressivists are primarily practitioners and lack a
theoretical center is the fact that they not only share
assumptions held by the Romantics, but that they share much
of the same philosophical grounding as three men who are
generally seen as profound thinkers and philosophers of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries— Mill, Arnold, and Dewey.
Like Dewey, they understand that having experiences and
being able to know and name those experiences play a vital
role in the discovery and creating of writing and coming to

145

knowledge.

They share with Mill, Arnold, and Dewey the

belief that education must not deny experience, must not
separate the emotive from the analytical, but instead must
capture what is most vital: feeling, experience, reflection,
creativity.

And like Dewey, Arnold, Mill, and the Romantics

before them, Rohman, Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff, in an
attempt to counter-act a pedagogy that views learning as
passive and writing as a mechanical act, nurture the
opportunity for students to reflect, question, and think
deeply in order that the imaginative mind, the "encompassing
intellect," can flourish.
The traditions and philosophies of Romanticism are
clearly present in many of our composition theories and
pedagogies.

In fact, as Albert 0. Wlecke and D. Gordon

Rohman recently argued at the 1990 Conference on College
Composition and Communication in Chicago, there is much of
modern society that is deeply rooted in Romanticism.
Moreover, as M. H. Abrams says of Wordsworth:
he has affected our consciousness and our
culture. Either directly or by way of his
influence on other writers, he has altered
the way we perceive and describe not only
the natural world, but our own selves and
other men and women, as well as the ways in
which we respond to what we perceive. ("The
Strangeness of Wordsworth" 45)
As the field of composition begins its exploration of
social-epistemic theories, it will attempt to break free of
many of these Romantic ties.

Perhaps some of these roots do
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need to be severed, but perhaps it would serve us better to
graft many of these Romantic roots to the new shoots of the
social-epistemic rhetoric.

There is much in expressivist

theories and pedagogies, and in their heritage of British
Romanticism, that is worthwhile.

Endnotes

1 The version I am using is collected in Richard
L. Graves' Rhetoric and Composition.
2 My oversimplification here does a disservice to
the Romantic view on language. Their theories are
complex and insightful. Three essays that I find
helpful in understanding Romantic theories of language
are A.W. Phinney's "Wordsworth's Winander Boy and
Romantic Theories of Language," Jonathon Ramsey's
"Wordsworth and the Childhood of Language," and Gene
Ruoff's "Wordsworth on Language: Toward a Radical
Poetics for English Romanticism." Also of interest is
Isobel Armstrong's Language as Living Form in
Nineteenth~Centry Poetry.

CHAPTER IV

MISREADINGS AND REREADINGS OF ROMANTICISM:
NEW LIGHT ON OLD PROBLEMS

As new educational and rhetorical theories arise, many
valuable aspects of Romantic philosophy and expressivist
rhetorics are falling into disrepute.

The attacks on

Romantic rhetorics, although sometimes justified, often rely
not only on a misunderstanding of the theories of particular
expressivist rhetoricians but on a caricature or misreading
of the tradition of Romanticism from which they evolve.

In

this chapter my defense of expressivist rhetorics will
revolve around three levels of argument:

that there are

general myths surrounding Romanticism which have become
commonplace and thus play a part in the reaction against
expressivism; that stereotyping expressivists because of a
denigrated view of Romanticism does a disservice to the
complexity of expressivist theories; and that not only can
we correct some of these caricatures or myths surrounding
Romanticism and expressivist theories by looking to the
Romantic tradition and understanding it better, but that
this glance backward might also offer the opportunity to
open up current expressivist pedagogies to new
possibilities.

Thus, I hope to remind readers of the

positive aspects of expressivist theories and pedagogies, to
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disinfect the term "Romantic" from some of the false
associations that have hampered a more positive view of
current Romantic rhetorics, and to widen the term "Romantic"
for those who have conceived of it too narrowly.
The historian Jacques Barzun has pointed out that the
twentieth century has harbored an "anti-Romantic animus"
(Classic, Romantic, Modern xi).

When we consider how

pervasive and relentless the disparagement of Romanticism
has been, it is not surprising that a theory of rhetoric
which has been identified as a descendant of Romanticism
should come under attack as well.

Much of the aversion to

Romanticism, however, seems based on caricatures of the
Romantic poets, caricatures which have their roots in false
images either perpetuated by the poets themselves or by the
satirical portraits of Romantic contemporaries like Thomas
Love Peacock.1
Peacock's sympathies were with neoclassical critical
principles and he adroitly parodies a number of ideas
popularized by Wordsworth and Coleridge.

Feigning

Wordsworth's voice, Peacock manages to portray the Lake
Poets as idealistic nature freaks who have no use for
society, and who walk around being showered with "poetical
impressions":
"Poetical impressions can be received only
among natural scenes: for all that is
artificial is antipoetical. Society is
artificial, therefore we will live out of
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society. The mountains are natural,
therefore we will live in the mountains.
There we shall be shining models of virtue,
passing the whole day in the innocent and
amiable occupation of going up and down
hill, receiving poetical impressions. .
.
("The Four Ages of Poetry 495)
Although satire is sometimes based on some truth in what is
being ridiculed, we must also remember that satire makes its
case by reduction and simplification.

From a passage like

this arises the false sense that the Romantics were merely
"nature poets" who saw themselves as virtuous souls in a
decaying society.

While the Romantics were idealistic and

even they promoted a caricature of themselves as brooding,
isolated, and lonely poets, they were actually less so than
either they or Peacock portray.
Peacock goes on, this time in his own voice as literary
critic, to suggest that the Romantics lacked reason and
intellectual rigor, and to denigrate the imagination to a
form of "fantasy": "[the Lake Poets] remaining studiously
ignorant of history, society, and human nature, cultivated
the fantasy only at the expense of the memory and the
reason" (495).

He also offers a scathing interpretation of

the Romantic focus on feeling:

"The highest inspirations of

poetry are resolvable into three ingredients: the rant of
unregulated passion, the whining of exaggerated feeling, and
the cant of factitious sentiment" (486).
Jacques Barzun's cultural history of Romanticism,
Classic, Romantic, Modern, explains that extreme views of
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Romanticism like Peacock's became accepted though unfounded
generalizations that promoted the twentieth century's
negative view of Romanticism.

Some of these widespread

generalizations include the idea that Romanticism is stupid,
anti-intellectual, fanciful, irrational, sentimental, an
exaggeration of individuality, and overly emotional.2
The Romantic emphasis on imagination, creativity, and
process, for instance, has often resulted in a charge of
anti-intellectualism.

We can see how this has leaked into

discussions on composition when Richard Young reminds us
that a "frequently heard accusation against the new
romanticism" is its lack of academic and intellectual
"rigor" ("Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks" 56).

This

general accusation picked up additional force when some
expressivist rhetoricians dropped all reading from their
writing courses and advocated that the students own writing
be the primary text in the class.

Donald Murray, for

example, taught writing courses at the University of New
Hampshire where the only required reading was the reading of
the texts generated by the students in the course.

This was

in response, it seems, to the traditional Freshman English
course, which was not specifically a writing course.
Rather, it was taught as another literature course which
required the typical literary analysis.

Murray himself

explains in his recent anthology of reading expressly for
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composition classes that the typical approach to the
teaching of writing did not allow students to make any
connection between the problems they faced in their own
drafts and the finished products they were reading:

"When I

first taught Freshman English I had to follow a syllabus
that forced the students to read prose models that the
students— and I—

could not relate to the problems they face

in their own writing" (xiii).

Although Murray's intent was

admirable— to connect reading to the actual writing
process— he might well have added to the already prevalent
belief that anything "Romantic" lacks "rigor."
Moreover, it is quite possible that individual
expressivist teachers have unintentionally curtailed
intellectual activity in the classroom through an attempt to
bring imagination, feeling, and spontaneity to the
forefront.

If for example, teachers allow students to write

whatever and however they wish in the name of "creativity,"
or "spontaneity," while too often ignoring craft, content,
revision, or the needs of an audience, then this charge is
credible.

I would urge expressivists, then, as well as

those who wish to condemn Romantic educational theories on
the basis of anti-intellectualism, to re-examine what the
Romantics actually practiced.
The Romantics believed strongly in the importance of
intellectual activity.

Shelley wrote insightful and
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knowledgeable essays on many subjects, including love,
religion, and politics.

Coleridge was a philosopher as well

as a poet, and perhaps one of the best read thinkers of all
time. Moreover, his lectures on Shakespeare remain a
standard in the literary canon.

In Aids to Reflection he

argues not only for reading, but for reflection, analysis,
and synthesis of that reading.

It is a misunderstanding of

Wordsworth, perhaps, that has most promoted the belief that
the Romantics were anti-intellectual.

If poems such as

"Expostulation and Reply" and "Tables Turned" are read at
face value, severed from Wordsworth's fuller philosophy,
then it appears that he indeed might be privileging frolic
with nature over intellectual activity.

But Wordsworth was

adamant about books and study, not only for himself, but in
his plan for a successful national education as well.3
Finally, a study of all of the Romantic poets and their
works reveals their thorough knowledge of the greatest works
of science, history, art, and literature, not only of their
own time, but of the past.
If we look closely at what the Romantics can offer a
theory for education and rhetoric, it is a far cry from
anti-intellectual.

They simply argue for a different sort

of intellect— one that is representative of the human mind
working to its fullest capacity, an imaginative and
synthesizing mind. It is study of books and study of nature,
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it is reason and imagination, but not anti-intellectualism,
that allow for the encompassing intellect.

In turn, this

fuller intellect fostered in our students can result in the
ability to think and reflect deeply, and to create ideas and
solutions.

It is this that expressivists want for students

and not merely the ability to repeat such memorized "facts”
as dates and definitions, as Dickens' Bitzer does in Hard
Times.

As Ann Berthoff would argue, without an imaginative

mind capable of "forming,” composition becomes a mere act of
drill rather than an act of making meaning.
Expressivist rhetorics have also been negatively
appraised if not dismissed on the grounds that pedagogies
which arise from the Romantic tradition are premised on a
view that successful writing
inspiration or through genius.

occurs only through
Unfortunately, this is

another case where the Romantics help to paint a caricature
of themselves.

Linda Flower, for instance, argues that the

myth of the inspired writer arose from Coleridge's
introductory remarks on how he composed the poem ”Kubla
Khan."

"Coleridge's account of his experience," explains

Flower, "contains four major elements of the myth of
inspiration" (Problem solving Strategies for Writers 42).
In his introduction to "Kubla Khan"

Coleridge suggests that

the creative vision comes without effort, fully articulated,
that it comes in a matter of moments, and that it cannot be
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repeated because it is a gift from the muse.

Flower finds

that expressivism falls short as an effective theory for
writing instruction, then, because this Romantic "myth of
the inspired writer" does not take into account cognitive
processes and such writerly strategies as problem solving
and goal setting, and because the myth breeds passivity in
students who would believe in inspiration and the muse
rather than in hard work and the practice of successful
writing strategies.

John Gage argues that students learn to

believe that "'Writers are born not made.'

'Writers are

sensitive people, gifted with imagination'" ("Why Write?"
17).

This belief, says Gage, is "mixed up with another

general superstition, perpetuated by the culture, that
writers are special people, an idea that has its origin in
the romantic adulation of writers as a class

. . . The

romantic belief is a strong one, and it helps to kill the
motivation of students who have struggled with mastery of
technique" (17).

Patricia Bizzell, like Gage, finds that

her students accept the idea of writing as inspiration— the
students seem to like the idea of "instant text production"
("Composing Processes: An Overview").

She further points

out that her students are not alone in this fantasy of
"instant text production."

Bizzell suggests that it is

"part of a more general notion in our culture, a sort of
debased Romantic version of creativity wherein verbal
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artifacts are supposed to be produced as easily and
inevitably as a hen lays eggs" (49).
Here, Flower, Bizzell, and Gage illustrate my point
about the way in which general myths surrounding Romanticism
have entered the conversations about current rhetorical
theory.

It is true that we have come to view artists and

poets as special beings blessed with transcendent power.
This probably does have its roots in Romanticism as Gage
suggests, perhaps because the Romantic self-projections, the
poet figures in the poetry of the Romantics, emanate a
blessed and special quality, and also because, as Flower
points out about the introduction to Kubla Khan, the poets
liked to give readers the sense that their poems and
creative visions just happened upon them.

Yet, in larger

works such as the Biographia Literaria and the Preface to
the Lyrical Ballads, their theories on the making of poetry
and the poet are less "adulating."

Although the poets did

believe they had a greater "sensibility" than the general
population, they were not as elitist as Gage implies; the
Romantics believed that this "sensibility" was something
that could be cultivated.
Just as the accusation that the Romantics believed in a
myth of the inspired writer is somewhat justified, the
accusation that expressivists similarly hold to a notion of
good writing as inspired, mysterious, and as some sort of
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gift in not unfounded.

Scholars like William Coles, for

instance, have suggested that writing is an art, and since
art cannot be taught as a mere skill, we cannot really teach
writing as writing ("The Teaching of Writing as Writing"
111).

While I agree with Coles that writing is much more

than a skill and that if it is to be "good" writing it
should not be taught as though it is a skill or a formulaic
procedure, it still remains that it is dangerous to conceive
of writing as an art or gift of genius.

If we have a

classroom where some students have god-given inspiration and
others do not, or if we propose a theory that assumes good
writers are inspired or must have innate genius, then an
oppressive and undemocratic classroom has been
predetermined. There are, after all, very few of our
students whom we would classify as "genius," and thus there
is no hope in the writing classroom for the majority of our
students because we have automatically created an
underclass.
David Russell sees this sort of undemocratic and
oppressive end to expressivist pedagogy:
At the level of public policy, then,
Romantic assumptions about composition have
a particularly significant effect. If
composition is an individual response to
inner promptings, a mysterious process,
then some will be prompted and some will
not. Those who are not may be excluded.
Sometimes that exclusion is direct: a
student is not admitted, or admitted only
to certain programs . . . At other times
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the exclusion is more subtle: a student is
excluded from an education that empowers
her to take a leadership role in society
because an institution assumes that many
(or most) of its students cannot write well
enough to receive such an education, or
that they cannot be taught . . . to write.
("Romantics on Writing: Liberal Culture and
the Abolition of Composition Courses" 144)
I am not arguing against Russell's point that public policy
is affected, sometimes for the worse, if institutions assume
that good writing happens only through inspiration or that
composition cannot be taught.

Rather, my point of departure

is with what Bizzell hints at when she notes that the myth
of instant text production is a Romantic idea which has been
"debased." I will be more blunt and call it an
understandable, but misuse nonetheless, of the term
"Romantic."4

To misconstrue Romantic ideas about genius and

inspiration has consequences:

it confines expressivists to

a theory of composing that is limited and perhaps damaging
to students; and it allows critics of expressivism a
convenient reason to dismiss expressivist rhetorics as too
problematic to be useful.

If we return to the Romantics in

order to understand more fully what it means to be the
"inspired writer" then perhaps this issue will become less
of a stumbling block.

Critics might be less likely to cast

out what is good about Romantic rhetorics with what is bad,
and perhaps it will offer expressivists new insight, not
only into their heritage, but into the complexities involved
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with the composing of "good writing."

We can also begin to

correct for our students the misconceived notion of
inspiration and genius so that they do not continue to
believe in the idea of "instant text production" and so that
"motivation is not killed" for those who have worked hard to
"master technique."
Both expressivists and their critics who argue that
expressivist theories suggest students must be geniuses or
inspired to write well are confusing the education of the
imagination or "encompassing intellect" with the production
of a great poet or artist.

Wordsworth and Coleridge

probably would argue that an imaginative education is a
precondition of becoming a great poet, but they nowhere
suggest that it is only great poets who have imagination.
Wordsworth, for example, believed that the imagination is
innate, as his poetry about children suggests, but that it
is "educated" out of us.

He believed that the imagination

can be cultivated and nurtured in all people, and since the
imagination is the key ingredient for genius, he believed
that genius is also innate but that it needs to be drawn
forth with the right kind of education.

Coleridge was more

skeptical of this belief because he held that all people
have Primary Imagination but not all are capable of
utilizing the Secondary.

However, the Secondary Imagination

can be put into motion by a mind self-consciously aware of
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its own imaginative potential (Biographia Literaria XVII).
Like Coleridge's discussion of the educated mind, this claim
that the imagination can be voluntarily invoked points to
the Romantic faith that people can nurture an imaginative
mind.

Thus, when we examine issues of inspiration, genius,

and the imagination in this light, the negative criticism
that a Romantic pedagogy does not work because our students
are not poetic geniuses is less credible.
To expressivists who claim that we might as well not
teach composition because good writing happens only when
those few students who have genius and an imaginative mind
happen to be struck with inspiration, and to critics who
disregard Romantic rhetorics because of a debased
understanding of Romantic inspiration, I suggest

that a

closer look at Romanticism will offer an alternative
reading.

I have already discussed the question of genius.

Ideally, the issue of inspiration takes care of itself
through the entire enterprise of cultivating in our students
an encompassing and imaginative intellect.

In other words,

when the mind is properly prepared, inspiration becomes a
habit, not an occasional gift from the muse.
In The Prelude, Wordsworth has written:
for I neither seem
To lack that first great gift, the vital soul,
Nor general Truths, which are themselves a sort
Of Elements and Agents, Under-powers,
Subordinate helpers of the living mind:
Nor am I naked of external things,
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Forms, images . . . .

(Book I 149-155)

This passage identifies "general Truths," "external things"
and the "vital soul" as necessary seeds for the growth of
the philosophical mind.

At least two of the these core

ingredients— "vital soul" and "external things"— also become
essential to the educational philosophies of Arnold, Mill,
and Dewey.

Likewise, they have traversed time and are

inherent in the theory and pedagogy of current expressivists
such as Elbow and Murray.

Each has made the point that if

we foster what Wordsworth calls the "vital soul" or "living
mind" we are promoting observation, perception, experience,
discovery, feelings, and reflection.

These, in their

entirety, allow Wordsworth to compose poetry that appears to
be spontaneous and inspired, allow Elbow to tap into the
"good writing that can just flow," and allow Murray the
surprising "moment of insight," not just occasionally, but
on a regular basis for almost any writing task.

In other

words, inspiration for the Romantics, and for most Romantic
rhetoricians, is not a phenomenon that is random and
involuntary.

As Coleridge says, the creative act is

motivated by "voluntary will," and in the Preface to the
Second Edition of the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth suggests
that it is practice that makes the poet different from the
nonpoet: "from practice . . .

a greater readiness and power

in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially those
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thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the
structure of his own mind, arise in him without immediate
external excitement" (737).
The problem for a theory and pedagogy of writing, of
course, lies in the fact that a writing course lasts ten to
fifteen weeks— certainly not enough time to cultivate an
encompassing intellect in students.

Yet, it is Wordsworth's

"practice" that Romantic rhetorics foster and hope to set
into motion, not just for ten or fifteen weeks, but for a
lifetime.

However, when expressivists advocate pre-writing,

freewriting, searching for voice, and discovery as ways of
not only inducing "good writing" from our students but as a
way of incorporating writing into their lives and for
initiating the continued growth of the intellect as well,
they are saddled with the unwarranted criticism that the
expressivist approach sees no writing "worth doing" but
writing for discovery.

This is yet another way in which

expressivist rhetorics are unfairly disparaged.

Maxine

Hairston, for instance, misreads expressivists on this
point:
They [Murray, Elbow, Coles, Berthoff]
believe that we create meaning by writing,
that meaning does not exist as a separate
entity to be communicated by writing. They
hold that the essential features of good
writing are originality and an authentic
voice. These teachers seem to believe that
every time students write they should do
Class III writing [what Hairston calls
reflective writing], spending substantial
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time on discovery and working through
several drafts to find out what they mean.
They imply that no other writing is worth
doing. ("Different Products, Different
Processes: A Theory about Writing" 449)
Hairston is correct that expressivists believe "students
should write to discover themselves and to make sense out of
their world," but they do not imply that other kinds of
writing are unworthy.

In Writing With Power, Peter Elbow

spends many pages discussing writing strategies for tasks
that do not lend themselves to discovery, drafting, and
reflecting.

What Elbow does argue is that doing reflective

writing and writing for discovery whenever possible can make
one a better writer and thinker, thereby helping out in any
writing task.

Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, he is talking

about "personal," "authentic," and "emotive" writing as
necessary to the growth of self and mind, not that it is
necessary for every written document.

Like Mill, he

realizes that the emotive cannot be separated from the
analytical without consequences.
Elbow addresses these misguided criticisms himself when
he tells his reader that
in the short run there is probably a
conflict between developing a real voice
and producing successful pragmatic
writing— polished pieces that work for
specific audiences and situations. . . Deep
personal outrage, for example, may be the
only authentic tone of voice you can use in
writing to a particular person, yet that
voice is neither appropriate or useful for
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the actual document you have to write.
(Writing With Power 307)
Elbow would argue that a quick five- or-ten minute freewrite
might clear the mind of this outrage, thus allowing for the
faster construction of the appropriate text.

The feelings

are not denied but remain a counterpart to the analytical
approach which produces the "appropriate" text.
I would argue, finally, that much of what creates the
"vital soul," and thus what creates the most fertile
opportunities for successful writing, can be taught to our
students.

We can, for instance, teach them to feel, to know

and understand their passions through such exercises as
Peter Elbow's freewritings and through personal journal
writing.

We can take the important step of teaching them to

reflect on their feelings, thoughts, observations,
perceptions, and experiences as Ann Berthoff does with her
double-entry notebook.

There is much that we can teach, and

if we take our cues from the Romantics, perhaps we can
envision and define a pedagogy that makes insight and
inspiration a recurrent aspect of every student's daily
thinking, and of the majority of their writing tasks, from
the most mundane to the most artistic.

If, on the other

hand, we choose to teach writing as a skill of form and
style and not as an act of thinking, or an act of the
creative and imaginative mind, there will be very few
students indeed who will become "good writers."
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As this discussion on inspiration, genius, "vital
soul," and good writing illustrates, it is difficult to
discuss Romanticism and expressivist rhetorics without
"emotions" and "feelings" creeping into the conversation.
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that there are
certain myths, usually negative ones, surrounding
Romanticism which have become commonplace.

The Romantic

concern with the emotive has resulted in one of these
general misunderstandings.

It has become a generally

accepted cultural assumption that to be "Romantic" is
equivalent to being overly sensitive, sentimental, and
emotional.

Likewise, there is a general feeling that

expressivist rhetorics are "touchy feely," overly indulgent,
and inappropriately tolerant of students wallowing in their
own feelings.

Admittedly, expressivists, especially Peter

Elbow, do not balk at the idea of bringing personal feeling
into the educational arena and the writing classroom; thus,
it is easy to see how this assumption continues to thrive.
As I pointed out in my earlier discussion of Peter
Elbow (Chapter 3), learning to write well relies a great
deal on learning to write with a "real voice."

Elbow

believes that the search for voice means exploring feelings:
"angry feelings, perhaps depressed feelings" (Writing with
Power 284).

This search for voice, in turn, is a catalyst

to the sorts of reflective thinking and writing which result
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in "growth or development" (Elbow 284).

If we remember,

Elbow indicates that intellectual development might come
about through writing to voice anger, hurt, or betrayal.
His point is, finally, that these feelings, whatever they
may be, are crucial.

However, just as it is wrong to view

the Romantic poets as overly emotional, it is mistaken to
assume that Elbow's students are allowed to devote an entire
writing course to indulging their feelings.
Elbow is not advocating raw emotions and feelings as
good writing even though they are part of fully experiencing
something.

He is advocating the Romantic version of

experience and Wordsworth's and Dewey's belief that
expression is at its best when an overflow of powerful
emotion is recalled and recreated through language at a
later time, not at the moment of the overflow.

That is, as

Wordsworth puts it in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads,
"Our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed
by our thoughts, which are indeed the representations of all
our past feelings" (1815 735).

What is important here, but

often forgotten or ignored, is that Wordsworth's poetry is
not written at the moment he is overwhelmed with raw
feeling, but it is written from a distance while reexperiencing some event that yielded those strong feelings.
This is exactly Elbow's point when he says that good writing
arises out of the re-experience, the participation in an
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event.

Peter Elbow is aware that people misconstrue the

part emotions play in his rhetoric, and thus he makes a
point to explain that writing is not just "loud emotion"
(312), but rather, as Wordsworth argues, a "recollection in
tranquillity."
Relevant to this discussion on emotion is the notion
that the Romantic emphasis on personal feeling, greater
sensibility, and experience is a reflection merely of the
inner self and therefore meaningful only to the individual.
The Romantic poets7 focus on self-discovery and personal
vision are often interpreted as outright self-centeredness
or egocentrism.

In fact, this interpretation lies behind

the fact that a focus on the personal seems to have entered
into the general lore surrounding Romanticism as the
"radical individualism" that Barzun identifies as an
undeserving general accusation.

In a similar vein,

expressivist rhetorics appear to have been infused with this
generally held misconception, and are perhaps too
unthinkingly thought of as self-centered and "radically"
individualistic (Berlin "Rhetoric and Ideology" 492).

The

Romantic notion of self, however, is more complex than these
charges assume.

Once again, in order to share with

expressivists a deeper understanding of their heritage, and
to dispel the tendency to stereotype expressivists because
an ill-conceived myth has spilled into the ways in which we
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view current expressivist rhetorics, I would like to point
out that it is a commonly held misconception that
Romanticism is primarily subjective to the point of
egocentricity.
Perception, observation, and reflection led the
Romantics to a sharpened sense of empathy which allowed them
to go beyond egocentrism.

Coleridge makes it clear that the

poet should transcend personal interest and any form of
radical individualism.

As poets, indeed as human beings, we

should
live in the universal, to know no self but
that which is reflected not only from the
faces of all around us, our fellowcreatures, but reflected from the flowers,
the trees, the beasts, yea from the very
surface of the waters and the sands of the
desert . . . . (From The Philosophical
Lectures, quoted in Wellek 162)
For Wordsworth, poetry exists primarily to work on human
feelings for the purpose of reaching mental and moral
happiness.

He thought the circumstances of the poet were

often a buffer to what others actually suffered in the
world; thus, he believes sympathy and empathy are critical:
However exalted a notion we would wish to
cherish of the character of a Poet, it is
obvious, that while he describes and
imitates passions, his employment is in
some degree mechanical, compared with the
freedom and power of real and substantial
action and suffering. So that it will be
the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings
near to those of the persons whose feelings
he describes, nay, for short spaces of
time, perhaps, to let himself slip into an
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entire delusion,
identify his own

and even confound and
feelings with theirs.
(Preface 737)
Wordsworth also argued that one of the functions of poetry
is to agitate people out of their "savage torpor" and
"spread relationship and love."

He aspired to give people

more feeling in order to create not only happy and moral
individuals, but a happy and moral society, and he saw his
job as a poet to bring all of society together:

"the Poet

binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of
human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and
over all time" (Preface 738).
Blake has said that the most sublime act is to give up
the

self for another,

sincere,

generous and

andscholars

have noted thatKeats was

open-minded,

having "extraordinary

sympathetic and tolerant understanding of other people"
(Bate Major British Writers 317).

Keats's concept of

"negative capability" suggests that one way to grasp the
complexities of life is by negating our own egos while being
imaginatively open-minded, sympathetic, and receptive to
differing kinds of experience.
Shelley, too, believed in an individualism which did
not create an unfeeling or isolated self.

In

A Defense of

Poetry , he argues that a moral and just society relies on
"love":
or a going out of our own nature, and an
identification of ourselves with the
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beautiful which exists in thought, action,
or person, not our own. A man, to be
greatly good, must imagine intensely and
comprehensively; he must put himself in the
place of another and of many others; the
pains and pleasures of his species must
become his own.
(Noyes 1101)
Within the Romantic enterprise, then, is the undergirding
for a rhetorical pedagogy that is based on the opposite of
radical individualism or egocentrism.
Those of us who teach first-year college students are
painfully aware just how easy it is for students to get
stuck in the subjective, to believe what they think and feel
is more important than what anyone else feels

or has to say.

In light of this, it is possible, in fact probable, that
some Romantic rhetoricians, in their hope to foster
uniqueness, personal vision, and voice, have focused on
individualism in such a way as to promote an already
predisposed egocentricity that does not result in empathy.
Many have not, however.

Peter Elbow echoes Coleridge's cry

for living in the "universal," for instance, when he argues
that an organism cannot grow, the mind cannot grow toward
knowledge, unless we allow ourselves to be "swallowed by
what is different from the self— to merge or expand into
what is different" ("The Pedagogy of the Bamboozled"
Embracing Contraries 97).

Elbow's "doubting and believing"

game promotes a methodology for learning that is based on
empathy. It is, in fact, a concept reminiscent of Keats's
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"negative capability."5

"The believing game," says Elbow,

"is essentially cooperative or collaborative":
the central event is the act of affirming
or entering into someone's thinking or
perceiving.
It tends to imply a
pluralistic model of knowledge— namely,
that truth is often complex and that
different people often catch different
aspects of it; and that we get closer to
seeing correctly by entering into each
others' conflicting perceptions or
formulations.
("Methodological Doubting
and Believing" Embracing Contraries 289)
Like Keats, Elbow is aware that empathic action often leaves
one with a chaotic or disjointed feeling.

Elbow suggests

that this uncomfortable feeling comes from a reluctance to
practice "believing" or empathy, and Keats argues that it is
the ability to sit comfortably with chaos or uncertainty
that is valuable:

to be "capable of being in uncertainties,

mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact
and reason" (Letters December 1817).
Donald Murray, though he differs from Elbow in that his
pedagogy seems less obviously based in empathy, is also an
expressivist who tries not to foster an egocentric
individualism in students. In fact, he urges students toward
an empathetic understanding of otherness.

In Write to

Learn, Murray's text for student writers, he writes:
Another way to make yourself receive
information that may be helpful to you as a
writer is to practice empathy, the ability
to put yourself in other people's skins.
We can imagine what it might be like to be
rich if we are poor or poor if we're rich,
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to be a policeman, to be selling or buying.
(33)
In addition to role-playing, he urges students to make
personal contact with people,

observe and join a child at

play, he might suggest. Or interview a poor person in order
to find out what it is like to be without food and medicine,
to hear first-hand about the pangs of hunger.

Just as

empathy allows Keats to take part in the existence of the
sparrow that comes before his window, Murray wants his
students, through observation, imaginative role-playing, and
interviewing, to be able to take part in the existence of
the lives of other people.

He wants them, through their

receptiveness, sympathy, reflection, and ultimately their
writing, to discover other worlds, and make connections
which make them aware, allowing them the greater possibility
for communicating through language with those who are
different from them.

So, as I have argued, the Romantic

self is not based on an individualism that supersedes
concern for others.

Nor, as Murray and Elbow show us, do

current expressivist rhetorics necessarily promote
egocentricity or negative forms of individualism in this
regard.
The simplification of the Romantic philosophies of the
self and of the pedagogical theories of Romantic
rhetoricians does not stop with issues of empathy and
understanding of others.

Unfortunately, Romantic theories
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have perpetuated a sense that audience is unimportant.

It

is true that previous to the Romantics poets saw pleasing an
audience as the major concern of artistic endeavor, and that
part of what is so revolutionary about Romantic thought is
the importance of the individual vision.

It is a major

shift in artistic orientation when the mind in the act of
creation and composing becomes a major part of the
rhetorical situation and the role of the audience seems
subordinate to this vision.

And although this shifting to

include the importance of the individual vision can be
interpreted as slighting the importance of audience, it
certainly does not exclude all concern with audience.
Wordsworth, for instance, usually evaluates his poetry
by its effects on the reader.

He recognized that in order

to gain the effect that he wanted he had to revise and
perfect technique.

There is overwhelming evidence of

Wordsworth's laborious and constant revisions of both his
theoretical discussions and his verse.

Further, until

recently critics have viewed Wordsworth as a poor theorist,
or illogical in the argument he makes in the Preface to the
Lyrical Ballads.

This view is changing, however, and

critics now recognize the rhetorical nature of Wordsworth's
Preface.

John Nabholtz, for instance, sees the Preface as a

rhetorical work in which Wordsworth is attempting to build a
relationship between himself as writer and his audience as
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reader ("My Reader, My Fellow-Labourer": A Study of English
Romantic Prose).

Although Anhradha Dingwaney and Lawrence

Needham take issue with Nabholtz's reading, and believe that
Wordsworth was not uniting reader and writer, they
nonetheless argue that the Preface is audience-directed and
"rhetorical in a specific sense" because it "seeks to clear
the way and create a taste for the Ballads by taking to task
those 'codes of decision' (and the audience which subscribes
to them) standing in the way of a genuine appreciation of
the poems; by doing so, it seeks to influence the subsequent
reception of the Ballads" ((Un)Creating Taste; Wordsworth's
Platonic Defense in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads 334).
And Coleridge, in spite of his attempts to make his poetry
appear as though it came effortlessly and fully forged from
the mind, always worked to create a product of careful and
conscious organization.

Finally, let us not forget that

like most poets, the Romantics meant their works to be read
and taken seriously by an audience:

"Poets do not write for

Poets alone" (Wordsworth Preface 739).

In fact, the

Romantics were the first generation of writers to appeal
directly to the reading public, not to patrons.
The propensity for Romantic rhetorics to face similar
criticisms— that their focus on spontaneity and personal
voice slight the importance of audience— seems natural
considering how regularly the ill-conceived generalizations
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surrounding Romanticism have become commonplace today.

Once

again, Donald Murray helps to distinguish deserved
criticisms from an unwarranted criticism that takes its
power from a stereotype of Romanticism.

He serves as an

example of an expressivist who does not suppress the
rhetorical importance of audience through a focus on the
self.

Murray does not allow his own writing, or that of his

students, to remain egocentric or isolated from a wider
audience.

He pushes his writing, and that of his students,

beyond the personal and private to the social.

Murray is,

after all, a poet, novelist, journalist, and regular
columnist for the Boston Globe.
reach an audience.

As a writer, his goal is to

He has written innumerable articles on

audience and revision (eg. "What Makes Readers Read," "Write
Research to be Read," "Teaching the Other Self: The Writer's
First Reader," "Make Meaning Clear: The Logic of Revisions,"
"The Maker's Eye: Revising Your Own Manuscripts"); his texts
always contain discussions on this part of the writing
process, and his class is structured so as to pursue the
craft of continuous revision.

His students draft, and they

meet in conferences with Murray and then draft again.

They

try countless leads and conclusions. They rewrite the same
paper in a different style or voice.

Sometimes they work on

one project, continuously revising throughout the semester.
Because Murray believes that the most accurate
definition of writing is "the process of using language to
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discover meaning in experience and to communicate it"
(Learning By Teaching 73), he advocates moving from what
Linda Flower calls "writer-based" prose to "reader-based"
prose.

"Communication" is the key word, and the end goal,

for Murray and his students.

If you can order information,

he says, "into significant meaning and then communicate it
to others [you] will influence the course of events within
town or nation, school or university, company or
corporation" (Write to Learn 4).

The awareness, the

empathy, the greater understanding of self and others gained
by Murray's students are set before the world in an attempt
to understand and communicate.

Contrary to what critics of

Murray's pedagogy might think, this focus on self in his
teaching philosophy does not totally eclipse the importance
of audience.
Peter Elbow seems an easier target than Donald Murray
for the accusation that expressivist rhetorics ignore
audience more than they ought to.

In fact, a major

difference between Elbow and Murray is what Murray recently
revealed to me as his obsessive need for closure and a
relentless call for revision.

Though Elbow does not ignore

revision, he seems much more at ease with a lack of closure
and with putting the emphasis on invention, and Murray makes
no bones about this difference between them.
At any rate, it is certainly clear that audience is not
the central element of Elbow's rhetorical teachings.

Elbow
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acknowledges that there are charges of "audience dismissal"
pending against him when he states: "It will be clear that
my argument for writing without audience awareness is not
meant to undermine the many good reasons for writing with
audience awareness some of the time" ("An Argument for
Ignoring Audience" 50).

That Elbow anticipates resistance

to his position is not surprising when a few paragraphs
laterhe takes the

controversial stance that "ignoring

audience can lead to better writing— immediately.

In

effect, writer-based prose can be better than reader-based
prose" (53).
Yet, those
he does directly

of us familiar with Elbow's work know that
address the issue of audience in histexts.

In Writing With Power, for instance, he writes:
They [readers] don't have us with them as
they read and they lack all those cues they
would get from watching our movements and
hearing our tone of voice and emphasis. In
writing we must get the words on the page
so clear that there's no need for audio
visual aids. Thus, readers in their
solitariness need more of the very things
that writers in their solitariness are most
likely to omit. The moral of the story is
obvious: pay lots of attention as you write
to your audience and its needs. (177)
Elbow is aware that the most "frequent weakness in the
writing of beginners . . .
needs of the reader" (178).

is too little attention to the
This is why discussions of

audience remain important, even in the expressivist's
classroom.

178

Admittedly, audience is not the primary focus for
Elbow, because like Murray, Elbow believes that a premature
emphasis on audience can have deadly effect on student
writing: "some of their worst writing— both jumbled and
flat— comes from worrying too much about audience" at the
inappropriate time (178).

He returns to this argument in

the more recent "An Argument for Ignoring Audience" as well:
"It is not that writers should never think about their
audience.

It's a question of when" (51).

And when the time

is wrong, suggests Elbow, not only is bad writing the
result, but the process of making meaning comes to an abrupt
halt.

Elbow has placed his argument about audience in

opposition to that of neo-classical rhetoric:
Notice that two pieties of composition
theory are in conflict:
(1) Think about audience as you write (this
stemming from the classical rhetorical
tradition).
(2) Use writing for making new meaning, not
just transmitting old meanings already
worked out (this stemming from the new
epistemic tradition I associate with Ann
Berthoff's classic explorations) (53).
As with the Romantics, the onus for expressivist
teachers has shifted from audience as the cardinal
rhetorical concern, especially at the beginning of a writing
task, to personal voice and vision, to what the writer is
trying to say.

Nonetheless, audience remains a part of the

rhetorical situation.

I suspect, however, that most people

in the discipline of composition understand Elbow's
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argument.

They may not agree with him, but nonetheless they

probably realize that Elbow is not advocating that students
flatly repress their concern for audience in all writing
tasks.
I would certainly grant, however, that students might
misunderstand Elbow's teachings unless we apply his
theoretical stance with care.

I sense the possibility for

misconstruing Elbow's perspective on audience is linked to
the cultural assumptions surrounding the "myth of the
inspired writer" that

I discussed earlier.

such as Murray and Elbow focus on

personal

When teachers
voice andvision

it is easy for students to cling to Bizzell's notion of
"instant text production."

As she notes, the result of this

notion is a resistance to revision.

"After all," students

might think, "this is

my personal vision. I said it

in my

voice how I wanted to

say it, and it was inspired." From

here it is an easy leap for students to resist revision and
to deny that an audience should have any impact on their
writing.

What seems crucial, then, is that we be extremely

careful when we apply Elbow's argument for ignoring
audience, and that we be sure that the focus on personal
vision does not continue to reinforce a misunderstood
version of Romantic inspiration.
It is interesting to see how the denigrated theories of
the Romantics come into play with current rhetorical
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theories when Elbow himself writes, "To celebrate writerbased prose is to risk the charge of romanticism: just
warbling one's woodnotes wild.

But my position also

contains the austere classic view that we must nevertheless
revise with conscious awareness . .
Ignoring Audience" 55).

("An Argument for

Elbow seems to wish to dissociate

himself from the Romantic tradition from which his theories
have evolved, perhaps because he has not considered an
interpretation that sees Romanticism as already containing
the delicate balance between raw material and revision.
Romanticism is not advocating "warbling one's woodnotes
wild," and it is worth offering another interpretation so
that expressivists, and their students and critics, begin to
realize that the Romantic tradition offers a version of
inspiration that comes only after hard work and much
practice.

Even "an inspired piece of writing" is

laboriously revised in light of an awareness of audience.
Recent criticisms by scholars such as Karen Burke
LeFevre and James Berlin who align themselves with theories
of marxism, social construction, or social-epistemic
rhetorics find expressivist theories lacking because they
seem to focus on the individual as opposed to the
relationship that involves the dialectical interaction among
writer, community, and social, political, and economic
conditions of existence.

Karen Burke LeFevre has written,
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for example, that within the Romantic tradition "the
inspired writer is apart from others and wants to keep it
that way" so as to "prevent himself and his creation from
being corrupted by society" (Invention as a Social Act 17).
And James Berlin has claimed that
expressionistic rhetoric is intended to
serve as a critique of the ideology of
corporate capitalism, proposing in its
place an ideology based on radical
individualism.
In the name of empowering
the individual, however, its naivete about
economic, social, and political
arrangements can lead to the marginalizing
of the individuals who would resist a
dehumanizing society, rendering them
ineffective through their isolation." (492)
LeFevre's criticisms are at least partially founded on
the debased commonplace definitions of Romanticism that
Jacques Barzun has found so prevalent.

Of course, the myth

of the inspired and solitary writer, since it is so widely
accepted, will continue to do the damage that LeFevre
reports until we actively debunk it as I have been trying to
do throughout this chapter.

Berlin's charge against

expressivism is also tied up in the misinformed
generalizations surrounding Romanticism, but the
misunderstanding lies with expressivists themselves and not
Berlin.

What Berlin presents is a clear case of

expressivist theory gone awry in its application.

That is,

I believe Berlin is correct in his assessment that
"expressionistic rhetoric is intended to serve as a critique
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of the ideology of corporate capitalism," but that in
practice expressivism can backfire.

I will argue, however,

that there is nothing inherent to a theory of expressivism
that creates "ineffective" citizens, but that in the real
world of the classroom a sort of "radical individualism" is
practiced, perhaps because of a misconstrued vision of the
Romantic individual.
As I have already pointed out, expressivist rhetorics
and Romanticism evolved in part as a reaction to the
establishment.

In the case of contemporary expressivism,

individuality becomes important since it appears that the
individual is lost in the face of modern bureaucracy and
corporate capitalism.

In order to regain any sense of

selfhood in the modern capitalist world, the predominate
focus is shifted to the individual.

Preliminary

ethnographic research by Amber Ahlstrom, a doctoral
candidate at the University of New Hampshire, suggests that
teachers trained in an expressivist writing program are
unaware of the complexities and depth of expressivist
theory, and thus latch onto what is most accessible about
it:

a belief in personal voice, a belief in personal

vision, and a continual reinforcement of the individual in
its opposition to a society that diminishes the individual.
They understand these, however, in the most limited of terms
so enacting or coming to grips with the social aspects of
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language, writing, and learning seems difficult for them.
The teachers in Ahlstrom's study appear to support Giroux's
belief that the "expressive view of writing ignores how
writing works in the world, hides the social nature of
language, and offers a false notion of a 'private self'"
(Faigley 531).

Consequently, Berlin's appraisal has merit:

It is possible for "empowered" individuals to change a
"dehumanizing society," but because they are unaware of the
"economic, social, and political arrangements," they remain
marginalized themselves and thus unavailable to precipitate
change.

Although expressivist theory evolves from a

tradition which recognizes the economic, social and
political conditions of existence, the practitioners of
expressivism often seem to fall short of incorporating this
tradition into their pedagogy.
Expressivist theory is not alone in its propensity for
misapplication, however.

It is as easy for those who are

advocates of a social-epistemic rhetoric as for an
expressivist teacher unintentionally to render students
"ineffective through their isolation."

Consider, for

instance, if it is not as much of an alienating and
isolating experience for a student to be constantly forced
to examine herself in terms of a political and economic
existence, to hold an opinion that is not yet hers, to be
told that her conservative ideas are oppressive and
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undemocratic.

I am not suggesting that there is something

intrinsic to social-epistemic rhetorics that makes them
equivalent to raw propagandizing anymore than there is
something inherent to Romantic rhetorics that guarantees
"ineffective" citizens.

The potential for misuse is there

for teachers who honor social and marxist theories for
writing instruction, however.

Yes, students must take

responsibility for their ineffectiveness and the ways in
which they oppress others, but the social-epistemic agenda,
if not carefully applied, can shut down students rather than
empower them,

of course, force-feeding students any

ideology, whether it is one we would consider desirable or
not, will not necessarily create politically aware students.
Recently, in fact, I had the opportunity of working with
teachers and talking to graduate teaching assistants in
Mississippi.

They noted that one of their largest problems

was applying a social-epistemic rhetoric in their
classrooms.

Their ultra-conservative students, according to

these teachers, become more resistant and dogmatic as the
instructors attempt to place reading, writing, and classroom
activities in relationship to social class, politics, and
the material conditions of existence.

In effect, many of

the students consciously isolate themselves or withdraw from
the ideology that is being impressed upon them.
Although the effectiveness of social-epistemic theories
is in need of examination by composition scholars, I would
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like to return now to expressivism and Romanticism in order
to open up and enrich the possibilities for expressivist
teachers and their critics by offering a rereading of the
Romantics and Romanticism in regards to the individual and
society.
While the Romantics helped to perpetuate a vision of
themselves as isolated, lonely, and misunderstood by
society, it is short-sighted to believe that the Romantics
thought isolation was a natural or desirable condition or
that an extended application of Romantic ideas has to result
in a naivete about political and social issues.

A more

accurate view of Romantic "individualism" reveals that there
is nothing inherently naive or undemocratic about the
Romantic self, nor that the Romantic honoring of
individuality implies a disparaging of social interaction.
In fact, the Romantic self is not as different from the
social-constructivist self as we have been inclined to
believe.
If current expressivists are true to their Romantic
roots, they are returning to a vision of the human as an
autonomous being with powers and rights.

As Kathleen Coburn

points out, Coleridge demanded that we respect the
individuality of our friends, and even our opponents.

She

suggests that in Coleridge's view, "the worst thing one
human being can do to another" is to deny a person autonomy,
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powers, and rights (The Self-Conscious Imagination 34).

The

fight against oppression was as important to Coleridge as it
is for social-epistemic teachers today.

Coleridge insisted

on the need for self-consciousness, in part, because he felt
it could help alleviate prejudice.

He believed that we

could not know others until we had a •'consciousness of
self,” and that until we knew ourselves difference would
continue to be linked with hatred (Coburn 32).

Expressivist

teachers like Murray uphold the Romantic tradition on this
issue with statements like "respect them [students] as
individuals, delight in their difference" (Expecting the
Unexpected 108).
Contrary to popular misunderstandings, the Romantics
did not deny the social construction of the self; they
simply asserted the importance of the individual in a social
environment that ignored or suppressed autonomy and
individuality.

In fact, if sociologist Dmitri Shalin is

correct, it was during the Romantic era that the notion of
the self as a social product was first established ("The
Romantic Antecedents" 51).

It would be useful, then, for

expressivists to understand the nature of the self as
defined by their Romantic heritage.
David Perkins points out that "beginning with
Wordsworth, it is generally accurate to say that art tends
less to distinguish between the outer world of events and
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the inner world of consciousness" (16).
attempts to display their "interfusion."

Rather, art
Thus, it is

Wordsworth's understanding that "we can know outward things
only as they are reflected and modified in some particular
consciousness or 'point of view'; and we can know our inner
world only as we are responding to something outside"
(Perkins 16).

What we have, then, is a dialectical

relationship between self and world.

Dmitri Shalin points

out that this dialectic is also present between the
"structure of self and the structure of society" (55):
The [Romantic] self is social not only
because it reflects the needs of the
moment, because it can assume this or that
mask depending on the others with whom it
interacts; it is social through and through
because it has no objective being outside
of its interaction with other selves,
because it comes into being within a
community, rather than merely adjusts to
it, as the predecessor of Romanticism
tacitly supposed.
(51)
In other words, the paradox here is that in refusing the
idea of an objective self and embracing that of a
subjective, the self is always changed, if not created, by
the community that self is in.

As I have already suggested

in my discussion of empathy, the main goal of the self for
the Romantic was to commune with another self.

As Shalin

puts it, "to be conscious of oneself," to be "conscious of
anything at all, according to the Romantics, the individual
must become another to oneself, see oneself from without,
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from the standpoint of the other— a feat one can perform
only as a member of society" (51).
In part, the Romantic desire to honor individuality is
in reaction to Locke's view of the human infant as a blank
slate or "tabula rasa."

The self that arises from a

Lockeian model is entirely "social," entirely a creature of
its environment, but is not in interaction with its
environment.

The Romantic self, on the other hand, is

shaped by environment but is also self-unfolding.

In other

words, as Coleridge's plant metaphor implies, the individual
is the joint product of an innate seed and an extrinsic or
environmental soil, air, and water.

The community and the

individual are interdependent; they cannot be separated.
My point is that it is false to assume that Romanticism
defines a "radical individualism" that is unaware of how the
self is socially shaped.

It is, in fact, an awareness of

the ways in which we are socially shaped that prompted their
special focus on the personal and subjective.

And, as

Shalin suggests, the Romantics were the first to acknowledge
the self as a social product; thus our current elaborations
on notions of social constructivism are further extensions
of a very valuable Romantic idea.6
There are current expressivist rhetoricians who, like
their Romantic predecessors, also acknowledge the social
aspects of the self and of the writing situation.

Ann
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Berthoff, for instance, embraces social theories as a part
of her expressivist rhetoric.

She often writes from an

expressivist's point of view with a social constructivist's
insight into social influences:
Language seen as a means of making meaning
has two aspects, the hypostatic and the
discursive.
By naming the world, we hold
images in mind; we remember; we can return
to our experience and reflect on it.
In
reflecting, we can change, we can
transform, we can envisage. Language thus
becomes the very type of social activity by
which we might move towards changing our
lives. The hypostatic power of language to
fix and stabilize frees us from the prison
of the moment. Language recreates us as
historical beings.
("Is Teaching Still
Possible?" 751)
Berthoff's belief in experience, reflection, the
imagination, and knowing as the "mind in action," and her
acceptance of language and thought as not meaningful
"outside a social context" and as necessarily established in
a "social setting" (749), identifies her as an expressivist
fully attuned to, and willing to embrace, social theories of
the self, learning, and writing.
There is one other aspect of the Romantic and
expressivist self that needs clarification,

critics of

Romantic rhetorics, such as David Kaufer and James Berlin,
believe that these rhetorics have the potential to focus on
individualism to the point of rendering students or writers
politically and socially ineffective.

And similarly, Lester

Faigley points out that "Marxism would accuse expressivism
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of failing to deal with key concepts such as class, power,
and ideology.

Kaufer, for instance, in "Point of View in

Rhetorical Situations: Classical and Romantic Contrasts and
Contemporary Implications," assumes that expressivist
rhetorical theories are only committed to their "personal
point of view" for reasons of "self-development," and that
they are not "bound to social action" (185).

If Kaufer is

right in his assumption, if Marxist critiques are right that
class, power, and ideology fall by the wayside, and if
Berlin is right in his argument that expressivist rhetorics
result in individuals who are naive about "economic, social,
and political arrangements," then perhaps those of us who
remain interested in expressivism as a theory for
composition pedagogy could learn some important lessons from
our Romantic ancestors.
The English Romantics were, in actuality, very aware of
political and economic concerns, and they were without doubt
dedicated to "social action."

The British Romantics saw the

people of nineteenth-century England as indifferent and
apathetic.

The Romantics envisioned a better world, changed

through their educational ideas and their writing.
wished to stir the imagination of the masses.

They

They wanted

their readers to be concerned about war, the reform of
Parliament, dislocation of rural life, and a starving lower
class, so they could improve, as Mill says, "the physical
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and social condition of mankind."

They yearned to be, as

Shelley argued they were, the "legislators of the world."
The Romantics were actively involved in the movement
for social change.

Coleridge, for instance, preached

"sedition" from both pulpit and pamphlet for many years.
Wordsworth went to France twice during the Revolution and
was quite taken with political fervor.

Young Shelley went

to Ireland and printed leaflets of advice for social change,
and Byron denounced crown policy in his first speech in the
House of Lords.

Byron died in Greece while trying to help

the cause of Greek independence.
The Romantics were greatly concerned with, and wrote
extensively on, the forces and political ideologies behind
the French Revolution, and the consequences of the
ideologies for English society.

Blake wrote of the

atrocities done to children in poems like "The Chimney
Sweep."

He pointed a harsh finger at both the church and

the government in poems like "London," while graphically
bringing to our attention the squalor and destitution of the
city streets.

Shelley spent a great deal of time writing

and talking earnestly about renovating society, and in
"England 1819" he draws an unflattering portrait of George
III while revealing the horrid realities of this ineffectual
king's rule:
An old, mad, blind, despised and dying king,—
Princes, the dregs of their dull race, who flow
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Through public scorn, — mud from a muddy spring,—
Rulers who neither see, nor feel, nor know,
But leech-like to their fainting country cling,
Till they drop, blind in blood, without a blow,—
A people starved and stabbed in the untilled
field,—
(lines 1-7)
Even Wordsworth is clearly, in Kaufer's terms, "bound
to social action."

The poet's job, according to Wordsworth

is to shake people out of their "savage torpor" and to bind
society together.

In poems like "The Ruined Cottage,"

Wordsworth wants to force readers into questioning a society
where the horrors of poverty are abundant.

Margaret, the

main character of "The Ruined Cottage," is suffering the
ravages of war and rural poverty.

Her husband has left her

and two children behind to join the army in order that they
might receive the bonus money given him for enlisting.
Margaret obstinately awaits his return, and in so doing she
and her humble cottage fall into ruins.

By the end of the

poem Margaret's moral decay matches that of her physical
decay.

Wordsworth indicates her final devastating fall into

despair when the eldest son is given to the church and the
infant dies of neglect.

Wordsworth does not make our task

as readers easy in this poem.

He does not make a moral

judgment for us, but instead unfolds the scene in front of
the reader, pushing us into thinking, questioning, and
reflecting on the economic, political, and societal
structures that are the root cause of Margaret's demise.
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The expressivist heritage, then, is not apolitical, and
expressivist teachers themselves can strive to problematize
social and political concerns as part of the classroom
agenda.

We can politicize our courses and make the students

socially aware through discussions and writing about
campus, state, national, and international events, and
issues concerning class, race, poverty, and bigotry.

The

Romantic tradition and the first generation of expressivist
teachers and theorists have given us much to build on. In a
sense, I am calling for a new generation of expressivists
who can reclaim the Romantic heritage and put into action
what is best about the rich and complex theories of the
Romantic poets; of Mill, Arnold, and Dewey; and Peter Elbow,
D. Gordon Rhoman, Donald Murray, and Ann Berthoff.
I would like to note, however, that the expressivist
agenda is already more political than we might realize at
first glance.

For instance, the fact that the expressivist

teacher views herself as an authority but not as the
absolute repository of knowledge is the buttress for a
democratic and non-oppressive classroom environment.
Expressivists assume that the act of writing, and the things
that go into it— observation, discovery, vision,
reflection— will lead to knowing. Thus, the teacher's job is
not to parcel out what she knows, but rather to help
students create knowledge on their own.

By allowing
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students their own authority expressivist pedagogies can
begin to dismantle the hierarchy of the traditional
classroom.

In this regard, expressivists share an important

tenet with the liberatory pedagogy of Paulo Freire.

Like

Freire, expressivist pedagogues offer "a revolutionary
model" because they provide "a method which does not depend
on knowledge that has been 'deposited' (in Freire's bestknown metaphor of education as banking)" (Berthoff "Paulo
Freire's Liberation Pedagogy" 364).

Ann Berthoff, for

instance, has become Freire's most ardent proponent.

She

recognizes that Freire's "pedagogy of knowing" is the
pedagogy she cultivates as an expressivist.

Of course, it

is clear that Berthoff differs from Murray and Elbow in that
she does not hesitate to make politics a central part of her
educational philosophy.

To the contrary, Murray is adamant

about refusing to force a political agenda on his students.
The issue of student and teacher authority is not
easily settled, but expressivists are not naive about the
difficulties that arise when teachers attempt to shift
traditional patterns of power within the classroom.
Although Donald Murray prefers to stay out of the
discussions on "liberatory pedagogy," Elbow, though he
disagrees with Ann Berthoff's whole-hearted acceptance of
Freire, enters freely into the political fracas.

In "The

Pedagogy of the Bamboozled," for instance, Peter Elbow
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argues that in order to create a "truly liberatory"
classroom "the teacher must work as a collaborating ally of
the student, not as a supervisor [original emphasis]
(Embracing Contraries 87).

But this is difficult to achieve

within the institution, and Elbow insists that it only
"seems" as though we have a genuine collaboration with
students:
There is a crucial contradiction in the
role of almost every institutional teacher
that prevents our being genuine allies of
the student: we are both credit-giver and
teacher. As credit-giver we are the hurdle
the student has to get over; as teacher we
are the person who helps the student get
over the hurdles.
It is very common for
teachers to imply that they are more truly
allies of the student than this
contradiction permits. This is a source of
bamboozlement for students, especially in
their relations with experimental, liberal,
open teachers who profess to be entirely
"on the student's side." (88)
Since we cannot truly give up all authority, what we can do,
according to Elbow, is to be forthright with our authority.
When we choose the readings for our students, we should do
so as an authority; when we give a grade, we should do so as
an authority.

As Elbow argues, "An honest exercise of

authority, even if it is hated, would not bamboozle" (91).
Unmasking our authority is itself a step toward dismantling
the traditional hierarchy— a hierarchy which, in part,
claims its power by hiding the extent to which it owns the
reins of control.

So, while Berthoff seems willing to
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believe a liberatory pedagogy is a possibility, Elbow
remains less enamored by it.
The expressivist emphasis on personal voice and vision
also helps to establish a pedagogy of equality.

In

nurturing individual uniqueness, vision, and voice,
expressivists are creating a climate in which all students
can be heard.

Those who remain silent or oppressed in other

courses, or in their daily lives, can enter into the
empowering act of naming their own experiences when they
know that their voices and experiences are not only
encouraged, but heard and valued.

Also, the fostering of

each individual voice leads to a chorus of perspectives.

We

must be wary, however, of letting the focus on individual
vision and voice isolate our students form the social
aspects of writing and selfhood.

And even though I believe

expressivist pedagogies, or what Patricia Bizzell calls
"personal-style" pedagogies are valuable, there are pitfalls
that we must watch for.

Bizzell reminds us, for example,

that it is necessary to bear in mind how
One's speaking, reading, and writing are
always shaped by one's social and cultural
background and by the political relations
this background creates with audiences of
similar or very different background. This
shaping is as much a matter of what the
writer knows as of what she does. For
example, a student may fail to produce an
acceptable personal-style essay because she
comes from a social group that does not
value the sort of intense introspection
such an essay calls for. Hence, she may
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either be simply too unfamiliar with
introspection to produce it, or too wary
with classmates (and teacher) from other
social groups to produce it for them to
read.
("Composing Processes: An Overview"
55)
If we are not aware of the social, political, and economic
conditions that bind our students our success will be
limited and we may, in fact, oppress the very individuals we
are attempting to liberate.

I an not, however, suggesting

that we should back away from personal introspection and the
kinds of writing that elicits personal reflection.

As Kurt

Spellmeyer argues, the sorts of personal essays that
expressivists often ask their students to write are probably
the last opportunity our college students have to "discover
the relationship of mutual implication, a relationship
fundamental to all writing, between the self and the
cultural heritage within which selfhood has meaning" ("A
Common Ground" 269).
While I do believe that the cultivation of personal
voice and personal perspective should not be compromised, at
the same time, I do not believe that any opinion, especially
those that are bigoted or fascist, should be unconditionally
tolerated.

To believe, however, that Romantic rhetorics

actually provide a catalyst for bigoted thinking is a
simplification of the expressivist stance.

For instance,

what Donald Murray realizes is that diversity, in its
fullest sense, cannot become a reality if any opinion, no
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matter how atrocious, is cut off and not given the chance to
be heard.

Even though Murray is generally thought of as

apolitical, his perspective on diversity is as radically
political, and perhaps more so, than some social-epistemic
perspectives.
Although the bigot in an expressivist classroom will be
given the chance to speak, he will also face hard-line
resistance.

Elbow's point in "Methodological Doubting and

Believing" is valid, however.

The student will not grow,

there is no hope for a change in perspective, if the teacher
and classmates do not play the "believing game" before the
"doubting game."

More often than not, if the student

holding the unacceptable belief is not afforded this initial
hearing he will retreat, sand-bagging his opinion against
the flood of criticism and holding onto a bigoted conviction
in defiance.

Doubting remains important, but if what Elbow

calls a "bargain and an exchange of temporary or conditional
assent" ("Doubting") is reached, then the student is more
willing to examine his belief critically.

And, it is in

unexamined convictions that the greatest danger lies.

The

expressivist acceptance of personal vision is an attempt to
protect diversity, but it is not an acceptance of bigoted
thought.

Rather, expressivists like Donald Murray and Peter

Elbow realize that the unacceptable opinion needs to be
voiced, and heard, in order to be examined.
examined, there is no hope for change.

If it is not
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Expressivist classrooms also encourage group and
collaborative work, and the recent surge of research and
scholarship on student collaboration has increased the
opportunity for successful results.

Group work provides a

built in forum for differing perspectives to be heard, tried
out, revised, and sometimes rejected.

Since many

expressivists pedagogies rely on group work, student
interaction, and discussion rather than lecture, plenty of
opportunities are created for conversation and dialogue to
take place.

Further, the expressivist emphasis on empathy

helps assure that a diverse classroom will become a reality.
Diversity can thrive where a multiplicity of voices is truly
heard, and where students and teachers bend into those
voices in order to empathize with and understand, though not
unthinkingly accept, a plethora of divergent perspectives.
Though we are inclined to forget and thus are apt to
ignore or misuse what is already there, the expressivist
approach to classroom pedagogy is broadly political in
nature even though it does not necessarily have politics as
a subject.

It strives for a democratic classroom, equality,

and true diversity.

It pushes hard against pedagogies that

strive for the assimilation of those who are different.

By

consciously working from a foundation of empathy and
personal voice and vision, it offers the chance for students
to become effective rather than "ineffective” citizens. In
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the end, expressivist rhetorics and pedagogies are capable
of creating a democratic classroom.
There is much about Romanticism which has been
misunderstood by scholars in composition studies and the
culture as a whole.

These misunderstandings have led to

perspectives which assume Romanticism and expressivist
rhetorics promote a dangerous form of radical individualism.
In reality, however, Romanticism is much more balanced and
complex than expressivists know and anti-Romantic critics
have been willing to admit.

In its embracing of emotion and

the particular individual, for instance, Romanticism's and
expressivism's goal is to accept humankind as it really is—
diverse.

The Romantics themselves arose out of a great

political and social need for change and reconstruction.

As

Jacques Barzun insightfully argues:
The vast horizons opened up by war and social
upheaval gave romanticism its scope: it was
inclusive, impatient of barriers, and eager for
diversity.
It . . . respected the individual as a source
. . . Accordingly, its political philosophy was an
attempt to reconcile personal freedom with the
inescapable need of collective action. (Classic,
Romantic, and Modern 137)
If we re-evaluate our conceptions and interpretations of
Romanticism, perhaps we will find aspects of the tradition
from which expressivist rhetorics develop worth keeping
alive as we continue to explore the rhetorical theories of
the present and the future.

Finally, if expressivists can
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reclaim the rich heritage from which they evolve, new
possibilities for Romantic rhetorics will arise.
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Endnotes

1 Peacock's essay, "The Four Ages of Poetry," is
what prompted Percy Shelley's solemn response in A
Defense of Poetry.
2 Barzun attaches an appendix to his study which
lists some of the ways in which the term Romantic is
being used in modern conversation. These include
"attractive," "exuberant," "ornamental," "unreal,"
"materialistic," "irrational," "futile," "heroic,"
"mysterious," "bombastic," "picturesque," "formless,"
"fanciful," and "emotional on principle."
3 Wordsworth, in The Prelude, actually calls the
reader's attention to the fact that he has short
changed the importance of books in both his childhood
and in later years:
"Thus far a scanty record is
deduced \ Of what I owed to books in early life; \
Their later influence yet remains untold;" (Book V 606608) .
4 What Russell does in this article is label
Lounsbury and Campbell Romantics because of their
desire to abolish writing courses on the grounds that
writing cannot be taught and that good writing only
happens to those few who are inspired.
5 Keats, of course, argued that Coleridge, though
he wanted to be, was incapable of really living "in the
universal" or practicing "negative capability" becuase
Coleridge was not able to "remain content with half
knowledge."
6 Shalin's article, "The Romantic Antecedents of
Meadian Social Psychology," chronicles the growth of
George Herbert Mead's stance on social psychology out
of Romantic philosophy.

CHAPTER V

ROMANTICISM AND ROMANTIC RHETORIC: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

As a woman and a feminist I have always found myself quite
comfortable with the fact that I am also a Romanticist and
an expressivist teacher.

Some of my friends and colleagues

find feminism at odds with Romanticism, and wonder at my
ease with Romantic philosophies.

It is true that

Romanticism and feminism are not perfect counterparts or
easy allies in all regards.

There is, however, much about

Romanticism and expressivist writing theory that
accommodates feminist theory and pedagogy, and it would, I
think, behoove expressivists to consider Romantic rhetorics
in light of recent feminist contributions to both literary
and composition studies.

If, for example, expressivist

theories and pedagogies are already empowering for women in
various ways as I hope to show they are, then a conscious
revision of expressivism that includes feminist perspectives
will be invaluable for creating a theory of composition that
strives for gender equality.
Feminist discussions on Romanticism have been slow in
coming to literary studies.

Feminist critiques of Romantic

rhetorics have been equally slow.

A collection of essays

edited by Cythnia L. Caywood and Gillian R. Overing entitled
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Teaching Writing: Pedagogy, Gender, and Equity, is the one
major contribution to the conjoining of feminist studies and
expressivist theories, or what the authors call
"revisionist" writing pedagogies.

Other scholars will

sometimes mention the compatibility of expressivist and
feminist teaching styles, but they do not make a critique of
expressivism their major concern (Flynn "Composing as a
Woman" Goulston "Women Writing").
Perhaps the timid move toward feminist perspectives on
Romanticism are a result of just how resoundingly male the
Romantic tradition has been.

Anne K. Mellor points out, for

instance, that the Romantic canon has lagged behind all
others in any reformulation in light of feminist
contribution (7).

This "lag" in the canon is two-fold:

feminine voices from the Romantic Age have been slow to
enter the literary canon; and the canon of scholarship, if I
might call it that, has been slow to see the influence of
feminist scholarship on Romanticism.

Virtually hundreds of

writers, many of them women, from the late 1700's to the
mid-1800's have been marginalized or ignored as possible
Romantics.

Prior to the early 1980's and the contribution

of feminist scholarship by such writers as Margaret Homans,
Anne Mellor, Susan Wolfson, Mary Jacobus, and Susan Levin,
the Romantic canon has consisted of primarily six males:
Blake, William Wordsworth, Coleridge, Percy Shelley, Byron,
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and Keats.

As my own project illustrates, the tradition

from which expressivist rhetorics arise has also been, in
large part, identified as male.
Thus, the time has come to examine, from a feminist
perspective, what the implications and consequences of this
are for expressivist theories and pedagogies.

A feminist

critique will raise potential philosophical questions for a
rhetoric and theory of education based on such a thoroughly
male tradition.

In her introduction to Romanticism and

Feminism, for example, Anne K. Mellor has suggested that the
canonization of only six of the writers from the Romantic
age has "legitimized the continued repression of women" (8).
It is worth noting, however, that these six writers did not
canonize themselves— male literary historians of a later
date have done so.

He still might ask, though, if a

rhetorical pedagogy primarily grounded in the philosophies
of two of these six Romantics would also continue the
repression that Mellor notes.

After all, there is a long

history of denial of education for women and the Romantics
did not all work to ensure women access to a full education.
Although Percy Shelley did, Coleridge, a major figure in my
history of expressivist theories, makes clear that his
argument for a schooling which would nurture the "truly
educated mind" was solely for men.

Women were to be

educated differently and for other purposes than that of the
cultivation of the imaginative and reflective mind.1
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Of more immediate concern for writing theory is James
Catano's argument that the expressivist rhetorics of William
Coles, Peter Elbow, and Ken Hacrorie are masculine because
they are built on a male self-formulation.

This self-

formulation, according to Catano, describes learning to
write in language which is combative and aggressive, and
sees learning to write in terms of mastery.

Masculine

aggression is apparent in Coles and Elbow, and this
aggression excludes women and is even ’’anti-feminine,"
according to Catano (433).

Peter Elbow's language in

Writing with Power demonstrates what Catano identifies as
aggressive male language:
Having rejected "subjective bullshit" in
the first text (141), Elbow follows up in
the second with a variety of aggressive
descriptions and metaphors of writing:
"the experience of battle conditions with
live ammunition" (33); "my decision . . .
to force the world to listen to me" (122);
"wielding the knife and seeing blood on the
floor" (123); and "the power of the words
to hit readers in the gut" (369).
(Catano
429)
This "masculinist" use of language is widespread and
the works of other writing theorists are also saturated with
a language of aggression and combat.

I have recently been

examining the metaphors that arise from a rhetoric of
violence in the works of social-constructivist David
Bartholomae ("English Studies and the Metaphors We Live
By"), for instance, and Susan Meisenhelder has noted that
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"examining modern conceptions of rhetoric and the handbooks
on writing we teach shows us that we often teach an
adversarial model of discourse" ("Redefining 'Powerful'
Writing: Toward a Feminist Theory of Writing" 186).
Meisenhelder suggests that when we teach writing based on
discourse models that are built on metaphors of war and
violence such as "attacking" and "defending" points of view,
and when we talk of using words as weapons and as acts of
aggression we are "promoting a patriarchal mode that
encourages students to internalize a rhetorical stance of
dominance . . . "

(186).

This has negative consequences for

women students because it reinforces a way of acting and
writing in the world which is unfamiliar to them and it
works to keep women oppressed by a male hierarchy.
The fact that expressivists' discourse models also
harbor language that is exclusionary and even "antifeminine," as Catano suggests, is an issue that should
concern expressivist rhetoricians as well as feminists.

We

should make concerted efforts to remove these metaphorical
constructs and to replace them with language that welcomes
and invites rather than excludes women.

Perhaps we can make

better use of nurturing and connecting metaphors and help
bring forward the expressivist focus on empathy and
discovery.

Peter Elbow, for instance, has a pedagogy that

is so clearly built on empathy that it seems strange to find

208

these aggressive metaphors, and I suspect that they are not
present in as large a number as more accommodating
metaphors.

Yet, it does seem urgent that he reconstruct his

language in passages like that quoted above by Catano.
Although some of the metaphors on which an expressivist
model of discourse is built do need prompt attention, they
are not reason to abandon expressivist rhetorics.

To the

contrary, expressivists need to explore what feminists are
now identifying as the feminine tradition in Romanticism in
order to alleviate some of these problems and issues as well
as enrich the Romantic tradition from which composition
scholars and teachers can draw.

Further, in spite of

Romanticism's male tradition, it is not necessarily a
"masculinist" tradition; on the contrary, the poets often
attempted to cultivate a "feminine consciousness."

Finally,

Romanticism, even without the additional benefit that will
arise with a consideration of a female tradition in
Romanticism, can benefit from and accommodate feminist
theories and pedagogies thereby creating the potential for a
rhetoric that is empowering for our women students.
First, let me point out that we must continue to be
concerned by the fact that Romantic educational theories
were originally male-centered.

We must not be deterred,

however, or women will continue to be denied a valuable
educational experience.

As Jane Roland Martin points out,
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women have been excluded throughout the history of
education, both as objects of educational thought and as
subjects ("Excluding Women"

135).2

In order to stop the

recurrent denial of the feminine by forcing women into a
masculine mode of education and composing, we can expand the
realm of expressivist rhetorics by widening the male
Romantic tradition to include women, and by revising
expressivist theory in light of feminist contribution.
widening can take place on several levels.

This

It can include

both women who were contemporary with the Romantics and it
can include women as writers, readers, and learners in
today's academy.

As expressivists we can join our

colleagues in literary studies to explore what Mary
Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, Felicia Hemans, Emily Bronte,
Dorothy Wordsworth, and others can add to our tradition.
Many will be surprised to find that Wollstonecraft
anticipated current social theories by arguing that women
are social constructions, shaped by our environment and the
type of education we receive (Martin 77), and that the
writings of Dorothy Wordsworth offer a "female version" of
the Romantic self which takes into account "the complexities
surrounding a woman's psychological development" (Levin 5).
Further, feminist literary scholars have already begun to
show that Dorothy Wordsworth's vision of the self expands
"individual subjectivity to visionary community" (Wolfson

2X0

Romanticism and Feminism 145), offering further reason for
not dismissing Romantic rhetorics on charges of radical
individualism.
Although we are inclined to see "collaboration” and
writing "communities” as primarily feminist orientations,
feminists themselves are reminding us that Romantic writers
very consciously formed discourse communities through which
they enabled their art and writing.

Levin reminds us, for

instance, that the Wordsworth circle at Grasmere was a
"community of language; and it was finally a community of
writing, a mutuality of writing energies in which each
shared in his or her own way" (6).3

It is in such writers

as Dorothy Wordsworth and Mary Shelley that we find an
alternative to the myth of the lonely writer.

Their works

show the community in action and collaboration, a community
of men and women alike.
In order to alleviate the masculinist rhetoric that
Catano has perceptively pointed out in expressivist
pedagogies, we must be self-reflective and we must
incorporate feminist theoretical and pedagogical
perspectives into expressivist stances:

we can examine and

change our metaphors so that they are not anti-feminine or
anti-woman; we can include a feminist rhetoric which models
a mode of composing founded on metaphors of collaboration
and caring rather than on metaphors of "war" and "rape"
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(Meisenhelder 193).

We can recognize and problematize the

fact that the powerful autonomous self of the Western world
is usually that of the "self-made" man not the "self-made"
woman or the socially constructed woman; we can take our cue
from feminists and change the expressivist rhetoric of the
self to a plurality of selves.

In sum, expressivists can

publicly articulate feminist theories in contrast to
masculinist theories.
A feminist investigation of the feminine tradition in
Romanticism will yield expressivist theories many valuable
prospects for teaching, but the philosophies of the male
poets also lend themselves to a feminist perspective.

In

Reclaiming a Conversation: the Ideal of the Educated Woman,
the feminist educational philosopher Jane Roland Martin
calls for a rethinking of education which will enable
emotion and feeling to become as much a part of the
educational process as analysis, critical thinking, and
self-sufficiency (192-193).

As I have shown, this was the

basis for Wordsworth and Coleridge's educational plan.
Martin also asks for an educational system that honors, and
melds together, both "reproductive societal processes" which
have traditionally been seen as the feeling and emotional
realm of the female, and the analytical realm of knowledge
making which is seen as the "productive societal processes"
usually ascribed to the world of the male (197).

Martin
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recalls a 1977 address by Adrienne Rich to women college
students in which Rich asked the students to claim an active
education that would connect with their experiences as women
rather than to passively receive one that privileges the
male experience.

Adrienne Rich, writes Martin, "was saying

that in becoming mere receptacles for a university learning
that excludes their experience and thought, women's lives
can be damaged beyond repair" (2).

As I have been arguing

throughout, the Romantic philosophies allow for a version of
an ideal education which promotes what Rich and Martin argue
for: an active rather than passive education, and a wedding
of the emotional and analytical, or the reproductive and
productive processes.
Although William Wordsworth has been accused of
relegating nature to the realm of the feminine in order to
assert his masculine poetic identity over the natural world
(Homans), he is just as likely to assert a more feminine
consciousness.

As the feminist critic Susan Wolfson argues,

"just as typically, and with a full range of investigation,
this poet may represent male consciousness as passive,
itself inscribed by voices of the 'other'" Romanticism and
Feminism 147).
earth . . .

She quotes The Prelude: "'the changeful

on my mind had stamped / The faces of the moving

year' (Prelude 1.586-88); the 'common face of Nature spake
to me . . . impressed /Collateral objects and appearances, /
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Albeit lifeless then, and doomed to sleep / Until maturer
seasons call them forth / To impregnate and to elevate the
mind' (1.615 24)" (147).

In these lines, argues Wolfson,

"the self is not just passive but feminine, and imaged,
implicitly, with the potential of female (re)productivity"
(147).

in effect, Wordsworth's lines here depict his male

consciousness in a state that is not asserting its identity
against the natural world.

Rather, as Wolfson suggests, his

male consciousness is being "inscribed by voices of the
'other'."

The result, as Wordsworth implies, is an

"impregnation" of the mind and the distinctly female ability
to give birth, to (re)produce.

In effect, Wordsworth's

description of the philosophical mind is androgynous.
Coleridge, too, strove for a consciousness that was as
much feminine as masculine.

As I have already pointed out,

he believed that the imaginative and "truly educated" mind
must be androgynous, must combine the feminine with the
masculine.

Indeed, by using the figure of the androgyne as

a central metaphor throughout his philosophical discussions,
Coleridge was able to suggest a union between the masculine
consciousness and the feminine, thereby creating a mind that
is potentially (re)productive.
It is valid to note that the male poets were not always
successful in their attempts to nurture a feminine
consciousness along with their male consciousness.

This
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failure prompts some feminist critics to argue that the
Romantics' attempts to incorporate the feminine did
irreparable damage to the women of their community (Homans,
Richardson).

It is also clear that both Wordsworth and

Coleridge viewed the feminine in a stereotypical manner.

An

examination of their writings, for instance, shows that they
ascribe the feminine part of the androgynous mind with
passivity rather than action.

Coleridge's model of the

androgynous mind can actually be broken down into typical
opposites— the masculine as light, life, mind, and reason
and the feminine as darkness, death, body, and passion.
Coleridge and Wordsworth's acceptance of the feminine as
crucial to the education of the encompassing intellect,
then, is premised on diminishing views of the feminine.
Feminists should be leery of terms like "male" and
"female" or "masculine" and "feminine" when refering to the
mind or consciousness.

It is but a simple step to

essentializing masculinity and femininity.

When the

creative mind is viewed as masculine, feminine, androgynous,
or in any way gendered, it is because centuries of male
writers have constructed these metaphors.

My ambition is

not to argue for these essentializing metaphors, but for the
intent, no matter how badly represented, that Wordsworth and
Coleridge had in trying to deconstruct the image of the
creative mind as solely masculine.

They did work toward
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cultivating a feminine consciousness during an historical
time in which the feminine consciousness was seen as
inferior and in which the feminine was conceived of in
stereotypical terms.

At the same time Wordsworth and

Coleridge were working from this stereotypical perspective
of the feminine, they were also attempting to work against
it, for embedded in Wordsworth's quest for the philosophic
mind and Coleridge's belief that the creative mind is
androgynous is a theory consonant with a philosophy that
honors the connection of feeling and emotion, analysis and
critical thinking, and the productive and reproductive
processes necessary to create an education that truly
accommodates women as well as men.

And, if we are willing

to join with feminists in diffusing the stereotypical views
of the feminine and masculine and in deconstructing the
belief that the attributes of masculine and feminine must be
separate, perhaps current expressivists can succeed where
our Romantic forebears failed.
A recent study of women's intellectual development also
suggests that aspects of Romantic educational philosophy are
beneficial for women.

In Women's Ways of Knowing, Mary

Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule
Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule, chronicle the
psychological development of women as they move from
positions of "silence" to positions of "constructed
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knowing," from powerless to empowered selves capable of not
only receiving knowledge, but of making knowledge.

Their

study suggests that the development of voice and self is
crucial to the development of women's minds and they find
that for the most part the process of education has
traditionally not allowed for the psychological and
intellectual growth of women because it has separated the
affective from the analytical, and lived experience from
academic experience.

Likewise, although she differs with

Belenky et al. on other points, Jane Roland Martin finds
that the educational journey is primarily one which is
damaging because it splits reason from emotion ("Becoming
Educated" ).

Interestingly enough, the suggestions Belenky

et al. make for creating an educational system that would
foster the development of women echo many of those made by
the Romantics for the cultivation of the "philosophical" or
"truly educated" mind:
We have argued in this book that educators
can help women develop their own authentic
voices if they emphasize connection over
separation, understanding and acceptance
over assessment, and collaboration over
debate,* if they accord respect to and allow
time for the knowledge that emerges from
firsthand experience; if instead of
imposing their own expectations and
arbitrary requirements, they encourage
students to evolve their own patterns of
work based on the problems they are
pursuing. These are lessons we have
learned in listening to women's voices.
(229)
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The Romantics advocated growth of the self, discovery of
voice, "connection," "understanding," "experience," and
although we don't usually perceive of the Romantics as
"collaborative," in practice they formed writing
communities, shared their work, and even collaborated on the
writing of their poetry.

Wordsworth and Coleridge, for

instance, not only collaborated to compile the Lyrical
Ballads, but often made additions, sometimes full stanzas,
to each other's poems.

They used each others' poetical

ideas and conversations with each other as ways of
overcoming writing blocks or as means of "inspiration."
Moreover, the epistemological stances in women's
development identified by Belenky et al.— "silence,"
"received knowledge," "subjective knowledge," "procedural
knowledge," and "constructed knowledge," are similar to the
developmental path described by the poets in the growth of
the creative, knowledge-making intellect.^

in the stage of

silence, for instance, women seem to be "'deaf and dumb' and
are unaware of the power of words for transmitting
knowledge" (36). "Silent" women are cut off from their
experience; they are unable to connect with the world around
them, nor are they able to connect with language.

They are

voiceless and without self:
Even though each of the women had the gifts
of intelligence and of all their senses,
they were unaware of the potential of such
gifts. While no one was actually "deaf and
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dumb," this metaphor suggests their
experience more accurately than does
"gaining a voice." They felt "deaf"
because they assumed they could not learn
from the words of others, "dumb" because
they felt so voiceless. (24)
Because they are cut off from the practice or privilege of
"making sense" of the world around them, do not "perceive"
as the Romantics would say, cannot connect with experience,
these women are missing a crucial link in the discovery of
self, which in turn leads to the ability of "finding a
voice" and making meaning through language.
Belenky et al. suggest that the silence these women
suffer is culturally imposed.

In its most extreme, this

imposition comes through such tragic and drastic forces as
emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.

If, however, women

can shed this cultural imposition and the consequent
"deafness and dumbness," if they can learn to connect with
experiences in some way, they move toward a means of knowing
that is analogous to Wordsworth's "wise passiveness.
During a time of "received knowledge," women begin to
observe, perceive, and experience.
listening" (36).

They "learn by

And as it is for Wordsworth, this stage is

important to women because although passive, it is a time of
experiencing and discovering through observation, and this
experiencing becomes important in later stages of creating
knowledge through language.
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Having found ways to move from silence to the ability
to "receive," the women in the study by Belenky et al. were
able to begin the important job of constructing selfknowledge through language.

This necessarily comes from a

position of subjectivity, just as it did for the Romantic
poets.

What becomes important is the individual's lived

experience or vision, and at this stage the "subjective
knower" starts to see the world in terms of an individual
self.

She finds her own experience understandable and

worthwhile, perhaps for the first time in her life.

The

authors of Women's Ways of Knowing capture the difficulty
women who finally come to trust their own experiencehave
connecting with the experiences of others with aquote
a young woman who was a "subjective" knower.

from

This woman

could find little sense in the experience revealed in
classical texts because it seemed irrelevant to her own
experience:
A college senior was highly critical of a
male professor:
"1 never knew what the man
was talking about. It was the way he spoke
or the words he used or just the way he put
words together that was hard for me to
understand. You can't learn from teachers
and books like you can from experience."
(74)
Her experience did not match the sense of this academic
world and at this point she is able to trust little else but
her own words and experience.

Because she has finally found

the power in her own experience and her own words, she finds
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it difficult to relate her experience to anyone else's and
she seems hesitant to reflect on the disparity between her
own experience and that revealed in the texts she is reading
or that the professor is trying to convey.

She remains

stuck as a "subjective knower" because she has not, as the
Romantics knew was crucial, "abandoned both subjectivism and
absolutism in some areas [of her life].

. . in favor of

reasoned reflection" (Women's Ways of Knowing 88).
According to Belenky et al., reflection is of utmost
importance to women's intellectual development just as it is
to the growth of Wordsworth's philosophical mind and
Coleridge's educated mind.

For Coleridge, reflection leads

to mental growth which eventually leads to a "distinct
consciousness," which is, in effect, a mind capable of
making meaning.

Likewise, the ability to be reflective is

the catalyst that moves women into the stage of development
that the authors of Women's Ways of Knowing call "procedural
knowledge."

Within this stage are two modes of knowing:

"connected" and "separate" knowing.

Separate knowers seem

to be the less productive of the two.

When a separate

knower is given a writing task, for instance, they "write
well," but often "feel the papers they write are pointless.
They have no connection to the papers they write for
teachers and they [the papers] are empty of their own
feelings, ideas, and voice" (188).

"Connected" knowing, on
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the other hand, is not disconnected from the self and world
as separate knowing is. It is the '•epistemological
orientation that is toward relationship" (101).

It is the

balanced position between subjectivity and objectivity that
the Romantics strove to find.

Connected knowing seems to

bear much in common with Romantic philosophies.

In fact,

the authors of Women's Ways of Knowing suggest that
Coleridge is a connected knower (113).
limited to Coleridge, however.

The ties are not

Belenky et al. write,

Connected knowers develop procedures for
gaining access to other people's knowledge.
At the heart of these procedures is the
capacity for empathy. Since knowledge
comes from experience, the only way they
can hope to understand another person's
ideas is to try to share the experience
that has led the person to form the idea.
(113)
This quote seems to describe the Romantic desire to connect
themselves with others.

It is reminiscent of Keats's

"negative capability," the ultimate ability to negate one's
own ego in order to identify and connect with an other.

And

it is certainly reflective of Wordsworth's entire project as
a poet:

"to bring his feelings near to those of the persons

whose feelings he describes" (Preface 737).
Unlike "separate knowers," women who are connected
knowers are not only able to write well in the conventional
sense, but they are also able to do so with voice, feeling
and critical thought.

Separate knowers are examples of what
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the Romantic poets felt that a misguided education of
analysis, severed from the emotive and experiential,
produced.

Separate knowers are capable of parroting back

information they have received, but as Belenky et al. note,
they are incomplete and uninvested in the making of
knowledge: "For women . . . who are separate knowers,
thinking and feeling are split asunder; they feel fraudulent
and deadened to their inner experiences and inner selves"
(135).
If women are able to cultivate experience, feeling,
voice, self, and reflection, they can become connected
knowers, and connected knowers are able to move into the
fifth epistemological position identified in Women's Ways of
Knowing, that of "constructed knowledge."

This stage is

finally the culmination of growth and development.

It is

most like William Wordsworth's mature mind— the
philosophical mind. Constructed knowers have the abilities
of the encompassing intellect.

They blend reason and

emotion, subjective and objective.

They are able to create

knowledge because they have, in effect, incorporated those
things the Romantics found crucial to a viable educational
process, "reflection," "experience," "empathy," "selfconsciousness," and "personal voice":
These women [constructed knowers] were all
articulate and reflective people. They
noticed what was going on with others and
cared about the lives of people about them.
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They were intensely self-conscious, in the
best sense of the word— aware of their own
thought, their judgments, their moods and
desires . . . Each was ambitious and
fighting to find her own voice— her own way
of expressing what she knew and cared
about. Each wanted her voice and actions to
make a difference to other people and the
world. (133)
Romantic educational philosophies, although originally
directed primarily at men, are also useful in the
epistemological development of women.

The research done by

the authors of Women's Ways of Knowing suggests that women
students would actually benefit from Romantic educational
philosophies, and likewise, they would be well accommodated
by expressivist rhetorical theories and pedagogies.

In

fact, some feminist researchers have noted a correlation
between feminist theories and expressivist theories. Cythnia
Caywood and Gillian Overing, for instance, suggest that
"revisionist” writing theories are a critique of a
patriarchal system just as are feminist theories:
In assembling it and reviewing these two
bodies of research, we have discovered a
consistent pattern, one characterized by
the recurrent intersection of several major
premises at the heart of both bodies of
research. The most important of these are:
the relation between revisionist critiques
of traditional writing theory and the
feminist critique of masculinist,
patriarchal ways of being; and the
correlation between the revisionists'
restructuring of pedagogy and revaluing of
the student and feminists' restructuring of
cultural models and revaluing of the
experience of women.
The familiar revisionists view of
writing as process, which challenges the
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classical view of writing as product,
offers a paradigmatic dialectic appropriate
to feminist discourse, (intro Teaching
Writing xii)
Both feminist theories and revisionist writing theories
question authority:

feminist theory that of the patriarchy

and revisionist theory that of the product.
While Overing and Caywood do not specify expressivist
theory as the "revisionist" theory they argue for, the focus
on the private and individual voice, personal experience,
and the process over product they identify as aspects of
"revisionist" theory clearly belong to expressivism.

So

expressivist rhetorics seem linked to feminist theory in
their critique of oppressive hierarchies as in earlier
decades when Romantic ideas and philosophies arose in Mill,
Arnold, and Dewey, and in Berthoff, Murray, Rohman, and
Elbow as reactions to oppressive establishments and
traditional schooling curricula.

In effect, as Caywood and

Overing argue, expressivist theory, what they call
"revisionist" theory and feminist theory are kindred in
their opposition to an established hierarchy:

"the process

model, in so far as it facilitates and legitimizes the
fullest expression of the individual voice, is compatible
with the feminist revisioning of hierarchy, if not essential
to it (xiv).
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule also find
expressivist rhetorical theories and pedagogies
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accommodating to women students.

They refer to and quote

Peter Elbow extensively in their study.

They cite him as a

writing teacher who fosters a learning climate in which
women can excel.

Both his focus on development of voice and

the privileging of "believing" over "doubting" allow women
to

take part more fully in their own educations because

they are able to work from a center of assent rather than
dissent and debate.
Peter Elbow's pedagogy also relies on connection and
empathy, two qualities critical to women's emotional and
intellectual growth.

Small groups provide Elbow's students

with the environment necessary for connections among people
to take place.

His "sharing" groups, where student's learn

to share their writing and listen closely to each other, are
helpful for women who are both searching for their own voice
and learning to "hear."

These groups stress active

listening, and they give students a chance to say what they
know without facing, in the beginning of the search for
voice, negative criticism and harsh response.

As Belenky et

al. point out, many "silent" women do not survive the
academy because they are not themselves secure with
language.

For many of these women, language is a weapon

which has been used against them to ensure their continued
silence in the face of male dominance and abuse.

Elbow's

groups, then, provide at least two important educative needs
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for women:

a place to practice using language and finding a

voice; and an environment in which negative criticism is
deferred until the writer has enough sense of self and
voice, perhaps alleviating the feeling that language is
necessarily a weapon to silence them.
Romantic rhetorics nurture experience and a "wise
passiveness," and expressivist teachers advocate seeing,
listening, hearing, receiving, and putting experience into
words through such exercises as Ann Berthoff's detailed
record of ten-minutes of observation and close description.
Moreover, Berthoff and Murray's use of the journal is
another example of how expressivist#s pedagogical techniques
invite women into the realm of discourse.

Feminists have

recognized that the private language used by women in
journals can be an important step toward learning how to
speak in the public language of the academy (Gannett Gender
and the Journal: Diaries and Academic Discourse
forthcoming).

Meisenhelder finds the journal invaluable for

women students and feminist teachers:
In this way
[through journal writing] we
aim to launch students— often especially
women students— on a private search for
self-identity and meaning in their own
lives. This is an important development for
several reasons. Besides the value in
helping students develop awareness,teaching
such a form of writing has been an
important step in transforming notions
about discourse and language. This kind of
writing allows students to experience the
power of important feminist ideas about
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language— especially the value of the
particular, the concrete, and the
emotional. From journal writing, students
learn that language doesn't have to be
distanced, logical, objective, and abstract
in the traditional model of rational
thought for it to convey meaning. (184)
Peter Elbow's freewriting is also a way in which
students can learn that language which is emotional and nonlogical has value.

In fact, pre-writing of all kinds are

especially inviting forms of discourse for women.

As Wendy

Goulston reminds us,
Prewriting is, after all, what women have
been doing for centuries in letters and
journals and conversations with each other,
"freewriting," brainstorming," meditating,
overflowing with uncensored feelings and
ideas.
("Women Writing" 25)
When we use these familiar and "expressive" modes as a
foundation for academic prose, says Goulston, "women can
draw on their own thinking and feeling to develop the
rhetorical strategies that best suit their styles, their
arguments, their values" (25).
Pre-writing, freewriting, journal keeping, exercises of
observation and reflection are the kinds of activities that
can help move our women students from the position of
silence where they are without self, voice, and power, to a
discursive position where they can break through "dumbness
and deafness."

By learning to experience, perceive, and

listen they can move to the position of "received
knowledge."

Activities such as pre-writing and freewriting

228

can allow our women students as well as men to make their
personal experience part of their learning process.

As

Peter Elbow suggests, they can write about their feelings
and what is important to them.

Elbow believes that

freewriting can help in the development of voice, and voice
is a crucial part of women's emotional and intellectual
growth, according to feminist researchers.
Also, the expressivist focus on reflection, empathy,
and voice can provide the vital means of moving through
•'subjective knowing" to "connected knowing," and eventually
to the stage of "constructed knowledge."

When teachers like

Donald Murray create a learning environment which focuses on
discovery of both self and others, our women students can
learn to become connected knowers through empathy and an
understanding of how the self interacts with the world.
Moreover, through practice like Ann Berthoff's students gain
while writing in double-entry notebooks where they rethink,
question, study, and reflect on their own observations and
experiences, our students can move beyond subjective knowing
to connected knowing.

In sum, since Romantic rhetorics,

both in original and modern forms, foster an encompassing
intellect in our students through pedagogies which blend the
emotive and analytical, the subjective and the objective,
discovery of self and discovery of others, they offer a
theory and practice that can help women reach their
potential as "constructed knowers."
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Although I have Initiated a feminist response to
Romantic teaching philosophies and expressivist rhetoric,
there is still further need of examination from a feminist
perspective.

Feminists can discover in what ways the

expressivist emphasis on the imagination, feeling, and
voice, empower women students, and we can determine what
kinds of "selves" we are empowering.

We can learn in what

ways we fall short of creating the ideal learning situation
for women.

Feminists can revise the Romantic tradition from

which expressivist theories grow to include the feminine
tradition in Romanticism.

We can begin to explore what

Emily Bronte, Felicia Hemans, Dorothy Wordsworth, Mary
Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft and many others can add to an
expressivist rhetoric.

By continuing to explore

expressivist rhetorics from a feminist perspective we can
not only widen the tradition from which they arise, but we
can continue to illuminate what is valuable about them.

We

must understand, however, that although Romantic educational
philosophies and expressivist rhetoric do provide an
educational climate favorable for women by integrating
reason and emotion, thought and action, and self and
experience, it is not satisfactory to just make note of
this.

As Jane Roland Martin argues, changing the

educational realm in any valuable way will require an
understanding that
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the exclusion of both women and the
reproductive processes of society from the
educational realm by philosophy of
education is a consequence of the structure
of the discipline and not simply due to an
oversight which is easily corrected. Thus,
philosophical inquiry into the nature of
those processes or into the education of
women cannot simply be grafted onto the
philosophy of education as presently
constituted. ("Excluding Women" 148)
Thus, it is only in continuing to revise and redefine
expressivist theory and pedagogy in light of feminist
perspectives that we can create a theory for composition
that truly strives for an education of equality.
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Endnotes
A

1 Coleridge held this view in spite of the fact
that he argues that the imaginative mind cannot reach
its full potential unless it is feminine as well as
masculine, unless it is an androgynous mind. This, of
course, raises the philosphical question for feminists
as to whether the Romantics wanted to grant the
feminine autonomy and power at all, or whether they
really wanted to absorb the feminine into the
masculine.
2 Martin points out that Rousseau's educational
plan for Sophie, which was drastically different from
that of Emile's, is rarely mentioned throughout the
history of educational thought and philosophy.
2 Other Romantic communities included Byron and
the Shelley household, the Hedge Club, and the
Trancsendental Club in America. All of these groups
included writing women members.
(See Levin's Dorothy
Wordsworth and Romanticism)
4 I am grateful to Thomas Newkirk for noticing
that Wordsworth was a "connected knower." Professor
Newkirk's insight led me to explore more fully the
parallels between women's ways of coming to the act of
knowing and that of the poets.
5 The authors of Women's Ways of Knowing suggest
that often the ability to connect with experience comes
for some of these women when they are able to make the
human connnection between themselves and a child.
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CHAPTER VI

A NOTE ON ROMANTIC RHETORICS AND THE CROSS-CULTURAL
CLASSROOM: THE WEIGHT OF TOO MUCH LIBERTY

In exploring the value of the Romantic tradition for
composition studies I am not recommending acceptance of the
entire program of Romanticist or expressivist theories.

The

lashings expressivist theories have been receiving from
proponents of social-constructivist rhetorics will hopefully
push expressivists to closely examine their assumptions,
theories, and pedagogies.

If we are not willing to reflect,

question, and critique with rigor the underpinning
philosophies of expressivism, we will not only fail to draw
on a valuable tradition as advantageously as we might, but
we will be blind to its problems and pitfalls as well.

I

believe, for example, that expressivists have not reflected
enough on cross-cultural issues, and minority and non-native
students.

There is a great deal for expressivists to learn

from our ethnic minority students and non-native speakers,
and from our colleagues in linguistics and English as a
Second Language.

James Paul Gee and Shirley Brice Heath,

for example, have shown us that ethnic minority students
come to our classes with discourse conventions that are
culturally, socially, and historically formed, and students
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themselves have pointed to differences between what writing
teachers ask for and what they traditionally do as writers
of their own culture.

It is important, in light of what

these students and scholars can tell us about cultural
issues, to examine closely whether expressivist theories and
pedagogies are helpful to minority students.
Fan Shen, a Chinese graduate student at Marquette
University, has made it clear that there are culturally
determined writing structures and has noted the distinctly
different forms that the writing of his native Chinese and
that of the Western world take.1

He claims, for instance,

that although it is often the expected form in the American
academy, the topic sentence format is not "natural" for
Chinese writers:2
A Chinese writer often clears the
surrounding bushes before attacking the
real target . . . before touching one's
main thesis, one should first state the
"conditions" of composition: how, why, and
when the piece is being composed. ("The
Classroom and the Wider Culture: Identity
as a Key to Learning English Composition"
463)
According to Fan Shen, this "bush-clearing pattern" has been
accepted as the norm in China for over two thousand years
(463).

Fan Shen notes "that clearing the bushes" began with

Kong Fuzi (Confucius) who says that "one first needs to call
things by their proper names" (463).

Fan Shen explains that

this requires stating how, why, and when the essay is being
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composed before one states the major thesis:

"like the

peeling of an onion: layer after layer is removed until the
reader finally arrives at the central point, the core"
(463).

In time this technique became formalized and the "Ba

Gu" or "eight-legged" essay became the norm.

Most Chinese

students, according to Fan Shen, are taught to follow a
certain pattern in the writing of narrative essays as well.
A recent Chinese textbook for writing he tells us, lists six
necessary "steps for writing a narrative essay, steps to be
taken in this order: time, place, character, event, cause,
and consequence" (463).

With my students I often try to get

them to shake up the order of things in a narrative essay.
It is apparent by what Fan Shen points out that the request
to shift place and time or consequence and cause might cause
a Chinese student an especially difficult problem.
My own limited experience with Japanese women suggests
that they are culturally shaped in ways that make argument,
as usually defined in American terms at any rate, an almost
impossible task for them.

Most of these women appear to

work within a language of conformity and obedience, and they
seem to have an unwavering respect for age and authority.
To these students, for whom polite negotiation and
accomodation are the norm of social interaction, the
confrontational American approach to argument is threatening
and silencing.

When asked to write an argumentative paper,
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the Japanese women have been unable to do so in conventional
American style.

Their papers take a completely different

form, a form that is usually a summation of ideas but that
contains no personal disagreement with any of the ideas
presented.

The Japanese society is also a culture where to

bring shame on one's self or to another is to be avoided at
all costs.

To claim disagreement is to bring dishonor not

only to the student, but to the person she is disagreeing
with.

Thus, argumentative papers by these students tend to

present various perspectives without critical or negative
comment.
It stands to reason, then, that if this is the
"natural" form the writings of at least some of our Asian
students will take, we either have to accept it as is (and I
expect the academy would object), or work with the students
so they may become conversant in the American traditions as
well.

This will require pushing against "two thousand

years" of cultural tradition in the case of Chinese students
and resocializing a way of being in the world for many
Japanese women.

Not all non-native students will come to us

with such drastically different forms as Chinese and
Japanese students do, but we be can sure that differences
will be abundant.

In fact, the more different the

structural forms of our students from what we are familiar
with, the easier the forms may be to address.

If the
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differences are subtle it may prove more difficult to ferret
out these differences in order to address the various
structures.

If we choose to help these students learn the

American forms, expressivists will need to address the
"varieties of structures" (Mitchell) in a forthright manner.
Some ESL experts argue that expressivist rhetorics are
not helpful, and are perhaps even harmful, when it comes to
writing instruction and the minority student or non-native
speaker.

Candace Mitchell, for instance, a cross-cultural

literacy specialist, suggests that the expressivist
assumption that writing will "naturally" find form can be
less than helpful. She argues that what "Berthoff and others
of the expressive school" do not address is the "issue of
the varieties of structures and ways of coherently ordering
reality through texts that exist across cultures" ("Four
Schools of Writing" 13).

Mitchell seems to suggest that

there is something inherent in expressivist theories that
keeps us from addressing the different traditions and
culturally-bound written forms of our minority and non
native students:
The message is, again, that form will
emerge naturally as long as opportunities
to engage in the "process" are provided.
No explicit statement as to what
constitutes good form is needed as the
assumption is that students will come to
uncover the implicit expectations of the
academy. Somehow out of the search for and
the subsequent finding of meaning will
emerge a coherent form.
Form-finding and
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form-creating may in fact be natural
abilities. Coherence may in fact emerge in
the act of writing. The point remains,
however, that the form to emerge may not be
the form anticipated by the academy.
(13)
Although I find nothing inherent in expressivism as a theory
that warrants Mitchell's charges, she does raise issues that
expressivists should explore.

In practice, does our

acceptance of organic form privilege forms "natural" to
American students while excluding the "natural" forms that
arise from the cultural heritage of our ethnic minority
students?

(When I use the term "natural" it is with full

recognition that what is "natural" for our students is
culturally determined.)

If so, are we unintentionally

placing these students at a disadvantage?

In order to

alleviate the risk of this possibility we can make efforts
to recognize and understand the various structures that will
"naturally" arise when students of differing cultural
backgrounds write.

And it seems that expressivists are in a

good position to do so since it is less likely that we would
demand an ethnic minority student to write, at least
initially, in a structure privileged by the Western world if
we truly allow "organic form" to emerge. In other words,
expressivists are apt to have created the opportunity to
consider and understand the various cultural structures by
fostering an environment which forgoes extrinsic structure
for what comes about "naturally."
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Mitchell also argues that the "organic" form the
student writer comes to may not be "anticipated" or accepted
by the academy, and she hints that the expressivist emphasis
on organic form excludes the teaching of these anticipated
academic conventions and structures.

She further implies

that "academic" form is the only "good" and right form:
"[expressivists provide] no explicit statement as to what
constitutes good form . . .

as the assumption is that

students will come to uncover the implicit expectations of
the academy" (13).

These are troublesome issues indeed.

Composition scholars have joined Mitchell in taking
expressivists to task for not specifying and making explicit
the discourse conventions of the academy (Bartholomae,
Bizzell).

They agree with Mitchell that the "natural" forms

students produce do not always take the forms expected and
privileged by the academy.

David Bartholomae believes that

unless we teach the academic discourse conventions to all of
our students, and especially our underprivileged students,
they will remain outside the academic conversations and will
thus remain marginalized and perhaps even be winnowed out of
the academy as failures.

But the potential discrepancy

between academic conventions and the forms that students
come to is recognized by most expressivist teachers.

In

fact, the expressivist emphasis on voice, sincerity,
reflection, and organic form is often an attempt to counter
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act the academy's forms and conventions.

The expressivist

stance is a conscious stand against the barrage of empty/
lifeless, prose that often mirrors our students' lack of
critical thought or investment in a subject, and which often
comes neatly packaged in one or another of the academic
prose forms.
Admittedly, the primary goal of an expressivist
rhetoric is to foster the growth of the whole being, the
imagination, and ultimately the encompassing intellect
rather than to teach specific forms.

However, the

expressivists' goal of educating the encompassing intellect
through a pedagogy that honors student voices, lived
experience, and emotional capacities does not have to remain
separate from introducing students to the forms and
conventions of the academy.

Mike Rose's success with

underprepared students, for instance, relies heavily on
incorporating his students' lived experience and interests
into his pedagogy.

Rose is aware, as are expressivists,

that a model for the teaching of writing "must honor the
cognitive and emotional," and he is aware, as are social
theorists, that these cannot be separated from the
"situational" dimensions of language ("The Language of
Exclusion" 357).
Rose, then, like the Romantics, Mill, Dewey,

Murray,

Elbow, and Berthoff, knows that the cognitive and the
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affective should not be split asunder.

He also shares with

expressivists the perspective that writing is a "means of
defining the self and defining reality . . . and is an
activity that develops over one's lifetime" (348).

He is in

sharp disagreement with most expressivists, however, and
joins Mitchell, Bartholomae, and Bizzell in the argument
that to deny students explicit practice within the discourse
conventions of the academy is to perpetuate the potential
for failure.

He argues that our students ought to be

required
a complete, active, struggling engagement
with the facts and principles of a
discipline, an encounter with the
disciplines texts and the incorporation of
them into one's own work, the framing of
one's knowledge within myriad conventions
that help define a discipline . . . . (359)
To require students this engagement with a discipline is a
tall order, and it certainly would require the cooperation
of the university as a whole.

Some expressivists, moreover,

might argue that it is not the composition teacher's job to
teach students to write for a discipline, but rather to
teach students to write to learn for a more general
knowledge and for the world at large.
Expressivists can learn from teachers like Rose how to
prepare students to be successful within the discourse
requirements of the academy while still preserving the focus
on lived experience, self, and voice.

Mike Rose, it seems,
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has begun the synthesis of cognitive, expressivist, and
social theories that Lester Faigley has called for
("Competing Theories of Process" 537).

Ultimately,

expressivists need not ignore academic discourse
conventions, for academic forms are only some of many to
choose from and they do have their place.

This is not to

say, however, that expressivists will continue to differ
from many of their critics in that academic forms remain of
secondary importance to the more important goal of educating
the whole being and encompassing intellect.
More problematic, however, than whether the teaching of
academic forms is of primary or secondary importance, is
Mitchell's implication that academic forms are inherently
"good."

For many expressivists, academic forms are anything

but good.

We are regularly dismayed by the formal

correctness of our students writing when it matches what the
academy asks for, say an "objective" essay that argues a
point through a particular linear structure and that
contains a clear thesis statement at the end of the first
paragraph.

What is often distressing about this

"correctness" is that it more often than not lacks, on the
student's part, any real critical thought, insight, or even
personal involvement with the content of the writing.

The

crux of expressivist theory lies in personal vision and
engagement, and in deep, reflective thought.

Therefore, it
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is not surprising that expressivists question whether we
should teach academic forms that often seem lifeless, a form
that students are capable of producing, but which are not
necessarily going to promote learning or the making of
knowledge.
Questions surrounding academic forms become even more
muddy in light of some liberatory pedagogies and socialepistemic rhetorics that accuse the academy of replicating
non-critical, "corporate-minded" students who leave the ivy
halls and enter mainstream America (e.g. Berlin, Ohmann).
The problem, according to scholars like Ohmann, is that
these "corporate-minded," non-thinking students become
citizens who perpetuate the most destructive and oppressive
facets of the "military industrial complex" which fuels
America (English in America).

Writing instructors have come

to realize that students can produce forms the academy
requires without necessarily engaging on any personal level
with what they are writing, or without engaging in critical
thought.

Thus, it has become the opinion of many in the

field of composition that those academic forms which are
more concerned with particular stylistic or discourse
conventions than with any making of knew knowledge might
actually contribute to this replication of non-critical
students.

It was expressivists during the 1960's, for

example, who precipitated the movement away from academic
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form.

Patricia Bizzell describes the anti-academic prose

movement this way:
the academy itself began to seem
discredited, in the eyes of many students
and teachers, by political developments in
the nation at large. . . the academy was
reluctant to incorporate new methods of
responding to these developments . . . this
reluctance was seen as enforcing
discriminatory social sorting, with white
middle-class men being educated for
positions of power and all others being
disenfranchised.
Academic expository
prose, the mastery of which was a
prerequisite for traditional academic work,
was implicated in the indictment of the
academy as an institution of political
oppression . . . By fostering students' own
styles, instead of forcing conformity to an
oppressive institutional standard, writing
teachers could feel they were making their
own contribution to reform of oppressive
academic and political institutions.
("Composing Processes" 52-53)
Having seen little change in the academy as a whole over the
intervening years, some expressivists continue to wonder
whether traditional academic expository prose should be
taught, especially in introductory writing courses.
Feminist scholarship which argues that academic forms are
oppressive, especially for women, because they privilege a
white male discourse have helped bolster expressivists'
resistance to academic conventions.

Further, if there is a

correlation between the "mastery" of academic forms and
oppressed American citizens, it seems insidious to turn our
ethnic minority students, students who might well work to
correct what is most negative about our society, into the
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same passive and non-critical writers and thinkers as are
many of our American students.
Granted, many minority students might well be eager to
enter into what many of us find negative about mainstream
American ideology, and participate in what they see as the
rewards.

Expressivist theory and pedagogy, however, and its

stand against empty form, can still play a vital role in
engendering the necessary critical capacities in all
students, majority and minority.

Because of the focus on

diversity, expressivist approaches to the teaching of
writing might, in fact, be especially useful in promoting
the differing perspectives minority students already hold.
In other words, expressivist pedagogy can offer the
opportunity for identity within diversity to flourish, and
this can enable our ethnic minority students to both
participate in and also criticize mainstream American
culture, including the academy.
It is, of course, unfair to assume, as Mitchell seems
to, that no expressivists talk about what constitutes "good"
or "academic" form.

Some may not, but it is not an emphasis

on "natural" form that precludes this, nor is it Romantic
rhetoric as a whole.

The expressivist stance is simply that

pre-determining form can be inhibitive and limiting.
Writing that is allowed to grow into form will find its own
coherence, and it does not necessarily have to conform to
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traditional conventions of academic discourse.

Joseph

Harris argues against the notion that
our students should necessarily be working
towards the mastery of some particular,
well-defined sort of discourse.
It seems
that they might better be encouraged toward
a kind of polyphony— an awareness of and
pleasure in the various competing
discourses that make up their own.
("The
Idea of Community in the Study of Writing"
17)
If we are not careful with the instructional trend toward
pedagogies that focus primarily on making students
conversant in academic discourses, our students can end up
like Richard Rodriguez— fully fluent in the public language
of the academy but exorcised of the private language of
their cultural discourse and community.

There is, of

course, a debate raging over whether the loss of an ethnic
cultural background is debilitating or even whether
replacing one's culture with another constitutes a loss at
all.

Rodriguez suggests, in Hunger of Memory, that the loss

of his familial culture and his assimilation into the
majority culture was not a bad thing, and was even
necessary.

What seems to me, however, to be the better

option is the one Harris offers:

students can become

members of a number of discourse communities "whose beliefs
and practices conflict as well as align" (18).
Perhaps, then, we should not push our students toward
the leaving of one community so that they might replace it
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with another.

The better solution might be in creating a

classroom where they can reorient themselves in connection
to several discourses or what Harris calls a "polyphony."
"Our goals as teachers," argues Harris, "need not be to
initiate our students into the values and practices of some
new community, but to offer them the chance to reflect
critically on those discourses— of home, school, work, the
media, and the like— to which they already belong" (19).
Expressivist theory would seem to supply what is necessary
for students to take a critical look at these various
discourses.

The expressivist focus on reflection, for

instance, especially if we apply Coleridge's summation of
reflectiveness which requires critical examination not only
of the self but of what is read and written, might easily
initiate the opportunity to "reflect critically" as Harris
requests.

Moreover, the emphasis on organic form allows for

the "polyphony" or multiple discourses to arise in the first
place.
This is not to deny that expressivists should address
"variety of structures" with our students— non-native and
native alike.

If we do not, however, the consequences may

be greater for our minority students, and as Mike Rose has
argued, for those underprivileged students on the
"boundary."

One of the insights I have gained from

colleagues in ESL is that many foreign students are
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overwhelmed by the expressivist's tendency not to offer some
formal structure.

Initially this lack of explicit form is

too great a liberty and students are left confused and
unable to write at all.
our position:

Perhaps, then, we should reevaluate

we can still let the form emerge "naturally"

if our cross-cultural students are able to overcome
confusion and compose at all; we can also make sure our
students know the various forms from which they can choose.
In fact, if we look back, once again, to the Romantics
themselves, we can see that the Romantic emphasis on organic
form does not deny the usefulness of formal structure.

Here

is William Wordsworth on the value of form:
Nuns fret not at their Convent's narrow room;
And Hermits are contented with their Cells;
And students with their pensive Citadels:
Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom,
Sit blithe and happy; Bees that soar for bloom,
High as the highest Peak of Furness Fells,
Will murmur by the hour in Foxglove bells:
In truth, the prison, unto which we doom
Ourselves, no prison is: and hence to me,
In sundry moods, 'twas pastime to be bound
Within the Sonnet's scanty plot of ground:
Pleased if some Souls (for such their needs must
be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,
Should find short solace there, as I have found.
Through the tightly structured form of the sonnet,
Wordsworth not only illustrates the value of form, but
suggests that it is not always confining.
can

Structure, then,

be liberating, and our prison of academic

always

forms may not

be a prison for our students, especially for those

who have "felt the weight of too much liberty."
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Expressivists, then, are faced with these questions:
Do we need to make explicit, perhaps especially for minority
ethnic students, how the form that their writing takes
differs from what the academy asks for?

Are we inclined to

accept the "natural" forms of our American students over
those of our non-native and minority students?

Are we

promoting forms that privilege a certain race, gender, and
class?

Do we wish to teach academic forms at all?

And

finally, what are the consequences of the way in which we
answer these questions for our ethnic minority students?
In order to answer these questions we need to enter
into conversation with our associates in ESL, and we must
not stop examining and reflecting on our goals and
assumptions.

If, for example, our agenda is to subvert the

expectations of the academy in an attempt to change its
literacy conventions rather than continuing to accept them,
we must ask if we are harming or sacrificing students by not
giving them every opportunity to empower themselves within
the codes of convention upheld by the academy.

We must

determine if we are explicit enough about varieties of form,
including academic form, so that our students of all
cultural orientations will be able to manipulate form and
discourse conventions well enough as readers and writers to
survive and flourish in the university and in the public
world for which it prepares us.

In other words, we must
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answer for ourselves as well as for our critics, how the
emphasis on organic form can lead to student empowerment
through choice and flexibility rather than to a naivete
about, or unthinking acceptance of, academic forms.

Let's

rise to the charges leveled by Mitchell and others, and as
expressivists consider the "varieties of structures" and the
ways in which forms that "naturally" arise are determined
socially, culturally, and historically.
A particular cultural concern, for instance, which
needs reflection and investigation in this regard is the
nature of the self or "I."

Since the growth of the self is

such an important aspect of Romantic rhetorics, it is
necessary to consider that the self will be very different
for our students depending on their cultural heritage.

The

"I" of the middle-class white student will differ greatly
from that of a student whose culture has taught her to
suppress the "I" for the good of the collective.

James V.

Catano, for instance, in his recent article, "The Rhetoric
of Masculinity: Origins, Institutions, and the Myth of the
Self-Made Man," argues that the self of male rhetoricians
like Peter Elbow and William Coles is that of America's
"self-made" man, the hero of the Protestant work ethic or
the ideal corporate entrepreneur.

We must examine the

cultural "I" we privilege as rigorously for our crosscultural students as feminists have for women.

We must be
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aware that the singular, autonomous ••I" that Elbow and Coles
are comfortable with is one that values individuality,
whereas the "I" of our students might not.
In fact, the self is not even a concern in many nonWestern cultures.

Xio Ming Li, a Doctoral student in

Composition Studies at the University of New Hampshire,
suggests that a focus on self is a problem unless we explain
what the "Self" is.

Li questions the validity of "self-

expression" because it presupposes an autonomous self.
her, self exists only in relationship to others.

For

Since, as

Xio Ming Li suggests, many cultures do not have as much of a
stake in what is "personal" as we do here in the United
States, oriental students will often have difficulties
writing a personal essay at all, and they will be more
confused than liberated by an expressivist emphasis on self
discovery and personal voice.

Perhaps reading and

discussing with these students concepts of the self that
arise in American writings like Thoreau's Walden, Whitman's
Song of Myself, and Maya Angelou's I Heard the Caged Bird
Sing would help.

Nonetheless, the concept of self raises

important questions if we wish to retain the self as an
important element in expressivist rhetorics.

Is our goal to

have our non-native and minority students learn to take on
the more American "I" of the majority of our students?
it to allow the students to retain their own culture's

Is
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concept of self while also being able to understand and
employ American selves?

How can we best aid this

transformation?
Since the "I" or self is culturally formed, and since
the "I" plays such an integral part in expressivist theory
and pedagogy, expressivists would do well by their students
to consider whether Romantic theories of the self can
successfully cross cultural boundaries.

Fan Shen suggests

that they can, but that in order to help at least Chinese
writers, it is "helpful if he or she [the teacher] pointed
out the different cultural/ideological connotations of the
word "I," the connotations that exist in a group-centered
culture and an individual-centered culture" (466).

Are we

willing to do as Fen Shen asks, and if not, are we willing
to consider that the result might be expressivist rhetorical
pedagogies that are less than helpful, perhaps even harmful,
as our critics like Candace Mitchell suggest?
Terry Dean's essay, "Multicultural Classrooms,
Monocultural Teachers" suggests that expressivist classrooms
are beneficial for ethnic minorities in some regards.

Dean

points out that ESL students, no matter how educated, often
stumble into difficulties with errors and pronunciation
which become what she calls "writing blocks":
It is not unusual for ESL errors to persist
in the writing or the pronunciation of
highly educated people (doctors, lawyers,
engineers, professors) because, consciously
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or unconsciously, those speech patterns are
part of the person's identity and culture
. . . Language-oriented topics are one way
to allow students to explore this kind of
writing block. Assignments that require
students to analyze their attitude towards
writing, their writing processes, and the
role that writing plays in their lives can
make these conflicts explicit. (30)
Expressivism's orientation toward "process" predisposes it
to be useful in solving the problem Dean has identified
here.

Moreover, some expressivists, as in the case with a

great many teachers at the University of New Hampshire where
the expressivist hand of Donald Murray is no longer directly
active but still felt, it is common practice for students to
write reflective papers about their writing processes, ways
in which these processes may have changed, and ways in which
learning about these processes have changed or not changed
them as writers and people.
Dean notes that response groups, a mainstay of many
expressivist pedagogies, can also assist the teacher of a
multicultural classroom:

"peer response groups encourage

active learning and help students link home and university
cultures" (31).

Working in peer groups can help students to

function in more than one discourse community at a time.
Dean argues that group work is valuable for providing " a
supportive environment for exploring culturally sensitive
issues that students might hesitate to bring up in class
discussion or with the teacher" (32).

Joan Wauters suggests
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that a non-confrontational approach is especially valuable
in the multicultural classroom.

She points out that in some

cultures a "direct verbal criticism implies 'loss of face'"
("Non-Confrontational Critiquing Pairs: An Alternative to
Verbal Peer Response Groups" 159).

Although Wauters's

argument in this ossay is for pairs of students to work on
editing in a non-abrasive way rather than in peer response
groups which can sometimes lose their supportive tone in the
fervor of criticism, it appears that Elbow's nonconfrontational sharing groups might also achieve worthwhile
results since the hard and fast rule of no confrontation or
harsh criticism are followed by group participants.

Yet, we

must not just assume that this nurturing environment is
helpful in all regards.

A recent article in the Boston

Sunday Globe (June 10, 1990), for instance, points to the
negative aspects: "the nurturing and cultural reinforcement
in bilingual classrooms often unravel when the students move
on to regular programs . . . ."

The possibility exists,

then, that the nurturing aspects of expressivist pedagogies
set students up for a way of learning that does not exist
elsewhere in the university.
There are many questions that arise when we consider
expressivist rhetorics and the cross-cultural classroom.
But as Peter Elbow says, in the search for knowledge we must
"fight the itch for closure" (Writing Without Teachers 177),
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and thus, I have offered few, if any, answers here.

My

discussion merely brushes the snow from the top of the
cross-cultural crevasse.

We need further investigation into

the ways in which our theories and pedagogies are helpful or
short-sighted in multi-cultural classrooms.

We need to

listen to the experiences of non-native writers like Fan
Shen, and we need to turn to our colleagues in second
language acquisition, cross-cultural literacy,
sociolinguistics, and anthropology for information and
guidance.

Expressivism needs to reconsider itself in light

of cultural issues.

Expressivists can learn more about

social theories, adapting to them and perhaps embracing many
of them since it is clear that even "organic" form is not
"natural" in the sense that form is in important ways
culturally determined.

Finally, we must not dogmatically

hold onto assumptions and theories assuming

that if they

work for American students they will work for all students.
We can begin to reconsider expressivist pedagogy as it
relates to students from various cultures.

There is much in

Romantic rhetorics of value and we should not dismiss
expressivism; yet we must be willing to reflect on and, if
need be, let go of those assumptions which are not useful.
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Endnotes

1 Throughout this section, "form" is a term that
shifts meaning. At times I use it to mean types of
discourse defined by a topic (as in the discourse of
science or the discourse of literary studies), at other
times the way the subject is constituted, and at times
sentence or speech patterns or methods of exposition.
There is a problem, I believe, in coming up with any
clear definition of what I mean by "form" because the
word has multiple and conflicting uses in the rhetoric
of our discipline.
2 I am not willing to grant that the topic
sentence is necessarily "natural" for the Western
tradition either.

CONCLUSION

A common complaint among educators in general, and
teachers of writing in particular, is that many of our
students are passive and indifferent. They seem not to care
about the problems of the modern age.

They seem to ignore

the urgent environmental dilemmas which have become an
undeniable part of their inheritance; they often appear
untroubled by moral issues such as abortion, the arms race,
capital punishment, sexism, and racism, believing that if
they are not immediately and directly affected by these
concerns, then these pressing issues are not of consequence.
In response to this legacy we have witnessed calls for
"new" approaches to teacher education, critical pedagogies,
and literacy. Paulo Freire, for instance, argues for a
"pedagogy of the oppressed" in which literacy becomes the
means for peoples of oppressed societies to take action
against dictatorial leadership.

Maxine Greene argues for a

dialectic leading to an "education of freedom" achieved
through imagination and resistance to forces that limit,
determine, and oppress.

Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren

strive for a "democratic" schooling that values student
experience and student voice.

James Berlin, speaking for

many in the field of composition who have turned toward
social theories for composition, calls for a "social-
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epistemic" rhetoric that educates students who become
conscious of economic, material, social, and political
concerns and strive for a more ideal democracy.

What these

various perspectives have in common is that each is informed
by a perceived need to find a pedagogy that reduces the
passivity and indifference of students and offers them an
active role in their own intellectual growth.
What I have argued here is that, inasmuch as these
scholars call for an approach that places individual
students as participants in their own education rather than
as mere "observers" or "beneficiaries," these scholars may
turn to, and rely on, many of the tenets of the educational
philosophies of the British Romantics.

Romantic educational

philosophies also offer expressivists a teaching approach
that denounces oppression and that educates students who are
democratically conscious.

Wordsworth and Coleridge

articulated a theory of education and the intellect which is
built on active and participatory education. These ideas
have been passed down to us not only through their own
writings, but through those of other educators such as Mill,
Arnold, and Dewey.

Current expressivists share a similar

philosophical grounding, not only with the Romantics, but
with Mill, Arnold, and Dewey, and the best of Romantic ideas
are now evident in the teaching philosophies of current
expressivist rhetoricians like Peter Elbow, Donald Murray,
and Ann Berthoff.
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When we examine the Romantic tradition from which
expressivist rhetorics arise and the assumptions under which
expressivists themselves operate, it becomes clear that
there is much to value.

Romantic rhetorics lend much to

feminist theories and pedagogies.

And if we consider that a

Romantic rhetoric, like the original Romantic movement in
England, is not anti-intellectual, it defies the charge that
this pedagogy loses intellectual rigor by focusing on
creativity.

A

Romantic pedagogy need not exclude

challenging reading and writing, both in depth and breadth.
Rigorous study and a wealth of knowledge gathered from
various doctrines and disciplines are a valued part of what
Wordsworth has called the "philosophical mind."

So too is

imaginative activity, which by combining both analytical and
imaginative study for our students can result in a
synthesizing intellect.
Moreover, since a fuller understanding of Romanticism
shows that it does not require our students to be geniuses
or "inspired" (in the generally misunderstood sense of the
"inspired writer") in order to communicate and write well
enough to make changes in their world, as teachers we need
not fear that composition cannot be taught, or that our
students cannot learn to be good writers.

As teachers of

writing we can cultivate both analytical and imaginative
ability in our students; we can model what Coleridge has
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called reflection and a "mind self-consciously aware of its
own imaginative potential."
The charge that Romantic rhetorics have a tendency to
create isolated and self-centered students who do not write
to communicate with an audience beyond themselves might be
true far too much of the timfe.

This short-sighted

application of Romantic theory, however, is not inherited
from the British Romantic poets.

To believe so is a false

conception of the poets and their work. To the contrary, the
poets have given us a model of open-mindedness and empathy,
and if expressivists understand our Romantic heritage we can
choose to include this valuable model in our teaching
philosophies.

We can, for instance, choose a teaching model

that urges students to practice empathy.

We can create the

opportunities for our students to talk with people who are
different and have had differing experiences.

We can create

the opportunity for contact with ethnic minority students
and others who differ in some way from the majority classes.
We can introduce reading and writing assignments that bring
students in touch with other ways of living, thereby setting
various ways of seeing against each other, enabling then to
"recognize the political and moral implications of competing
models of understanding" (Paul Armstrong 31).

Through

seeking new experiences, and understanding and awareness of
others, our students are able to take part in the existence
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of the lives of other people.

Through their receptiveness,

empathy, and ultimately self-discovery, they gain knowledge
and the ability to imagine and reason about ways in which to
work with those who are different.
As educators working from a pedagogy founded on
Romanticism, we can make a concerted effort to make sure our
students do move beyond isolated selves to the social world.
As expressivist rhetoricians we can embrace social theories
while retaining what is most valuable about expressivist
doctrine.

We can nurture the process of discovering meaning

in experience and communicating it.

We can make sure that

our students know that personal experience is information
that can be shared as public information, and that
communicating it can influence "the course of events within
town or nation, school or university, company or
corporation" (Murray Write to Learn 4).

The awareness, the

empathy, the greater understanding of self and other, that
students can gain through a rhetoric based on the philosophy
of the British Romantic poets, need not be kept within the
individual, and it need not undercut an awareness for social
and political realities. Nor need it deny that the self is
socially as well as individually defined.

As even Kinneavy

who has argued so energetically against Romantic theories
must finally admit;
expressive discourse is, in a very
important sense psychologically prior to
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all the other uses of language. It is the
expressive component which gives
all discourse a personal significance to
the speaker or listener.
Indeed, the
expressive component of discourse is what
involves a man [or woman] with the world
and his [her] fellows to give him his [her]
unique brand of humanity . . .
A democracy
which ignores expression has forgotten its
own roots. (396).
A personal definition of self aids, and is indeed necessary,
in the development of humans' awareness of their socially
defined interactions with others.
What I am finally arguing is that a rhetoric and a
pedagogy based on Romanticism can be one of vision and
possibility, one that urges students to see and understand
themselves and others.

A pedagogy that works from a basis

of empathy and diversity is vital if we are to teach
students how to interact and communicate in the challenging,
changing, and complex world they will live and work in.
For too long we have focused our concern primarily on
preparing students to be productive members of the labor
force.

In a time when we are destroying our environment,

facing starvation and drought, world-wide epidemics, and the
possibility of nuclear destruction, we must prepare them for
more than competency in reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Not only must they have the technical knowledge to discover
a cure for aids, but they must have the vision to understand
the importance and significance of their work outside the
laboratory walls. They must be encouraged to imagine a

263

better world, and not dismiss the idea as "unrealistic" or
"utopian."

They must learn to empathize and communicate.

As teachers we must aid them in doing this by insuring them
at least the potential for reaching the full use of their
intellectual powers. By means of a Romantic teaching
philosophy and rhetoric that celebrate self-discovery,
personal experience and the experience of others, empathy
and awareness, and the imagination as well as reason, a
better world may have a better chance at becoming a reality.
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